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Summary 
 
This thesis investigates Beckett’s interests in the seventeenth-century philosopher 
Arnold Geulincx, tracing these interests first back to primary sources in Beckett’s own 
notes and correspondence, and then forward through his oeuvre. This first full-length 
study of the occasionalist philosopher in Beckett’s works reveals Geulincx as closely 
bound, in changeable and subtle ways, to Beckett’s altering compositional 
methodologies and aesthetic foci. It argues that multifaceted attentiveness to the 
different ways in which Geulincx is alluded to or explicitly cited in different works is 
required if the extent of Geulincx’ importance across Beckett’s oeuvre is to be 
properly understood. 
 
Chapter 1 presents a lineage of correspondence dating from 1936 to 1967 in which 
Beckett cites or alludes to Geulincx. It introduces Geulincx’ occasionalism and 
Beckett’s transcriptions from his works. Chapter 2 builds upon this empirical 
groundwork by arguing for a proposed chronology of Murphy’s composition. This 
focuses Geulincx’ importance to Murphy as a frame of reference located 
predominantly in the novel’s latter stages. Chapter 3 investigates Geulincx’ explicit 
presence in manuscript drafts of Watt. It argues that this particular presence is refined 
out of the novel’s final stages at the same time as it is thematised. Chapter 4 focuses in 
on a specific paragraph that cites Geulincx in La Fin/The End and Suite. The different 
versions of this paragraph stage a number of textual manoeuvres in revisions and 
translation that are revealing about Beckett’s attitude towards Geulincx as a source. 
Chapter 5 traces the consequences of this aesthetic attitude through imagery derived 
from Geulincx in Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable, this latter as a novel that 
seeks to enact certain of Geulincx’ ethical principles as narrative voice. The final 
chapter argues that there are highly refined and abstracted reappearances of Geulincx 
to be located in How It Is and in the television plays as a reinvigorated fascination 
with puppetry that also owes a debt to Beckett’s reading Heinrich von Kleist.  
 
While Geulincx has long been thought of as a fleeting presence in Beckett’s oeuvre, 
this full-length study finds that the philosopher’s altering and recurring presences 
bear closer scrutiny. Geulincx’ presences are more deeply embedded in Beckett’s 
work than previously noted by critics, and in this they frequently reflect Beckett’s 
broader changing aesthetic concerns as Beckett developed what he called his ‘series’ 
of works. 
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Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis 
[Wherein you have no power, therein you should not will] 
Arnold Geulincx (Ethica) 
 
 
 
 
He had manipulated that sentence for years now, emending its terms, as 
joy for grief, to answer his occasions, even calling upon it to bear the 
strain of certain applications for which he feared it had not been 
intended, and still it held good through it all. He walked with it now in 
his mind, as though it had been there all the time he slept, holding that 
fragile place against dreams. 
    Samuel Beckett (‘Yellow’) 
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Deidre Bair, Beckett produced these notes ‘Because he had not taken a philosophy 
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189th and 190th folios, in a section titled ‘Philosophy of Renaissance’5, sub-headed 
‘Natural Science Period’6, Beckett transcribed from Windelband three sides of notes 
about Geulincx and his place in the history of philosophy.7 
 
In the ‘Whoroscope’ notebook of the 1930s Beckett noted the following: ‘21.  
Murphy: I am not of the big world, I am of the little world: ubi nihil valo, ibi nihil  
velo (I quote from memory) & inversely.’8 
 
1936 
 
9 January Letter from Beckett to Thomas MacGreevy. Beckett describes 
his unforeseen return to TCD library to research Geulincx. The 
National Library does not have an edition.9  
 
                                                
1 Burnet 1914. 
2 Alexander 1922. 
3 Windelband 1901. 
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9 See Beckett to MacGreevy, 9 January 1936. Cited by Engelberts, Frost and Maxwell (eds.) 2006, p. 
144. 
 xii 
9 January Letter from Beckett to George Reavey. In contrast to Brian 
Coffey’s proposal of ‘serious’ philosophical monographs Beckett 
writes that ‘my Geulincx could only be a literary fantasia’10. 
 
16 January  Letter from Beckett to MacGreevy. Beckett tells MacGreevy he 
‘suddenly’ sees Murphy, the novel he was working on at the 
time, as a ‘break down’11 between Geulincx’12 ethical maxim ubi 
nihil vales, ibi nihil velis [wherein you have no power, therein 
you should not will] and Malraux’s ‘Il est difficile à celui qui vit 
hors du monde de ne pas rechercher les siens’13 [‘it is difficult 
for one who lives isolated from the everyday world not to seek 
others like himself’14]. This latter would become the epigraph 
for Chapter 9 in Murphy. 
 
29 January Letter from Beckett to MacGreevy. Beckett tells MacGreevy 
that Coffey had ‘promised me Geulincx & Eluard 
informations’15, which Coffey had not supplied. 
 
6 February  Letter from Beckett to MacGreevy. Beckett reveals of Murphy’s 
progress that  ‘There only remain three chapters of mechanical 
writing’16. In Chapter 9 of Murphy Beckett will quote Geulincx’ 
maxim, describing it as ‘the beautiful Belgo-Latin of Arnold 
Geulincx’17. He will also make further allusions to Geulincx in 
the later chapters of the novel. 
 
5 March  Letter from Beckett to MacGreevy in which Beckett expresses 
his enthusiasm for the Geulincx research. He compares 
                                                
10 Beckett to Reavey, 9 January 1936. CL, 2009, p. 295. 
11 Beckett to MacGreevy, 16 January 1936. CL, 2009, p. 299. 
12 I derive the unusual convention of referring to Geulincx’ name without an ‘s’ after the possessive 
apostrophe from Ethics, where the editors refer to Geulincx in this way throughout. 
13 Murphy, p. 90. 
14 Malraux 2009, p. 243. See Malraux 1968, p. 232 for the French original.  
15 Beckett to MacGreevy, 29 January 1936. CL, p. 305. 
16 Beckett to MacGreevy, 6 February 1936. CL, p. 312 
17 Murphy, p. 101. 
 xiii 
Geulincx’ philosophy variously to Berkeley, Balzac, Rimbaud, 
Greek mythology and the New Testament via contrasting 
interpretations of ‘sight’ and ‘vision’. Beckett describes 
Geulincx’ ‘vision’ as ‘the only excuse for remaining alive.’18 
 
25 March Letter from Beckett to MacGreevy in which Beckett says he is 
bored in Dublin, his reading Geulincx at TCD one of only two 
things getting him out of the house.19 
 
25 March Letter from Beckett to Arland Ussher. Beckett recommends 
Geulincx to Ussher ‘most heartily’20, and describes his favoured 
part of Ethica as the long section (Treatise I, Chapter II, section 
II, § 1-3) on humility. 
 
9 April Letter from Beckett to MacGreevy. Beckett has stopped reading 
Geulincx. He jokes about his own inability and incapacity, 
specifically his being unable to read any more of Geulincx’ 
ethical lessons about abstinence ‘even in Lent’21. 
 
9 June   Beckett finishes a first draft of Murphy.22 
 
1938 
 
Beckett writes ‘Les Deux Besoins’, which uses Geulincx’ term ‘autology’. 
 
1941-45 
 
                                                
18 Beckett to MacGreevy, 5 March 1936. CL, pp. 318-319. 
19 See Beckett to MacGreevy, 25 March 1936. CL, 2009, pp. 323-324. 
20 Beckett to Ussher, 25 March 1936. CL, 2009, p. 329. 
21 Beckett to MacGreevy, 9 April 1936. Cited by Engelberts, Frost and Maxwell (eds.) 2006, p. 145. 
22 See Pilling 2006a, p. 58. 
 xiv 
Beckett works on Watt, during which time specific allusions and broader themes 
traceable to Geulincx are written first into, before being predominantly written out 
of, drafts of the novel in notebooks and typescript. 
 
1946 
 
13 March The date in Beckett’s ‘Suite’ notebook under which Beckett 
composes a passage, first in English then in French, in which 
the narrator recalls being given Geulincx’ Ethics by a now dead 
tutor. The English passage is Beckett’s final prose written first 
in English for many years. Suite was later altered and published 
as La Fin/The End. 
 
5 July  Beckett begins Mercier et Camier, which will be completed on 
15 October. Towards the end of the novel a much-changed 
version of Watt appears, ‘given a new lease of life’23. The newly 
prophetic Watt announces his author’s future aesthetic horizons 
with a drunken outburst in which he proclaims the possibility of 
‘one’ to be born from the ashes of previous protagonists, who in 
the terms of Geulincx’ ethical maxim ‘having nothing will wish 
for nothing, except to be left the nothing he hath.’24 
 
1947 
 
2 May Beckett begins Molloy, which will be completed by 1 November. 
In the novel Molloy says he ‘loved the image’25 from Geulincx’ 
Ethica of a man aboard a ship attempting to travel in the 
opposite direction to that in which the ship is going. 
 
                                                
23 Pilling 2006a, p. 99. 
24 Beckett 1974, p.114. 
25 TN, p. 51. 
 xv 
27 November  Beckett begins Malone meurt, which will be completed by 30 
May 1948, towards the end of which he alludes to, in a partial 
quotation, Geulincx’ maxim. It is a fragment that becomes 
transformed again in the novel’s later translation into Malone 
Dies. 
 
1948 
 
29 March Begins L’Innomable, a first draft of which will be completed by 
21 January 1950, then revised later that year. In the novel 
Beckett returns to the imagery of Geulincx’ ship a number of 
times. Chapter 5 discusses how this novel’s narrating voice 
presents a thinking in ignorance which manifests an 
epistemology congruent with Geulincx’ ethical epistemology of 
impotence. 
 
1949 
 
9 March  Letter from Beckett to Georges Duthuit. Beckett uses the word 
‘autology’, transcribed from Geulincx’ Metaphysica Vera, to 
describe the artistic process.26 
 
Undated Letter from Beckett to Duthuit. In this undated letter (but 
which is earlier than 26 May 194927) Beckett tells Duthuit that 
Geulincx’ maxim says everything (‘Tout est dit’). The maxim’s 
correctness is taken for granted, according to Beckett, and 
assessing its importance solely a matter of agreeing on the 
domain (‘s’entendre sur ce domaine’28) implied by Geulincx’ 
conception of worthlessness and incapacity. 
                                                
26 Beckett to Duthuit, 9 March 1949. Cited by Gontarski and Uhlmann (eds.) 2006, p. 19. Beckett also 
used the term ‘autology’ in ‘Les Deux Besoins’ (1938). 
27 Pilling in private correspondence, April 2008. 
28 Beckett to Duthuit. Undated. Duthuit Archives, Paris. 
 xvi 
1954 
 
17 February  Letter from Beckett to Erich Franzen, the German translator of 
Molloy, in which Beckett discusses how the image of the 
traveller on a ship as ‘a passage in the Ethics of Geulincx’29 also 
incorporates allusions to Dante. 
 
1956 
 
7 November  Letter from Beckett to Mary Hutchinson in which Beckett, who 
himself ‘cannot bear’ the prospect of looking back at his 
previous work, proposes Geulincx and Democritus as in some 
‘queer’ way his work’s ‘foci’30. 
 
28 November Letter from Beckett to Hutchinson. In a reply to questions 
raised by Hutchinson about Geulincx Beckett describes his 
search twenty years earlier for an edition of the philosopher’s 
works. Beckett writes that he found in Geulincx, in a phrase 
that complicates the description in Murphy of Geulincx’ 
‘beautiful’ language, some ‘Frightful kitchen Latin but 
fascinating guignol world’31. 
 
1958 
 
17 December  Beckett began composing Comment C’est, which was not 
completed until late 1960, before Beckett then translated it into 
How It Is over the following three years. The novel makes no 
mention of Geulincx but does name the more famous 
                                                
29 Beckett to Franzen, 17 February 1954. Cited by Uhlmann 1999, p. 54. 
30 Beckett to Hutchinson, 7 November 1956. Mary Hutchinson Papers, Series II, Subseries B, box 2, 
folder 4, HRHRC. 
31 Beckett to Hutchinson, 28 November 1956. Mary Hutchinson Papers, Series II, Subseries B, box 2, 
folder 4, HRHRC. 
 xvii 
occasionalist Nicolas Malebranche, and retains surprising 
residues of earlier Geulingian imagery and phrases. 
 
1962 
   
Undated  Lawrence Harvey (publishing in 1970) dates an interview in 
which Beckett talked about Geulincx as taking place in this 
year. According to Harvey, Beckett repeated the substance of 
letters sent to Hutchinson eight years earlier and to Sighle 
Kennedy five years later to the effect that were he a critic ‘he 
would start out with’32 Geulincx and Democritus. 
 
1967 
 
14 June Letter from Beckett to Sighle Kennedy in reply to Kennedy’s 
promptings about Proust, Joyce, and more esoteric notions of 
Greenwich Mean Time as pertaining to Murphy. Beckett quotes 
Geulincx’ maxim along with Democritus’ as possible ‘points of 
departure’ for those in the ‘unenviable position’ of studying his 
work.33 
 
1969 
 
Beckett appears to have first encountered Heinrich von Kleist’s influential essay on 
the marionette theatre in late 1969. Chapter 6 argues that this reinvigorates Beckett’s 
earlier ideas of Geulincx, expressed in 1956, as a ‘fascinating guignol world’ of 
puppetry, contributing toward certain of the late plays for television including Ghost 
Trio (1975) and Nacht und Träume (1982), as well as Still. 
 
 
                                                
32 Harvey 1970, p. 267. 
33 Beckett to Kennedy, 14 June 1967. Cited by Kennedy 1971, p. 300 (reprinted in Disjecta, p. 113). 
 xviii 
1972 
 
17-26 June  Beckett begins Still (completed the following month), described 
by Ackerley and Gontarski as ‘a return to the concerns of 
Geulincx and the Occasionalists’34. 
 
Undated 
 
Marginalia added by Beckett to his copy of Berkeley’s A New Theory of Vision, and 
Other Writings. This marginalia reads ‘Against Geulincx?’. The edition is in the 
library of Beckett’s Paris flat, where it has been since Beckett’s death.  
                                                
34 Ackerley and Gontarski (eds.) 2006, p. 543. 
 1 
Chapter 1 – Beckett and Geulincx 
  
1.1  Introduction 
 
With a few chapters left to write of Murphy in January 1936 Beckett ventured within 
what he called ‘the abhorred gates’1 of TCD library for the first time since resigning 
from a teaching post at the university four years earlier. Beckett returned repeatedly to 
the library over the following three months to transcribe extensive notes from three 
works by the little known post-Cartesian philosopher of ‘occasionalism’ Arnold 
Geulincx (1624-1669). It was not a small undertaking, and it was also not the first 
time Beckett had encountered Geulincx. Earlier in the 1930s Beckett had taken notes 
on the obscure thinker as part of the 267 pages of ‘Philosophy Notes’, where Beckett 
wrote briefly on occasionalism in a lineage derived from one of his compendium 
source books for philosophical history, Wilhelm Windelband’s A History of 
Philosophy.2  
It is thanks to these two research projects and to Beckett’s later naming 
Geulincx in personal correspondence and in Murphy and Molloy, that this 
philosopher has long been recognised by scholars as a name of some importance to 
Beckett. Indeed, from the very first edited collection of essays on Beckett (19593) and 
the first single-authored monograph (19614), to the publication in 2006 of the first 
ever English translation of Geulincx’ Ethica as Ethics (in an edition that includes full 
                                                
1 Beckett to Thomas MacGreevy, 9 January 1936. Cited by Engelberts, Frost and Maxwell (eds.) 2006, 
p. 144. 
2 See Windelband 1901. 
3 See Mintz 1959. Samuel Mintz’s article laid much of the groundwork for future study of Beckett’s 
relationship with Geulincx in an argument regarding Murphy’s adopted farce of astrology. Murphy is, 
according to Mintz, ‘committed to a method of determination outside the scope of theism’ (Mintz 
1959, p. 160). Murphy is thereby, as David Hesla called him in 1971 in a description C.J. Ackerley 
cited in 2004, ‘an Occasionalist without at the same time being a deist’ (Ackerley 2004, p. 122). Mintz 
advocates a reading of Geulincx as stoically introspective, writing ‘Geulincx exhorted his readers to 
renounce the world and to cultivate the inner life, the only place where the self is effectual’ (Mintz 
1959, p. 159). This is not an entirely accurate representation of Geulincx, as will be shown below, yet 
such a reading of Geulincx in relation to Beckett has proved influential. 
4 See Kenner 1961, pp. 83-96. Hugh Kenner wrote of Geulincx that what ‘qualifies him for repeated 
mention in the Beckett canon, is not simply the ceremonious resignation of his prose, but the curious 
doctrine it serves. It is the doctrine of a “bodytight” mental world’ (Kenner 1961, p. 83). Kenner points 
to the ‘strange detachment’ (Kenner 1961, p. 84) Beckett’s protagonists live with between their bodies 
and their minds, all of them also well aware that they are somehow simultaneously bound together. 
Kenner goes on to argue that themes of congruence and disconnection more broadly in Beckett’s work 
owe a debt to Geulincx. Kenner’s argument will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
 2 
translations of Beckett’s 1936 transcriptions from that work), studies devoting 
sections to the importance of Geulincx to Beckett are numerous.5 Nevertheless, and 
somewhat surprisingly, no full-length study has attempted to explore the relationship. 
Is there any need for one now? Critics have dutifully followed the indication Beckett 
gave to Sighle Kennedy in 1967, where Beckett wrote that were he in ‘the unenviable 
position of having to study my work my points of departure would be the “Naught is 
more real…” [from Democritus] and the “Ubi nihil vales…” [from Geulincx] both 
already in Murphy and neither very rational’6. Yet there are a number of limitations to 
this prior scholarship. Firstly, the extent to which Beckett cites or alludes to Geulincx 
in correspondence has never been fully recognised. Consequently the implications for 
Beckett’s texts of his long-term thinking about Geulincx have rarely been proposed, 
and even less explored with any precision. Beckett names Geulincx or mentions 
concepts derived from the thinker (e.g. ‘autology’) in some sixteen separate instances 
of correspondence. This correspondence spans a thirty-year period and itself 
powerfully counters a hypothesis that Geulincx for Beckett was merely a throwaway 
reference, one easily exhausted of limited potential then forgotten.  
A further constraint on prior (Anglophone) scholarship has been one of 
translation. Until 2006 no English translation from the original ‘Beautiful Belgo-
Latin’7 as it is recalled in Murphy of Geulincx’ masterpiece Ethica (from which the 
majority of Beckett’s transcriptions derive) had ever existed. Even the Latin was out 
of print for 185 years before resurrection in Jan Pieter Nicolaas Land’s complete 
collected edition of 1891-1893, the three-volume Arnoldi Geulincx Anverpiensis Opera 
Philosophica that Beckett consulted in TCD.8 Land’s edition is itself quite rare, 
Beckett having tried and failed to locate it at the National Library of Ireland prior to 
finding it at TCD. While occasional German and Dutch editions survive in some 
European libraries, these have failed to pique the curiosity of Beckett scholars writing 
in those languages. 
                                                
5 See Mintz 1959; Kenner 1961, pp. 83-96; Hesla 1971, pp. 30-41; Pilling 1979, pp. 114-116; Dobrez 
1986, pp. 12-74; Wood 1993; Ackerley 2004; Weller 2005, pp. 74-93; Uhlmann 2004, 2006a and 2006b, 
pp. 65-113; Casanova 2006, pp. 59-74; Feldman 2006 and 2009a. 
6 Beckett to Kennedy, 14 June 1967. Cited by Kennedy 1971, p. 300. Reprinted in Disjecta, p. 113. 
7 Murphy, p. 101. 
8 Similarly, the second work from which Beckett took transcriptions (Metaphysica Vera) was translated 
into English in 1999 as Metaphysics. 
 3 
Thirdly, Beckett’s transcriptions from Geulincx have also only recently been 
made available at TCD to scholarly consultation. Prior to this any close textual 
comparative work on the subject was severely hampered. Consequently it is only since 
2006 that a full-length study requiring recourse to an authoritative translation could 
be properly founded. Geulincx, then, occupies simultaneously both a curiously new 
and old area of Beckett scholarship, and despite his long established and recurring 
presence in this scholarship the precise nature of his presence is in fact far from fixed. 
Indeed, scholars are not even agreed on how to pronounce Geulincx’ name.9 
Scholarship that addresses itself to Geulincx in the context of specific works 
by Beckett will be discussed in relevant chapters below. Yet it is worth highlighting 
here certain of the broader claims made about Geulincx’ impact on Beckett. Deirdre 
Bair, for example, asserted that ‘Geulincx’s philosophy had the most lasting effect on 
Beckett of anything he had read to date. So impressive was it that he made it the key 
of his novel Murphy, written in 1935’10. More recently C.J. Ackerley and S.E. 
Gontarski claimed that Geulincx’ ‘ethical axiom became for SB the foundation of 
doubt and humility, the bêtise that underpins his life’s work’11. Ackerley has also 
asserted that, somehow singularly luminous among the wide-ranging contexts of 
Beckett’s literary and philosophical backgrounds ‘Beckett’s gospel is Geulincx’s 
Ethica’12. Pascale Casanova similarly argues that ‘Geulincx became one of Beckett’s 
major intellectual references’13. Over-reliant on Bair’s biography Casanova does not 
date Beckett’s research on Geulincx to 1936, so is able to read Geulincx’ direct 
influence on works earlier than Murphy:  
 
Beckett would seek to illustrate Geulincx’s system of mutual externality very 
precisely, by conveying it in literary form with the introduction of the indolent, 
nonchalant character from Dante’s Purgatorio, Belacqua.  
                                                
9 They are, or course, not to be entirely blamed for this. As is detailed below written occurrences of his 
name vary greatly even within single editions. The Dictionary of Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century 
Dutch Philosophers notes spellings of ‘Arnold (or Arnout) Geulincx: Geulinx, Geulings, Geulincs, 
Geulingius, Geulingh’ (van Bunge, Krop, Leeuwenburgh, van Ruler, Schuurman, Wielema (eds.) 2003, 
p. 322). H.J. de Vleeschauwer also offers ‘an older form of the name, Aernout’ (de Vleeschauwer 1957, 
p. 13). Land manages to clarify the pronunciation in a paper outlining his fourteen years of research 
that led to the collected edition of 1891-1893, published just prior to that edition, where he helpfully 
points out ‘the eu is pronounced as oe’ (Land 1891, p. 224). 
10 Bair 1978, p. 92. Bair, however, offers little textual evidence for this grand claim and underestimates 
how long Murphy’s composition took. 
11 Ackerley and Gontarski (eds.) 2006, p. 224. 
12 Ackerley 2004, p. 20. 
13 Casanova 2006, p. 59. 
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Casanova goes on to assert the almost unlimited scope of Geulincx’ impact on 
Beckett: ‘Beckett discovered in Geulincx’s system a formulation of his own 
intellectual, national, literary, social and psychological confinement and a tool for 
understanding it’14. 
In stark contrast to these grand claims, arguments that Geulincx’ place within 
Beckett’s frame of reference and the oeuvre is minor and fleeting are just as prevalent. 
J.D. O’Hara insisted in 1981, for example, that ‘Geulincx appears in his [Beckett’s] 
works in a single repeated sentence’15. P.J. Murphy has argued that if there was a great 
influence of Beckett’s reading upon Murphy it rather derived from ‘Beckett’s very 
close reading of Spinoza, which underlies all the other more superficial philosophical 
references in the novel (Geulincx, Descartes and Democritus included)’16. 
Tracing ‘a literary fantasia’ follows a route through Beckett’s oeuvre that finds a 
mutable, protean Geulincx whose final ‘importance’ lies variously between the 
extremities of the above claims. It argues that Geulincx’ ‘importance’ can most clearly 
and persuasively be identified in discrete moments of text. Yet this is not to imply that 
such moments are concomitantly insignificant. ‘Moments’ in Beckett’s works, those of 
fragmentary recollection, as a slippage of one realm of existence into another, as a 
pause in the seemingly perpetual stream of unlovable experience in the world, even as 
an amalgam of all three, are primary. They are frequently of such primacy that to 
dismiss their import is to fail to take note of an important minor key in Beckett’s work 
that finds a realm of tangible experience opposable, albeit at times with futility, to a 
void of forgetting and, paradoxically, to impermanence. For example, when Krapp 
recalls via his self-made recordings old ‘moments’ these are fragmentary little pieces of 
time as ‘hard’ and distinct from the surrounding flux (and as ironically 
‘unforgettable’) as the ‘small, old, hard, solid rubber ball’ that Krapp holds back a 
moment from a dog: ‘I sat on for a few moments with the ball in my hand and the dog 
pawing and yelping at me. [Pause.] Moments. Her moments, my moments. [Pause.] 
The dog’s moments’. Naïvely Krapp records of the ball ‘I shall feel it, in my hand, 
                                                
14 Casanova 2006, p. 61. 
15 O’Hara 1981, p. 249. 
16 Murphy 1994, p. 229. 
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until my dying day’17. This is not to claim that when Geulincx comes to the fore of a 
text he thereby consistently manifests a moment of pause or opposition to 
impermanence, even though this might sometimes be the case. It is merely to assert 
the less controversial primacy in Beckett’s oeuvre of the fragmentary, the momentary, 
and the half-forgotten. As we will see, it is often in a context of these important foci 
that Beckett brings Geulincx to bear. 
In 1936 Beckett tantalisingly referred to ‘my Geulincx’ as ‘a literary fantasia’18. 
By doing so he indicated the presence of a version of Geulincx unfixed and 
fundamentally open to change. I argue that for Beckett Geulincx was not simply a 
fixed paradigm of interiority, despite the philosopher’s emphasis on an inspection of 
the self. Nor was he a monomaniacal rationalist, whose spring could be wound while 
Beckett and reader laugh ironically at the follies of ‘philosophy’ or ‘language’. 
Primarily, for Beckett, Geulincx’ ethics as derived from his metaphysics have 
implications for Beckett’s altering conceptions of freedom, incapacity and 
impossibility. These are implications that themselves alter in alignment with Beckett’s 
own altering aesthetic focus. Primarily, I argue that multifaceted attentiveness to the 
different ways in which Geulincx is alluded to or explicitly cited in different works is 
required if the extent of Geulincx’ importance across Beckett’s oeuvre is to be 
properly understood.  
To these ends this study proceeds with an empirical impetus, staying close to 
textual evidence in final published or staged form as well as in correspondence, 
manuscript and typescript. In these terms a ‘Geulingian reading’ of a Beckett text is 
one that seeks first to ground itself in specific and verifiable appearances of Geulincx 
before proceeding to questions about what these appearances might do in/to a text. 
Such empirical procedures, however, also attempt to not rush too fast to dismiss 
claims, such as those of Casanova, which might lack a precisely argued empirical 
basis. As Garin Dowd has pointed out in an argument against the imposition of strict 
empiricist boundaries on readings of Beckett’s texts, Beckett’s 1936 transcriptions 
from Geulincx are fundamentally ‘of uncertain status’19. We cannot say, that is, why 
Beckett produced them. There are a number of possibilities, many of which are 
                                                
17 CDW, p. 220. 
18 Beckett to George Reavey, 9 January 1936. CL, p. 295. 
19 Dowd 2008, p. 388. 
 6 
persuasive. Yet despite attempts below to settle this issue as far as it can be settled, it 
remains stubbornly elusive. This elusiveness is important, and Dowd argues that it is 
impossible to trace the entirety of the literary act to a concomitant verifiable location 
in a world of physicality, of philosophical transcriptions, notebooks, correspondence 
and draft material. This issue also points towards the important assertion that if 
‘influence’ is at stake in Beckett’s relationship to Geulincx, this influence is not 
categorical, and nor does it necessarily imply a radical break with the past.  
Somehow then this important elusiveness must be reconciled with an empirical 
approach. In order to better conceptualise the scope of what ‘influence’ in Beckett in 
the context of Geulincx might imply, and how Beckett’s uses of Geulincx might 
operate in a manner not always easily visible, not necessarily wholly inscribed in a 
particular allusion or citation or neatly ascribable to a concomitant textual moment in 
Geulincx, the issues benefit from a concrete example. 
 
1.2  ‘An unscratchable itch’20 
 
In Chapter 9 of Murphy – the chapter that bears Malraux’s epigraph21 on 
Murphy’s narcissism, or fatalistic search for what he will never find (his own kind) – 
another character attempts to seek what is other than himself, namely Murphy. 
Ticklepenny enquires into the inner workings of the protagonist, glimpsed during 
Murphy’s owl-eyed repose of bondage in the chair. Murphy holds his tongue on the 
issue, throwing pedantic questions back at his inquisitor, unwilling to countenance 
‘the absurdity of saddling such a person with the rationalist prurit’22. Beckett’s 
strikingly varied uses of this Latin word prurit, or itch – often, as stated in Company, 
one that cannot be properly scratched – illustrate in microcosm certain difficulties for 
any assertion of direct ‘influence’ by a single author, literary or philosophical, upon 
Beckett’s work and thought.  
                                                
20 Company, p. 36. 
21 ‘Il est difficile à celui qui vit hors du monde de ne pas rechercher les siens’ (Murphy, p. 90). 
22 Murphy, p. 109. 
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The word prurit appeared in Beckett’s ‘Dream’ notebook (c. 1930-32) in an 
entry taken from Pierre Garnier’s 1890s book on masturbation,23 prior to its 
incorporation in Beckett’s first novel where Belacqua will drive his ‘dear little sweet 
little Fünkelein’24 to ‘a paroxysm of pruritus’25. Beckett later used the word as a 
collective noun when he outlined plans for a future novel following Murphy’s failure 
to find a publisher. Proposing his next work should be in chapters of a suitable length 
for publication on sheets of toilet paper he described the project: ‘All edges 
disinfected. 1000 wipes of good clean fun. Also in Braille for anal pruritics’26. A 
version of the word as a joke name for a chronic disease appears a few years later in a 
1937 letter to MacGreevy, where ‘the damn old pruritis is just about as bad as ever’27, 
Beckett referring to an intractable physical symptom of his own located somewhere 
‘between wind and water’28. Later still, in Watt, Mr Nackybal suffers from this same 
symptom, ‘learnedly’ scratching through his kilt ‘a diffuse ano-scrotal prurit […] of 
sixty-four years standing’29.  
Prurit, pruritis, pruritus and pruritics, then, came to be used by Beckett 
between 1932 and 1945 in a number of divergent ways: as fragmented allusion, an 
obscure and (synecdochically) obscene word culled in the cause of what Beckett 
called the autodidactic ‘demon of notesnatching’30 that loomed over the 1930s; as 
derived autobiographically from his own lived experience of ill or irritable health, 
revealed in correspondence; and in Murphy, and differently in Watt, as parts of the 
project of undermining and satirising the rationality that saddles so many of Beckett’s 
fictional creatures.31 
                                                
23 Beckett 1999, p. 62. Entry 443 (from Onanisme seul et à deux sous toutes ses formes et leurs 
conséquences), the word appears alongside ‘prurience’ and ‘prurigo’. 
24 Dream, p. 17. 
25 Dream, p. 108. The word also appears on page 19, where Belacqua ‘forgot his manners’ and cries out 
for ‘some ease of the old pruritus and leave me in peace to my own penny death and my own penny 
rapture’. 
26 Beckett to Mary Manning Howe, 14 November 1936. CL, p. 383. 
27 Beckett to MacGreevy, 16 February 1937. CL, p. 447. 
28 Beckett to Howe, 18 January 1937. CL, p. 422. 
29 Watt, p. 181. 
30 Beckett 1999, p. xiii. 
31 Beckett described the protagonist of Suite et Fin to de Beauvoir in an angry letter regarding that 
piece’s semi-publication in a similar way, as ‘“one of my creatures”’ (Knowlson 1996, p. 360). This first 
letter, however, was not sent. Beckett toned down his anger in the version that he did send, and which 
is quoted by Overbeck & Fehsenfeld. In the second version Beckett writes ‘“Mais il m’est décidément 
impossible de me dérober au devoir que je me sens vis-à-vis d’une creature”’ (Overbeck & Fehsenfeld 
2006, p. 358). 
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Analogies for these varying uses of and derivations from a single word can be 
found in Beckett’s multi-faceted relationship with Geulincx. For example, Beckett 
encouraged Arland Ussher ‘most heartily’ to read Geulincx’ section on humility, 
Beckett’s evident enthusiasm for Geulincx’ ethical project seemingly stemming from 
the possibility of taking it at face-value, as a valuable and personal lesson growing out 
of a detailed theorisation of attitude. Beckett signs off the communiqué hinting 
obliquely that this obscure Latin text might function just as appropriately as any other 
contemporary convention of leave-taking. Mixing Geulincx with another favourite 
Christian mystic Thomas à Kempis he writes ‘Humiliter, Simpliciter, Fideliter 
[humbly, simply, truly]’32 as his valedictory gesture of friendship in a reproduction of 
his own previous use of the phrase in Dream of Fair to Middling Women.33 Also, the time-
consuming and dedicated delving into TCD library in 1936 to do the Geulincx 
research, claiming he did not rationally know why, though impelled by some force of 
conviction that ‘my instinct is right and the work worth doing’34, traces a development 
of earlier ‘notesnatching’ and the more in-depth ‘Philosophy Notes’ as part of a 
lineage of continuing but changing importance to Beckett of such autodidacticism. 
Following this research, as is argued in Chapter 2, Geulincx comes to function in 
parts of Murphy comically, as one of a number of prisms through which we can see 
Murphy’s flawed self-regard more clearly than he can. Hence, in this dramatic sense, 
Beckett’s use of Geulincx can be ironic. 
However, there is an important appearance of the word prurit so far 
unmentioned that focuses these analogies. The word appears in Geulincx’ Ethica and 
Beckett’s notes from it. Beckett writes ‘Et non spectat ad minimam impietatem ille 
humani ingenii pruritus ad conciliandum ea quae captum excedunt nostrum…’35 The 
passage is copied identically from the annotations to Treatise 1, Chapter 1, § 2, 
Reason, annotation 8. It is translated in the 2006 publication of Ethics as ‘This craving 
of human ingenuity to reconcile things that exceed its understanding involves no small 
                                                
32 Beckett to Ussher, 25 March 1936. CL, p. 329. 
33 Where the Alba ‘will do this thing, she will, she will be the belle, gladly, gravely and carefully, 
humiliter, simpliciter, fideliter, and not merely because she might just as well’ (Dream, pp. 208-209). 
34 Beckett to MacGreevy, 5 March 1936. CL, p. 319. 
35 TCD MS 10971/6/9v and TCD MS 10971/6/19. Cf. Opera vol. 3, 167. It is perhaps worth noting that 
despite Ackerley’s accuracy in noting that prurit ‘appears in Geulincx’ Ethica, where Pythagoras’s 
doctrine of metempsychosis is attributed to vulgar opinion’ (Ackerley 2004, 165), Beckett does not 
transcribe it from that section, only noting a single sentence from that annotation which is prior to the 
appearance of ‘pruritus’. 
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measure of impiety…’36 This appearance of the word ‘pruritus’ in Beckett’s notes 
marks, I argue, a shift of emphasis in an instance of Beckett’s use of what John Pilling 
has called, following Beckett’s beloved Dr Johnson, ‘hard words’37. As seen above, 
Beckett had already used the hard word prurit prior to its appearance in his notes 
from Geulincx. Following his rediscovery of it in Ethica, however, his use of it in 
prose subtly alters. In Murphy, and also in Watt (in the context of Mr Nackybal’s 
mathematical intuition via Louit’s interrogation by academic committee), the word 
becomes closely allied with rationality and simultaneously with something ineffable, 
beyond or against this rationality that supervenes upon it. It no longer more baldly 
denotes a general sense of frustration or panic such as overcomes the Smeraldina. 
This rediscovery of prurit in 1936 serves as a good model of certain 
implications in Beckett’s appropriations of Geulincx more generally. That is, while 
Beckett had previously utilised a number of themes that are foregrounded by 
Geulincx, his treatment of these (such as self-inspection, freedom, incapacity and 
impossibility) subtly shifts after this encounter. Yet just as with pruritus this is not a 
matter of a fundamental break with the past, implying the inclusion of something that 
was categorically absent from earlier texts.  
In a sense then we might want to argue that Casanova could well be right to 
trace the Geulingian aspects of Beckett’s oeuvre back earlier than Murphy, to a 
broader context than that which would solely take account of Beckett’s interests in 
Geulincx as starting concurrent with the research in 1936. As Beckett himself warned 
in Dante…Bruno.Vico..Joyce, ‘The danger is in the neatness of identifications’38. 
However, starting from an empirical, chronological basis at least allows the possibility 
of an informed critical choice about the nature of such comparative manoeuvres. 
Tracing the change in Beckett’s fictional uses of pruritus to his Geulincx 
transcriptions reveals a moment of change, a moment that should be acknowledged 
while also recognising its indebtedness to what came before. On a broader scale, 
tracing the more explicit appearances of Geulincx through Beckett’s oeuvre reveals 
                                                
36 Ethics, p. 317. Martin Wilson in the sentence that follows this one also translates the Latin ‘prurigine’ 
(TCD MS 10971/6/9v and Opera vol. 3 167) as ‘craving’. 
37 Pilling uses the term to categorise certain of the ‘helps’ that knowledge of Latin gave Beckett. For 
instance, as ‘interesting individual instances of learned vocabulary, or what Dr. Johnson in his Idler 
paper on them (no. 70) called ‘hard words’’ (Pilling 1995, p. 7). 
38 Disjecta, p. 19. 
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Geulincx situated at a number of crucial ‘moments’ of change in the oeuvre. Geulincx 
neither wholly determines Beckett’s altering conceptions of self-inspection, freedom, 
incapacity and impossibility as they manifest variously through his oeuvre, yet nor is 
he entirely incidental to them. He is bound into them in such ways that a comparative, 
empirically grounded chronological tracing from one work to the next provides the 
clearest way of distinguishing his often ephemeral or faded outlines, of tracing his 
outlined figure more precisely against his surrounding ground. 
 
1.3 The Correspondence 
 
As noted above, Beckett wrote to critics and colleagues on the subject of 
Geulincx at regular (if infrequent) intervals over a thirty-year period. In these letters 
Beckett either gave the name of the philosopher, quoted his axiom from Ethica, 
alluded to principles or cited terminology central to Geulincx’ metaphysics and ethics. 
The correspondence covered by this lengthy period, which began during the writing 
of Murphy and includes the middle period works, the turns to French and to drama, 
and a return to prose with Comment c’est/How It Is, has never previously been fully 
compiled and some of it remains unpublished. It forms, along with the allusions to 
and citations of Geulincx appearing throughout Beckett’s prose and drama, a 
fundamental basis for any investigation into Geulincx’ various impacts upon Beckett’s 
creative work and critical and philosophical thinking. Accordingly, it is discussed here 
in detail. 
Beckett’s most widely cited reference to Geulincx is in fact his final one. In a 
1967 letter to Kennedy Beckett responded to questions about his work as part of a 
lineage including the oeuvres of Joyce and Proust as based in Beckett’s early critical 
statements about form and content in Joyce’s then-titled Work in Progress: 
 
Do the critical statements in your essay “Dante…Bruno.Vico..Joyce” – with their 
open admiration for the “practical… roundheaded… scientific… rational… 
empirical” in thought, and their repeated admiration for writing which “is not 
about something, it is that something itself” – do these statements in your early 
essay serve as a valid yardstick for measurement of your later work?39 
 
                                                
39 Kennedy to Beckett, 7 May 1967. Cited by Kennedy 1971, p. 302. 
 11 
Beckett attempted to steer Kennedy away from Modernist authors, with whom 
Beckett was of course intimately familiar, and onto more minor yet to Beckett more 
viable routes of enquiry: 
 
I simply do not feel the presence in my writings as a whole of the Proust & Joyce 
situations you evoke. If I were in the unenviable position of having to study my 
work my points of departure would be the “Naught is more real…” and the “Ubi 
nihil vales…” both already in Murphy and neither very rational.40 
 
A striking aspect of this letter is its description of the rationalist Geulincx in Murphy 
as not ‘very rational’. This is surely a self-deprecating joke that refers to Beckett’s own 
decision to cite Geulincx, but is it also anything more? Was Beckett perhaps also 
hinting that these axioms or the philosophers themselves are inherently not ‘very 
rational’? As will be argued in Chapter 2, when Murphy is looked at closely it becomes 
clear that these axioms (and, indeed, many other borrowings) are extensively 
refracted. They are bent if not entirely out of shape then enough that they might be a 
little more amenable to Beckett’s own immediate ends as author utilising what he 
called his intertextual ‘bits of pipe’41, in a structure of deliberate misappropriation 
comparable with Murphy’s own faux-adoption of astrology. In this sense perhaps the 
considered deployment within texts of fragmentary quotation such as these axioms 
might be described as not ‘very rational’, in that they become transformed, severed 
from dependence on their original meaning. At the very least the letter intimates that 
the philosophical borrowings Beckett makes are not intended to be straightforward. 
In 1967 Beckett was writing about Murphy with thirty years’ worth of 
hindsight. Earlier letters trace his Geulincx research as it progressed. The first 
mention of Geulincx in Beckett’s correspondence is in a letter to MacGreevy of 9 
January 1936 where Beckett writes of his new research: 
 
I put my foot within the abhorred gates for the first time since the escape, on a 
commission from Ruddy. And I fear I shall have to penetrate more deeply, in 
search of Geulincx, who does not exist in the National [Library], but does in 
TCD.42 
 
                                                
40 Beckett to Kennedy, 14 June 1967. Cited by Kennedy 1971, p. 300. Reprinted in Disjecta, p. 113. 
41 Knowlson 1983, p. 16. 
42 Beckett to MacGreevy, 9 January 1936. Cited by Engelberts, Frost and Maxwell (eds.) 2006, p. 144. 
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‘Ruddy’ (Thomas Rudmose-Brown) was professor of Romance Languages at TCD, 
Beckett’s tutor and friend. He is incorporated into Dream of Fair to Middling Women 
as the Polar Bear, a caricature among others that Beckett came to regret given his 
indebtedness to Rudmose-Brown’s encouragement and interest, the teacher fostering 
Beckett’s wide-ranging literary education while at TCD.43 Beckett’s ‘escape’ refers to 
his fraught decision to resign a teaching post from the college,44 while the ‘And’ most 
likely implies that the ‘commission from Ruddy’ and Beckett’s being ‘in search of 
Geulincx’ are not one and the same mission. His motivation for the latter derived 
from somewhere else, and although it is difficult to determine exactly where Beckett 
perhaps gives a clue in a letter to Reavey written the same day:  
 
He [Brian Coffey] appears to want to make the philosophical series very serious 
& Fach. But my Geulincx could only be a literary fantasia.45 
 
Reportedly Coffey was planning to publish a series of philosophical monographs. 
Martha Fehsenfeld and Lois Overbeck repeat the rumour that Coffey had asked 
Beckett to produce one such monograph on Geulincx as part of this planned series, 
asserting that ‘Coffey encouraged SB to read Geulincx for a possible monograph in a 
Philosophy series’46 and even more directly that ‘he [Coffey] had proposed that SB 
prepare a monograph on Geulincx’47. This would explain why Beckett ventured so 
‘deeply, in search of Geulincx’, but it attempts to do so with no justification. 
Importantly, there appears to be no extant evidence to substantiate the claim. While 
Coffey may indeed have been planning a series of monographs there are few surviving 
letters between Beckett and Coffey that would settle the issue of any intended or 
potential contribution from Beckett.48 Mark Nixon, one among a number of critics 
                                                
43 See Knowlson 1996, pp. 47-51. 
44 A decision made official in a telegram sent from Germany in January 1932. See Knowlson 1996, p 
145. 
45 Beckett to Reavey, 9 January 1936. CL, p. 295. 
46 CL, p. 692. 
47 CL, p. 309. 
48 The bulk of Coffey’s own collected correspondence, held at the University of Delaware, begins in 
1974, and the few surviving earlier letters have no bearing on the issue. These earlier letters, recently 
acquired by the University of Delaware’s ‘Coffey papers’ collection (as a supplement to the main 
collection and yet to be catalogued) do date from the 1930s. Yet these are mostly new-year greeting 
postcards and make no reference to a monograph series or to Geulincx. 
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sceptical of this monograph claim, adduces that such an extrapolation of Coffey’s 
plans ‘is a misinterpretation of the “literary fantasia” quotation’49. 
There are precedents for Coffey’s involvement in Beckett’s philosophical 
reading. It is well known, for example, that Coffey lent Beckett Spinoza’s Ethics in 
1936, a work Beckett had some trouble with.50 Yet had Coffey also directed Beckett to 
Geulincx it is likely this would have received mention in Coffey’s memoir of his 
involvement with the 1930s’ Beckett and the composition of Murphy. However, all 
Coffey records in Memory’s Murphy Maker (1962, reprinted 1991) in this regard is the 
following, which appears in the context of a discussion of the Descartes of 
Whoroscope: 
 
As a consequence of the original distinction (of body and soul), post-Cartesian 
thinking reached curious positions of involvement with theology. One such 
thinker was Geulincx, concerning whom I had a p.c. from Beckett asking 
questions.51 
 
Beckett does mention this ‘p.c.’ to Coffey (presumably a personal communiqué or a 
postcard). In a letter of 29 January 1936 Beckett told MacGreevy that he has not 
heard from Coffey, who ‘promised me Geulincx & Eluard informations’52. We are left, 
then, with Dowd’s description of Beckett’s notes as being ‘of uncertain status’53. 
Even though this issue of intention cannot be definitively resolved via this 
letter, the 9 January letter to Reavey describing ‘my Geulincx’ as ‘a literary fantasia’ is 
fundamental to a consideration of Beckett’s fascination. Beckett’s contrast, set up in 
musical terms between what might be ‘Fach’ and ‘fantasia’, is highly revealing. 
Colloquially meaning compartment or subject, the Fach system delineates an opera-
                                                
49 Nixon in private correspondence, 17 January 2009. 
50 When Beckett confessed to MacGreevy that he ‘had tried it in vain in English’ (Beckett to 
MacGreevy, 19 August 1936, cited by Knowlson 1996, p. 219) after Coffey’s enthusing about Spinoza, 
Coffey lent Beckett some French editions of Spinoza’s works and critical commentary. Beckett 
tantalisingly said of this further reading ‘He lent me Brunchwiff’s Spinoza et ses Contemporains, the 
Ethica in the Classiques Garnier with Latin en regard, of which I have had time only for enough to give 
me a glimpse of Spinoza as a solution and a salvation (impossible in English translation)’ (Beckett to 
MacGreevy, 19 September 1936, CL, pp. 370-371) [the correct spelling is Brunschvicg]. Such a cliff-
hanger, however, came to a rather more prosaic conclusion in a further letter from Beckett to Ussher in 
1938 where Beckett writes ‘I cannot see anyone throwing much light on Spinoza except Spinoza’ 
(Beckett to Ussher, 6 April 1938, cited by Knowlson 1996, p. 746). A number of critics have, however, 
read Spinoza’s impact on Beckett as substantial. See for example O’Hara 1981, Murphy 1994, pp. 222-
239 and Dowd 2007, pp. 77-82. 
51 Coffey 1991, p. 3. 
52 Beckett to MacGreevy, 29 January 1936. CL, p. 305 
53 Dowd 2008, p. 388. 
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singer’s voice-category, classifying according to range and tone. It is a system of strict 
though not always mutually exclusive musical boundaries. The system predominantly 
correlates with the English classifications of Soprano, Contralto, Tenor, Baritone, Bass 
and their subcategories. A particular singer graded according to a certain fach will be 
called upon to perform a given role written for a specific style of voice (which might 
not necessarily correspond to a single fach). The word Beckett chooses to contrast 
with fach, ‘fantasia’, is defined by Grove Music: 
 
A term adopted in the Renaissance for an instrumental composition whose form 
and invention spring ‘solely from the fantasy and skill of the author who created 
it’ (Luis de Milán, 1535-6). From the 16th century to the 19th the fantasia tended 
to retain this subjective licence, and its formal and stylistic characteristics may 
consequently vary widely from free, improvisatory types to strictly contrapuntal 
and more or less standard sectional forms.54 
 
While there is not the requisite space here to properly detail the many historical 
changes to the expansive and mutable fantasia form, the emphasis across its history on 
a personally ‘subjective’, potentially ‘improvisatory’ form is important to bear in mind. 
As well as the capacity of the term to refer to what might be ‘more or less standard’ 
forms, it can also, by virtue of its essential mutability, stand in stark contrast to a 
strictly categorised (fach) system. Beckett’s ‘my Geulincx’, regardless of whether this 
was a critical monograph to be edited by Coffey, or a Geulincx of Beckett’s literary 
imagination, is a Geulincx of which Beckett asserts his own ‘subjective licence’. Such 
a Geulincx might ‘vary widely’ from anyone else’s reading of the philosopher. 
However, this Geulincx could also bear a close resemblance to how Geulincx might 
see himself, in solely and strictly philosophical terms. By denoting his interest a 
‘fantasia’ these become equally valid possibilities, as does the individuality of Beckett’s 
own Geulincx. Beckett shifts the ground away from the possibility of properly asking 
of his philosophical reading whether it might be correct and accurate or not.55 
This musical contrast set up in relation to Geulincx is not dissimilar to 
references Beckett made to Schopenhauer. In a 1932 letter to MacGreevy, for 
example, Beckett described his reading this other favoured philosopher of abstention 
                                                
54 Field, www.oxfordmusiconline.com, last accessed 1 May 2010. 
55 For details of specific musical fantasias Beckett heard performed see CL, p. 142 (‘Flight of the 
Bumble Bee’ by Nikolai Andreyevich Rimsky-Korsakov), and p. 173 (‘Liszt’s ‘Après une lecture du 
Dante, fantasia quasi sonata’).  
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and will-lessness in terms that strove to extricate his reading from a pre-determined 
framework: 
 
I am not reading philosophy, nor caring whether he is right or wrong or a good 
or worthless metaphysician. An intellectual justification of unhappiness – the 
greatest that has ever been attempted – is worth the examination of one who is 
interested in Leopardi and Proust rather than in Carducci and Barrès.56 
 
Similarly, Beckett wrote that while he had been ill in 1937 ‘the only thing I could read 
was Schopenhauer […] it is a pleasure also to find a philosopher that can be read like 
a poet’57. Here, as with Geulincx, Beckett’s responses to philosophy extend beyond 
the bounds of analytic accuracy. Beckett does not hear the philosophical voice of 
Schopenhauer as one to be strictly classified according to how the philosopher might 
be ‘right or wrong or a good or worthless metaphysician’, in a ‘Fach’-styled analysis. 
The voice Beckett hears is one speaking poetically and intellectually about emotional 
and psychological experience, a voice with a range extending beyond pre-assigned, 
strictly philosophical, categories. Beckett’s comments recall his ‘Philosophy Notes’ in 
which he wrote the following of Schopenhauer: 
 
Schopenhauer became – leaving the weaknesses of his system aside – one of the 
greatest philosophical writers because – in contrast to Hegel – he put the world 
back in its rightful place, because he attempted to think perspicuously.  One 
reads him therefore with the admiration with which one once read Plato.  
Whoever demands from philosophy no more than the highest conceivable 
perspicuity, the liveliest metaphorical representation of abstract concepts, must 
call him a tremendous thinker-poet.58 
 
This extract from the ‘Philosophy Notes’ shows again how the intellectual roots 
Beckett puts down in his early ‘notesnatching’ days have the capacity to break to the 
surface of his writing at later stages in unpredictable ways, ways that might at times 
sound entirely without precedent, but are not always necessarily so. 
Following the ‘fantasia’ letter to Reavey, Beckett returned frequently to 
Geulincx’ ethical axiom in correspondence in what might be termed the basse 
fondamentale or the root-note of his semi-improvisatory incorporations of Geulincx. 
Beckett first mentions this axiom in a letter to MacGreevy of 16 January: 
                                                
56 Beckett to MacGreevy, c. 18-25 July 1930. CL, p. 33. 
57 Beckett to MacGreevy, 21 September 1937. CL, p. 550. 
58 TCD MS 10967/478. 
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No news from Coffey since I saw him here. I shall have to go into TCD after 
Geulincx, as he does not exist in National Library. I suddenly see that Murphy is 
[a] break down between his ubi nihil vales ibi nihil velis (positive) and Malraux’s 
Il est difficile à celui qui vit hors du monde de ne pas rechercher les siens 
(negation).59 
 
Similar to how it will also be cited later Beckett contrasts it with a further axiom, here 
a quote from Malraux’s La Condition humaine (‘it is difficult for one who lives 
isolated from the everyday world not to seek others like himself’60). The perspective 
adopted and adapted from Malraux is that of Tchen (Ch’en in English translations), a 
political activist who plans to blow himself up as an act of terrorism, and requires 
solitude in order to plan this. Nixon describes Beckett’s use of Malraux here: 
 
Unsurprisingly, Beckett removes the references to the committed man, thus 
obscuring a complexity that pertains to his own thinking at both this and a later 
time. For Beckett, the artist is as committed as the political activist, although the 
investment of energy is directed inward rather than outward.61  
 
Murphy’s indebtedness to Geulincx’ philosophical ethics, in terms of intertextual 
references and of where Murphy himself might be situated between these two unusual 
bedfellows, is discussed in Chapter 2.  
At the beginning of March Beckett admitted to characteristic aporia regarding 
his research, in his most complex letter about Geulincx: 
 
I have been reading Geulincx in T.C.D., without knowing why exactly. Perhaps 
because the text is so hard to come by. But that is rationalisation and my instinct 
is right & the work worth doing, because of its saturation in the conviction that 
the sub specie aeternitatis [from the perspective of eternity] vision is the only 
excuse for remaining alive.62 
 
Beckett’s enthusiasm for his research is clear, and the letter speaks of its personal 
importance to him. Beckett goes on to situate Geulincx’ central principles of inspectio 
sui and despectio sui, the looking inward at self and the outward looking at the world, 
in relation to a range of classical and modern literary and philosophical references: 
 
                                                
59 Beckett to MacGreevy, 16 January 1936. CL, p. 299. Beckett appears to have forgotten his 
mentioning these difficulties of locating Geulincx at the National Library to MacGreevy a week earlier. 
60 Malraux 2009, p. 243. See Malraux 1968, p. 232 for the French original.  
61 Nixon 2005, p. 62. 
62 Beckett to MacGreevy, 5 March 1936. CL, pp. 318-319. 
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He does not put out his eyes on that account, as the Israelites did and Rimbaud 
began to, or like the terrified Berkeley repudiate them; one feels them very 
patiently turned outward, and without Schwärmerei turned inward, Janus or 
Telephus eyes, like those of Frenhofer in the Chef d’Oeuvre Inconnu, when he 
shall have forgotten Mabuse & ceased to barbouiller.63 
 
In different ways George Berkeley, Arthur Rimbaud, and ‘the Israelites’ all turned 
away from reality or otherwise stopped their eyes from seeing. Berkeley’s importance 
to Beckett is attested by, for example, Film (1964) exploring for purposes of merely 
‘structural and dramatic convenience’64 Berkeley’s axiom Esse est percipi [to be is to be 
perceived]. Berkeley’s idealist contention that no objects of the perceived world exist 
except in the mind of a perceiver is also employed as a ‘dramatic convenience’ in 
other of Beckett’s work,65 but it finds particular and explicit focus in Film. Rimbaud’s, 
as Beckett called it in 1931, ‘eye-suicide – pour des visions’ [for the visions], was an 
exploration of poetic vision by a child who in Les Poètes de sept ans [The Seven-Year-
Old Poets] squeezes his eyes to produce hallucinogenic, hypnagogic visions: 
 
En passant il tirait la langue, les deux poings 
À l'aine, et dans ses yeux fermés voyait des points. 
Une porte s'ouvrait sur le soir: à la lampe 
On le voyait, là-haut, qui râlait sur la rampe 
Sous un golfe de jour pendent du toit.66 
 
He’d run by, sticking out his tongue, fists 
In crotch, eyes shut tight, seeing stars. 
A door opened onto evening; up 
There among the banisters he’d rant 
And rave in a pool of ceiling light.67 
  
This concept of the sightless seer, as finds precedent in Beckett’s early interest in (and 
translations of) Rimbaud, was an important motif for Beckett in later years.68 
                                                
63 Beckett to MacGreevy, 5 March 1936. CL, p. 319. 
64 CDW, p. 323. 
65 See Ackerley and Gontarski (eds.) 2006, p. 50 for a summary of Berkeleyan interpretations of other 
of Beckett’s works. 
66 Rimbaud 2009, p. 96. 
67 Rimbaud 2009, p. 97. 
68 Endgame’s Hamm, for example, is blind, his eyes having ‘gone all white’ (CDW, p. 94). As is A in 
Rough for Theatre 1. Both protagonists relying instead on variously wheeled contraptions and a bullied 
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Beckett’s ‘the Israelites’ refers to 2 Corinthians 3:7-3:8, which describes how 
‘the people of Israel’ could not face the fading glory of Moses: 
 
Now if the ministry of death that was inscribed in letters of stone came with such 
glory that the people of Israel could not gaze on Moses’ face (because the glory 
was fading away from it), will not the Spirit’s ministry have even more glory?69 
 
Moses covers his face with a veil to ‘keep the people of Israel from gazing at the end 
of what was fading away’70, a veil that becomes a metaphor for an adulterated truth 
that could ‘pervert God’s word’71. Geulincx’ eyes, then, according to Beckett’s 
comparisons, are able patiently and with discipline to face the vicissitudes of an 
outward world without turning away or closing, in full awareness at the same time of 
an internal world where there is little real refuge. Like the two-faced Roman God 
Janus, Geulincx could simultaneously and without ‘Schwärmerei’ [fanaticism, or 
raving] look in these two directions. Beckett’s allusion to Telephus is similarly to a 
narrative of doubled self. Beckett points to the myth of Telephus’s stab wound 
received from Achilles, a wound that would not heal unless Telephus scraped pieces 
of the spear that had injured him into his wound. The wound could only be cured, 
like Geulincx’ inspectio sui, by turning to a complementary solution – a return to the 
origin of the wound, or a return to the world, analogous for Beckett with despectio 
sui.72 
Beckett took the name Frenhoffer from the elderly painter of Balzac’s Le Chef 
d’oeuvre inconnu [The Unknown Masterpiece] (1832). In the short story Frenhoffer 
reveals a portrait he has been working on for ten years to two younger painters 
(Poussin and Porbus), in exchange for the opportunity to paint Poussin’s lover. Yet in 
a legacy of Mabuse, Frenhoffer’s teacher who only ever had one student, Frenhoffer 
has laboured too long on the picture he mistakenly thinks is a masterpiece. The less 
experienced painters point out that the portrait has been obscured to such a degree 
by perpetual layering (‘barbouiller’ – to daub, or smear) that barely a foot is 
                                                                                                                                          
collaborator. In a visceral critique of the capacities of a sightless seer, The Unnamable will not be able 
to determine if his eye sockets are either crying or perhaps leaking ‘liquefied brain’ (TN, p. 295). 
69 2 Corinthians 3.7-3.8, International Standard Version. 
70 2 Corinthians 3.13, International Standard Version. 
71 2 Corinthians 4.2, International Standard Version. 
72 Telephus is also mentioned at the beginning of Proust, where Beckett writes ‘In Proust each spear 
may be a spear of Telephus’, his illustration of the ‘Proustian equation’ examined as ‘that double-
headed monster of damnation and salvation – Time’ (Proust, p. 11). 
 19 
recognisable. In Le Chef d’oeuvre inconnu Frenhoffer never finds freedom from his 
teacher’s legacy, never forgetting Mabuse. He realises his spectacular failure and dies 
after burning his canvasses. All of Frenhoffer’s eloquent criticism of art as a visionary 
incarnation of nature, rather than a mere following of its contours, according to which 
‘The mission of art is not to copy nature, but to give expression to it’73, comes to 
nothing. In contrast to Frenhoffer, according to Beckett, Geulincx does manage to 
free himself from burdensome legacy, achieving a freedom in turning from the 
accreted layers of re-doing the same old thing.  
Twenty days after this March letter Beckett briefly mentioned his Geulincx 
research to MacGreevy, along with his lassitude at the family house: 
 
The days pass pearly, mild and tolerable. I seldom go to town, unless to read 
Geulincx in Trinity or do a pressing tot for Frank when hard beset.74 
 
Another letter was addressed to a friend and member of the Dublin literati Arland 
Ussher and again spoke of Beckett’s enthusiasm for Geulincx: 
 
I am obliged to read in Trinity College Library, as Arnoldus Geulincx is not 
available elsewhere. I recommend him to you most heartily, especially his Ethica, 
and above all the second section of the second chapter of the first tractate, where 
he disquires on his fourth cardinal virtue, Humility, contemptus negativus sui 
ipsius [comprising its own contemptible negation].75 
 
Despite this enthusiasm, however, it did not take Beckett long to run out of energy for 
the reading, as he confessed to MacGreevy on 9 April: 
 
Could not finish the Ethic of Geulincx, à l’impossible nul n’est tenu [No one can 
be expected to achieve the impossible], not even in Lent.76 
 
Beckett’s joke with a French proverb relies a little on MacGreevy knowing something 
of Geulincx’ ethics of abstinence. Being unable to fully follow Geulincx ‘even in Lent’ 
makes a joke not only of Beckett as a very ‘dirty low-church P.[rotestant]’77, as he 
                                                
73 Balzac 2007, p. 12. 
74 Beckett to MacGreevy, 25 March 1936. CL, pp. 323-324. 
75 Beckett to Ussher, 25 March 1936. CL, p. 329. 
76 Beckett to MacGreevy, 9 April 1936. Cited by Engelberts, Frost and Maxwell (eds.) 2006, p. 145. 
77 Beckett to MacGreevy, 18 October 1932. Cited by Engelberts, Frost and Maxwell (eds.) 2006, p. 
134. 
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described himself in 1932, but also of Geulincx’ ethical lessons about the impossibility 
of achievement as themselves impossible to achieve, even given favourable 
circumstances. By the time Beckett made this joke about Geulingian impossibility he 
had taken notes from Questiones Quodlibeticae and Metaphysica Vera and 
approximately two thirds of Ethica, stopping where posthumously edited sections of 
Ethica begin. However, Beckett did not stop writing about Geulincx to 
correspondents once he was again free from TCD in 1936. 
Two letters to Georges Duthuit from spring 1949 refer to Geulincx.78 In the 
first, Geulincx’ ethical axiom is again cited in relation to Murphy: 
 
Ussy – Samedi, 
C’est vraiment très simple, […] et pas métaphysique ni mystique pour un liard, 
ce que nous avons pigé, c’est même le sens commun, bon et rond comme la lettre 
de d’Alembert. Dans la vieille phrase de Geulincx citée dans Murphy, un peu à 
l’aveuglette il est vrai, tout est dit. Ubi Nihil Vales, Ibi Nihil Velis. Il s’agit 
seulement de s’entendre sur ce domaine où l’on ne vaut rien. On ne risque guère 
d’en exagérer l’étendue.79 
 
Ussy – Saturday, 
It’s really very simple, [...] and not in the least metaphysical or mystical, what 
we’ve understood, it’s even common sense, good and round like d’Alembert’s 
letter. In Geulincx’s old phrase, cited in Murphy, a little randomly, it’s true, 
everything is said. Ubi Nihil Velis, Ibi Nihil Velis. It’s simply a matter of agreeing 
on this domain where one is worth nothing. It’s scarcely possible to exaggerate its 
extent. 
 
These are some of Beckett’s most emphatic statements on Geulincx, where an all-
encompassing capacity of the axiom is stressed. According to Beckett the axiom is 
unarguable and it is only a matter of what the ‘domaine’ of its applicability might be. 
In a second letter to Duthuit Beckett describes Bram van Velde and an art of non-
relation using the term ‘autology’, which he had transcribed from the title to 
Metaphysica Vera’s Chapter 1.80 Beckett applies the term to creativity, to the artist who 
                                                
78 Duthuit (who was Henri Matisse’s son-in-law) edited the English language French publication 
transition after 1947 (taking over the name from Eugene Jolas), and corresponded in detail with 
Beckett. According to Knowlson, ‘over the period from 1948-1952 [Duthuit] seems to have taken on 
Tom MacGreevy’s role as Beckett’s main confidant’. (Knowlson 1996, p. 371) Their collaborative 
discussions resulted in the Three Dialogues (1949). 
79 Beckett to Duthuit. Undated. Duthuit Archives, Paris. 
80 See TCD MS 10971/6/2r, and below. 
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‘indulges now and then in a small séance of autology with a greedy sucking sound’81. 
The word autology dates from the mid-seventeenth century82 and is used by Geulincx 
in Metaphysica Vera to refer to what in Ethica is described via inspectio sui and 
despectio sui. This latter, the turning away from self to the world is a consequence of 
self-inspection’s discovery of almost total ignorance. Geulincx argues that combining 
one’s awareness of such ignorance and incapacity with a turning out to the world in 
awe at the power of God constitutes humility. Geulincx describes this specific form of 
humility in systematic detail and lauds it as ‘the most exalted of the Cardinal 
Virtues’83. The letter to Ussher shows that this humility, established through 
‘autology’, was a major interest for Beckett. 
In 1954 the German translator of Molloy, Erich Franzen, asked Beckett about 
the passage in Molloy that names Geulincx: 
 
I who had loved the image of old Geulincx, dead young, who left me free, on the 
black boat of Ulysses, to crawl towards the East, along the deck.84 
 
As Anthony Uhlmann has revealed, Beckett sent the following in reply: 
 
This passage is suggested (a) by a passage in the Ethics of Geulincx where he 
compares human freedom to that of a man, on board a boat carrying him 
irresistibly westward, free to move eastward within the limits of the boat itself, as 
far as the stern; and (b) by Ulysses’ relation in Dante (Inf. 26) of his second 
voyage (a medieval tradition) to and beyond the Pillars of Hercules, his 
shipwreck and death… I imagine a member of the crew who does not share the 
adventurous spirit of Ulysses and is at least at liberty to crawl homewards… 
along the brief deck. 85 
 
Such valiant because doomed effort is, Molloy opines, ‘a great measure of freedom, 
for him who has not the pioneering spirit’86. This Geulingian image of the man on a 
ship recurs in L’Innomable/The Unnamable and again, reduced and barely 
recognisable, in later works such as Comment c’est/How It Is. The steady reduction 
                                                
81 Beckett to Duthuit, 9 March 1949. Cited by Gontarski and Uhlmann (eds.) 2006, p. 19. Translated 
from ‘se livre de temps en temps à une petite séance d’autologie, avec un bruit goulu de succion’ 
(Gontarski and Uhlmann (eds.) 2006, p. 16). 
82 OED cites first use of the word in 1633 by Phineas Fletcher: ‘He that would learn Theologie must 
first study autologie. The way to God is by our selves’. 
83 Ethics, p. 326. 
84 TN, p. 51. 
85 Beckett to Franzen, 17 February 1954. Cited by Uhlmann 1999, p. 54. 
86 TN, p. 51. 
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and fragmentation of this image in its reappearances are traced in detail in Chapters 5 
and 6, and they provide a revealing example of how Beckett’s altering ‘foci’ are partly 
constituted by his attitudes towards allusion and influence. 
Two years after this letter to Franzen Beckett wrote to the writer and lifelong 
friend of T.S. Eliot, Mary Hutchinson,87 in a remarkably similar way to how he would 
later write the widely cited letter to Kennedy: 
 
I feel more and more something that is almost if not quite a loathing for almost 
everything I have written and simply cannot bear to go back over it and into it. If 
there is a queer real there somewhere it is the Abderites, mentioned in Murphy, 
complicated by – ibidem – the Geulincx ‘ubi nihil vales etc.’ I suppose these are 
its foci and where a commentary might take its rise. But I really do not know 
myself – and don't want to know – par quel bout le prendre [by whatever end it 
is grabbed], and can't help anyone.88 
 
Beckett and Hutchinson corresponded further on the subject of Geulincx, where 
Beckett referred to the difficulties twenty years earlier of finding Ethica in Ireland, 
and described Geulincx’ world of incapacity and dependence on God as a world 
where man is a puppet (a ‘guignol’, a French forerunner of the English Punch89): 
 
Geulincx hard to come by. I read him in TCD library, the National Library 
didn't boast the Ethics. Frightful kitchen Latin but fascinating guignol world.90 
  
This letter significantly complicates the earlier admiration ambivalently voiced in 
Murphy for Geulincx’ ‘Beautiful Belgo-Latin’. Just as intriguing, however, is Beckett’s 
description of Geulincx’ world as ‘guignol’, as one of puppetry, the implications of 
which are discussed in Chapter 6. 
This lineage of correspondence establishes that the well-known 1967 letter to 
Kennedy is far from an anomaly. It is instead the final letter in a regular and 
                                                
87 Hutchinson, a member of the Bloomsbury group, published a book of short stories in 1927 entitled 
Fugitive Pieces. See Pilling 2006a, p. 235. 
88 Beckett to Hutchinson, 7 November 1956. Mary Hutchinson Papers, Series II, Subseries B, box 2, 
folder 4, HRHRC. 
89 Colloquial French use of ‘guignol’ is as an insult, despite the fact that Guignol himself is witty and 
tends to triumph over adverse circumstances. The puppet was designed as a peasant figure intended to 
represent provincial men from the Daupiné region, likely by the puppet-master Laurent Mourguet 
(1769-1844). The name was later used by the Théâtre du Grand Guignol, founded in 1897, a company 
that specialised in depicting gothic murder, rape and suicide. 
90 Beckett to Hutchinson, 28 November 1956. Mary Hutchinson Papers, Series II, Subseries B, box 2, 
folder 4, HRHRC. 
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remarkably consistent series of correspondence pointing to the importance of 
Geulincx, a series that includes correspondence with MacGreevy, Reavey, Ussher, 
Duthuit, Franzen, Hutchinson, and Kennedy, and probably also includes Lawrence 
Harvey. In 1970 Harvey paraphrased a remark by Beckett that repeats again the 
substance of the Hutchinson and Kennedy letters. However, Harvey gives no citation 
and this leaves open the slight possibility that he might not be referring to one of the 
interviews conducted between himself and Beckett in 1962, but that he has perhaps 
made a mistake and misdated the Kennedy letter by five years: 
 
In 1962 Beckett remarked that if he were a critic setting out to write on the works 
of Beckett (and he thanked heaven he was not), he would start out with two 
quotations, one by Geulincx: ‘Ubi nihil valis [sic] ibi nihil velis,’ and one by 
Democritus: ‘Nothing is more real than nothing.’ The first suggests that to 
Murphy (and perhaps to a lesser extent to Beckett), the body, that part of him 
which exists in the macrocosm, is of negligible value. Indeed, it is primarily a 
source of suffering. And where no value is attached, no desire is possible. 91 
 
One final empirical fragment should be noted that extends the importance of 
this lineage of correspondence. Left in Beckett’s Paris flat at his death in 1989 was a 
copy of Berkeley’s A New Theory of Vision, and Other Writings (Dent, 1926 [1910]). 
In the margin of p.146 of this edition, alongside propositions LXVI-LXVII of 
Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge Beckett annotated in blue pencil ‘Against 
Geulincx?’ Beckett also connected the paragraphs of the two propositions by means 
of an undulating line in the text’s margin. Principles of Human Knowledge is the thesis 
where Berkeley asserts and argues for the axiom Beckett utilises in Film. The 
propositions that struck Beckett in relation to Geulincx bear clear comparison to 
Geulincx’ metaphysical occasionalism. Berkeley writes in proposition LXVI – ‘Proper 
employment of the natural philosopher’, for example:  
 
Hence it is evident, that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-
operating or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, 
and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a 
proper and obvious use assigned them, when they are considered only as marks 
or signs for our information. 
 
                                                
91 Harvey 1970, p. 267. 
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Berkeley goes on to say that the proper employment of a natural philosopher is 
therefore to search after and understand ‘this language’92 of marks and signs, rather 
than attributing to it external causal agency, as Geulincx would, thereby getting us 
into what Berkeley calls ‘great absurdities’. Berkeley writes that ‘The fire which I see is 
not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that 
forewarns me of it’93. Not so far removed from occasionalism but crucially opposed to 
the logical validity of matter in general, Berkeley’s argument posits an idealist 
informational systematisation where Geulincx sees divine causal agency. In 
proposition LXVII Berkeley highlights consequences of how certain (unnamed) 
philosophers leave out of their account of matter important qualities (‘the positive 
ideas of extension, figure, solidity, and motion’94) which has the consequence of 
necessitating an ‘occasion of our ideas, or […] the presence whereof God is pleased to 
excite ideas is us’95. While we might not want to extrapolate too far with Beckett’s 
annotation, it being likely that most of Beckett’s marginalia in his library books would 
have been entered much earlier than 1989, it is nevertheless worth noting that far 
from all of Beckett’s influential early sources of fascination are accounted for in this 
library. If the annotation is from decades earlier, it survived much longer than many 
others of Beckett’s important books.96 
 
1.4 Geulincx in the ‘Philosophy Notes’ 
 
Beckett’s first known encounter with Geulincx and occasionalism was via 
Windelband as part of a narrative of the history of philosophy. Following 
Windelband, Beckett took notes on occasionalism’s inheriting from Descartes issues 
of mind/body dualism. The notes first describe Descartes’s dualism: 
 
                                                
92 Berkeley 1910, p. 146.  
93 Berkeley 1910, p. 145. 
94 Berkeley 1910, p. 146. 
95 Berkeley 1910, p. 147. 
96 Beckett had been reading other works by Berkeley in 1933. Joseph Hone, the Irish critic and 
biographer (1882-1959), had given Beckett a copy of Berkeley’s Commonplace Book, ‘which is full of 
profound things, and at the same time of a foul (& false) intellectual canaillerie, enough to put you off 
reading anything more’ (Beckett to MacGreevy, 23 April 1933. CL, p. 154). I would like to express my 
gratitude to Mark Nixon and Dirk van Hulle for their kind permission to cite this marginalia, deriving 
as it does from their forthcoming publication on Beckett’s Paris library (Cambridge University Press, 
forthcoming 2011). 
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The nature of man consists in the inner union, metaphysically incomprehensible, 
of two heterogeneous substances, mind and body, and this is the only instance of 
interaction between the conscious and spatial. Animals are mere bodies, but in 
humans the form of spiritus animales in pineal gland (conarium) disturbs the 
mental substance and gives rise to unclear and indistinct idea (emotion, passion, 
perturbation animi).97 
 
Beckett goes on to summarise how a consequent ‘theory of influxus physicus led to a 
revision of theory of causality’. This revision of ‘psycho-physical’ interaction argued 
that the 
 
true functions in causal relation are not causae efficientes, but causae 
occasionales. The ultimate “cause” for causal connection between stimuli and 
sensations, purpose and action, is God. This is occasionalism.98 
 
Following Windelband, Beckett names Geulincx as the occasionalist who takes these 
ideas to their extreme: 
 
This furthest developed in Ethics of Geulincx.  Illustration of the 2 Clocks which 
having once been synchronised by same artificer continue to move in perfect 
harmony, ‘absque ulla causalitate qua alterum hoc in altero causat, sed propter 
meram dependentiam, qua utrumque ab eadem arte et simili industria 
constitutum est’. 
 What anthropologism!  
Leibniz illustrated with same analogy his doctrine of ‘preestablished harmony’, 
characterised Cartesian conception by immediate and permanent 
interdependence of 2 clocks, and occasionalist by constantly renewed regulation 
of clocks by clock master.99 
 
The Latin quotation that Windelband quoted from Geulincx is translated in the italics 
of the following passage from Beckett’s notes from Ethics. 
 
It is the same as if two clocks agree with each other and with the daily course of 
the Sun: when one chimes and tells the hours, the other also chimes and likewise 
indicates the hour; and all that without any causality in the sense of one having a 
                                                
97 The pineal gland as ‘conarium’ foreshadows that of Murphy’s own, which had ‘shrunk to nothing’ 
(Murphy, p. 8). 
98 TCD MS 10967/189r. 
99 TCD MS 10967/189r-189v. Ackerley describes Beckett’s annotation of the notes on Geulincx, 
claiming ‘Beckett added in annoyance: “What anthropologism!”’ (Ackerley 2005a, p. 97) This 
assessment of the interpolation, while quite probably accurate, does not, however, tell the whole story. 
Beckett’s addition merely modifies Windelband’s own description of occasionalism’s inheritance of a 
Cartesian dualist ontology, illustrated via the synchronised clocks: ‘This anthropological rationale of 
Occasionalism fits from the beginning into a more general metaphysical course of thought’ 
(Windelband 1901, p. 415. Italics are Windelband’s). 
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causal effect on the other, but rather on account of mere dependence, inasmuch as 
both of them have been constructed with the same art and similar industry.100 
 
This historically important passage (it is the section in Ethics around which debate 
arose in the nineteenth century disputing the provenance of Leibniz’s clock simile101) 
was identically transcribed by Beckett both from Windelband into the ‘Philosophy 
Notes’ and then later from Geulincx in 1936. Its duplication traces an important 
continuity between the cribbing ‘Philosophy Notes’ of the early 1930s and the later 
more in-depth study. The duplication also reveals, of course, Beckett’s familiarity with 
the central element of Geulincx’ metaphysical system, that which Geulincx takes 
‘furthest’ and upon which he built his ethics. This is his resolution of the problems of 
causality by making causation reside entirely with that ‘ultimate “cause”’, the agency 
of God.  
The early notes are only a glimpse of what was to come. They gesture briefly, 
for example, towards relations between Geulincx’ epistemological system (which sets 
criteria for his metaphysics) and his ethics, which as we will see is what so 
fundamentally distinguishes Geulingian philosophy. In the concluding section of 
these notes Beckett wrote 
 
Geulincx reduces self-activity to immanent mental activity in man. The ‘autology’ 
or inspectio sui is not only epistemological starting point, it is also ethical 
conclusion of his system. Man has nothing to do in outer world. Ubi nihil vales, 
ibi nihil velis. Highest virtue humility – despectio sui.102 
 
Just as Geulincx himself did, Beckett appears to have seen this axiom as holding all 
Geulincx’ philosophy in its neatly balanced grasp. In prose works Beckett will go on 
to upset this tidy balance, but before this he became much more familiar with the 
details of Geulincx’ metaphysics and ethics. Once behind the ‘abhorred gates’ Beckett 
worked assiduously on transcriptions from Geulincx. In order to gain a better 
appreciation of the work Beckett was engaged in for four months of 1936, with a view 
                                                
100 Ethics, p. 332. 
101 This major controversy, which lasted around three years and risked miring Leibniz’ prestigious 
reputation in accusations of plagiarism, followed the work of ‘an unknown private scholar, Berthold’ 
(de Vleeschauwer 1957, p. 45), who discovered that Leibniz’ famous simile of the synchronised clocks 
as an illustration of his pre-established harmony has a suspiciously similar precedent in Geulincx’ lesser 
known employment of precisely this same simile. On this see de Lattre 1970, pp. 553-566 and de 
Vleeschauwer 1957, pp. 45-56. 
102 TCD MS 10967/189v. 
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to then being able to determine more accurately how this impacts his literary work, 
the chapter turns to a detailed archaeology of these surviving notes. 
 
1.5  TCD MS 10971/6 
 
Beckett transcribed only five sentences on a single folio from Questiones 
Quodlibeticae [Questions Concerning Disputations]103. The 10 folios (recto and verso) 
of notes from Metaphysica Vera [Metaphysics] are much more thorough, summarising 
sections from the entire work.104 The most extensive notes are from Ethica [Ethics], 
some forty sides of which survive as two typescripts and a manuscript.105 The first fair 
copy comprises 18 typed sides,106 the second fair copy a further 18,107 the manuscript 
4.108 While Ethica takes up a substantial part of Land’s volume 3 of the three-volume 
Opera, Beckett’s focus on it indicates he was not reading the collected works 
exhaustively from start to finish but concentrated instead on discrete works, one from 
each of the three volumes. Beckett’s working process can be adduced with some 
confidence from the Ethica material. For instance, the first fair copy includes a 
number of handwritten corrections. These are incorporated as typescript into the 
second fair copy, which repeats the material of the first fair copy and extends it, the 
handwritten corrections of the first fair copy inserted where appropriate in the body 
of the text. The final four handwritten foolscap pages begin, with a little overlap, 
where the second fair copy finishes.109 This manuscript ends with roughly a quarter of 
a page left blank, near the end of Ethica’s Treatise 1, at 11. Adminiculum Humilitatis, 
suggesting this was the point at which, as Beckett admitted, he ‘could not finish the 
Ethic’. It appears beyond much doubt that Beckett first took handwritten notes, 
presumably while in the library. He then typed these up adding handwritten 
corrections and insertions, before retyping this first fair copy (incorporating 
corrections in the body text and rearranging paragraphs of the second fair copy), 
                                                
103 TCD MS 10971/6/1r. 
104 TCD MS 10971/6/2r-6v. 
105 TCD MS 10971/6/7r-36r. 
106 162 x 200mm. 
107 203 x 329mm. 
108 203 x 329mm. 
109 There is an overlap of two sides of material which survives as typescript at the end of the second fair 
copy and as handwritten notes at the beginning of the manuscript. 
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leaving aside a final few pages still in manuscript as for a second time he could not 
quite get to the end of Ethica.110 
There is, however, an issue that is less clear about the composition of the 
notes, and that has potentially important implications for thinking about how 
Beckett’s interest in Geulincx might manifest itself in his fiction of the 1930s. 
Typically Beckett’s research into Geulincx is thought to coincide exactly with his first 
mentioning it in correspondence to MacGreevy in early January 1936. Yet there are 
anomalies in the notes that scholars have indicated might point to Beckett’s using an 
edition of Geulincx’ works other than Land’s 1891-1893 edition. I provide evidence 
that seeks to settle this, though am forced to conclude that the familiar story is indeed 
the most likely if less exciting one. Despite this conclusion it is not without interest to 
weigh the alternatives on this issue, particularly as they have come to be cited in 
recent studies of Geulincx and Beckett. Most importantly, however, they bear on the 
extent of any impact Geulincx might be said to have on the composition of Murphy.  
Murphy is the work most frequently associated with Geulincx in critical studies 
of Beckett’s relationship to the philosopher. As early as 1960 Ruby Cohn summarised 
the critical orthodoxy that continues to the present day: ‘Murphy is the most 
Geulincxian of the works’111. However, the dating of Beckett’s research becomes 
highly important here. Without Beckett consulting Geulincx prior to his return to 
Dublin at Christmas 1935 Geulincx comes to Beckett’s sphere of influence relatively 
late into Murphy’s composition. That is, crucially, too late to make a significant impact 
on most of the novel that would not be the result of extensive rewriting. The inference 
must follow that given the compositional dating of Murphy currently available 
Geulincx cannot be considered as a source for major developments of the novel 
earlier than around Chapter 9, and is therefore unlikely to be a structural scaffold 
upon which earlier sections, such as Murphy’s mind of Chapter 6 for example, are 
built, unless Beckett extensively redrafted. This impacts the critical orthodoxy greatly. 
                                                
110 See Ethics, pp. 307-308 and Engelberts, Frost and Maxwell (eds.) 2006, pp. 141-147, for further 
discussions of these notes. Geulincx provides a section summary at the beginning of each section. As 
Uhlmann describes Beckett’s paragraph alterations clearly I quote him here: ‘In Geulincx, and in 
Beckett’s first fair copy, the Argument to a given heading (which summarizes what is discussed under 
that heading) is given at the end of the Annotations to that Number. In the second fair copy Beckett 
moves all of these Arguments to the top of each section, under the relevant headings. This, no doubt, 
allowed for easier reference’ (Ethics, p. 308). 
111 Cohn 1960, pp. 93-94. Cohn was reviewing an article in her edited special issue of Transition (1959) 
by Samuel Mintz, which she argued demonstrated this. See Mintz 1959. 
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Unless evidence can be found for Beckett’s consulting Geulincx earlier than January 
1936 a number of the broad claims for the importance of Geulincx in relation to 
Murphy begin to appear shaky. The evidence is assessed here, and its consequences 
for a reading of Murphy are discussed in Chapter 2. 
One anomaly that might indicate Beckett’s use of different versions of Ethica is 
variations in how Geulincx’ name is spelled. Matthijs Engelberts, Everett Frost and 
Jane Maxwell, for example, point out Beckett’s ‘spelling […] of “Arnoldus” and 
“Geulinx” (unusual but not unprecedented) may mean that he began his study in 
something other than the Land edition’. However, the editors’ attribution of this 
spelling to ‘fols 1-15’112 is inaccurate. Beckett does write ‘Geulinx’ at the beginning of 
his notes, but on fol. 11v he uses the correct (standardised by Land) spelling of 
‘Geulincx’.113 The name appears as one of very few interjections or marginalia Beckett 
adds to the faithfully transcribed notes. In a paragraph addressed by Geulincx to his 
fictional ethical novitiate Philaretus (the moniker later adopted by Geulincx’ student 
Cornelius Bontekoe when he posthumously edited and published Geulincx’ works) 
Beckett notes: ‘Geulincx’s fictitious apostrophee [sic], virtuous but hasty’114. 
Land consistently spells the name ‘Arnoldi Geulincx’ throughout Opera, in 
large bold type on each edition’s title page and throughout the editions. In 1935/6 
TCD only had Land’s edition of any text by Geulincx. Beckett did, however, hold a 
reader’s ticket for the British Museum. His application for it is dated 27/7/32115 and it 
was renewed a number of times over the following few years while Beckett was 
resident in London (which he was between January and late December 1935116). Might 
Beckett have consulted any of the other two versions of Ethica or other texts by 
Geulincx held at the British Museum?  
Geulincx’ name is spelled in a number of different ways throughout the 
publications the British Library holds on and by Geulincx. A version of Physica Vera 
(which includes Metaphysica Vera), published in the same edition as Bontekoe’s own 
                                                
112 Engelberts, Frost and Maxwell (eds.) 2006, p. 145. 
113 Though this was before the even later standard form of the genitive, consequently Beckett added an 
apostrophe. This thesis follows the convention employed in Ethics of not using an apostrophe. 
114 TCD MS 10971/7/11r. Cf. Ethics, p. 322. This quotation is from the first fair copy, although the 
editors of Ethics assert they are using the second fair copy as the basis for transcription of Beckett’s 
notes. The anomaly is presumably intentional because in the second fair copy the quotation is 
abbreviated to ‘G’s fictitious apostrophee, virtuous but hasty’ (TCD MS 10971/6/21r). 
115 See CL, 2009, p. 109. 
116 See Pilling 2006a, pp. 50-55. 
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Metaphysica and edited by Bontekoe in 1688, has Bontekoe’s name on the spine of the 
book but does refer, in the introductory essay a number of times, to ‘Arnoldus 
Geulinx’, the spelling that matches Beckett’s initial variant. Bontekoe then uses 
‘Arnoldi Geulincx’ on the title page for Physica Vera. The pattern of using a number 
of Latin cases in the same edition is continued in the two editions of Ethica other than 
Land’s that Beckett could have consulted in the British Museum in 1935. However, 
these editions also exhibit variants. In a 1675 edition of Ethica the author is named on 
the title page as ‘Arnoldi Geulincs’.117 Yet in this edition’s introductory chapter 
reference is made to ‘Arnoldus Geulinxs’, to ‘Arnoldi Geulinxs’, and to ‘Arnoldus 
Geulinx’, only this final a match for Beckett’s. Other declensions and variants include 
‘Arnoldum’, ‘Geulingius’, and ‘Geulingi’. In the 1709 edition of Ethica, again 
attributed on the title page to ‘Arnoldi Geulincs’, Geulincx’ own Dedicatio Auctoris is 
signed A. Geulinck.118 The conclusion all this leads to is that if Beckett did consult one 
of these other versions then the more likely candidate looks to be the 1675 version, 
with Beckett first reading the introductory essay by Bontekoe and transcribing the 
spelling used there before correcting it when he came to use Land. Yet this is far from 
convincing evidence that Beckett used the earlier edition, and it also does nothing to 
settle the matter of whether Beckett first consulted Land’s Opera in London.119 
A second route of inquiry involves the typewriter Beckett used. Engelberts, 
Frost and Maxwell are certain that both the first and second fair copies of Ethica 
notes 
 
are from the same typewriter as used for TCD MS 10967 (Western Philosophy), 
as evidenced by the offset figure ‘2’ and left hand round bracket, and for 
typewritten correspondence originating variously from Dublin or Foxrock120 
 
In contrast van Ruler, Uhlmann and Wilson advance the following: 
 
There is also some evidence that a different typewriter was used in preparing the 
second fair copy: the letter capital ‘D’ which occurs in words such as ‘Deum’, is 
at times barely visible in the second fair copy121 
                                                
117 Geulincx 1675. 
118 Geulincx 1709. 
119 We can be sure that Beckett did consult Opera, as this is the only place Geulincx’ Questiones 
Quodlibeticae has been published. 
120 Engelberts, Frost and Maxwell (eds.) 2006, p. 142. 
121 Ethics, p. 308. 
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What is of primary interest here, however, is less the actual typewriter Beckett used 
than the location at which Beckett typed up his notes, it being plausible Beckett 
would use a different typewriter in London than in Dublin. Unfortunately, no 
identifications this neat can be claimed. There is very little evidence of differences in 
idiosyncrasies caused by varying typewriters between the two fair copies. van Ruler, 
Uhlmann and Wilson appear to simply exaggerate the discrepancies between the two 
typescripts. Indeed the similarity (noted by Engelberts, Frost and Maxwell) of the left 
open bracket in each typescript looks to fix this issue on its own. Wider at the top 
than the bottom, this bracket, and the less often used numerical ‘2’ which appears 
with a faint shadow of itself and at a slight angle, both clearly look to come from the 
same typewriter. The capital letter ‘D’, cited van Ruler, Uhlmann and Wilson as a 
reason for positing a second typewriter, is very rarely distinct from its appearance in 
the first fair copy. 
Perhaps Beckett’s method of organising his material might offer some 
assistance. In the Ethica notes Beckett organises paragraphs by using capital letters 
that correspond to Geulincx’ Arabic numerals (with lowercase ‘a’ added where 
relevant to indicate a section taken from an annotation). Beckett notes ‘C’ in the 
margin, corresponding to a section in Ethica Geulincx titles ‘3’, for instance. It is a 
difference that may derive from Beckett’s seeing, in earlier versions of Ethica, a 
convention not carried over by Land of subdividing the book into lettered sections. 
Located between the main text and the annotations (recto only) in these earlier 
editions is a capital letter. ‘A’ begins the sequence and the next five pages are labelled 
respectively ‘A2’, ‘A3’, ‘A4’, ‘A5’, and ‘A6’. The six pages in the sequence after this 
have neither letter nor numerical indicator, whereupon a following sequence begins 
with the following alphabetical letter.122 This continues through the first Treatise until 
(in the 1675 edition) ‘N’, when the second treatise begins with pages marked by a 
lowercase ‘a’.123 Potentially Beckett saw this system of organisation in the opening 
pages of Ethica (where there is a coincidence of paragraph numbers and this older 
system) and began to use the capital letters, deciding to continue with his system after 
                                                
122 I.e. ‘B’ appears, with pages indicated up to ‘B6’, and the next six pages appear again without either 
letter or numeral. 
123 In the 1709 edition the alphabet carries on straight through the book until completed, when a new 
sequence starts only seven pages from the end with ‘Aa1’ etc. 
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he will have realised the coincidence only lasts a few pages. However, this fiddly, 
technical and archaic pagination system is also not going to settle the issue. Beckett’s 
organising the paragraphs where he does is less likely due to this system than it is to a 
shuttling back and forth among the book’s well-organised sections, reading the 
annotations as he went and transcribing them in the order that matched his reading, 
in order to avoid being what Murphy calls a ‘gentle skimmer’124. 
The strongest evidence for claiming Beckett consulted a version of Ethica 
other than in Opera is the divergence of Beckett’s notes from verbatim transcriptions 
of Land’s text. Such deviations are numerous, with many often occurring on a single 
page. To take just fol. 7r (the first page of notes from Ethica), variations include the 
following: 
 
Land: ‘Igitur in Sapientae fano’125 
Beckett: ‘In Sapientae fano’126 
 
Land: ‘Imo sine Ethica’127 
Beckett: ‘Sine Ethica’128 
 
Land: ‘Non enim eaedem mihi Virtutes’129 
Beckett: ‘Non mihi Virtutes’130 
 
Land: ‘At vero nullum’131 
Beckett: ‘Vero nullum’132 
 
What such variations indicate, however, rather than use of an edition other than 
Land’s, is Beckett’s excellent command of Latin. They indicate that Beckett knew 
where he could condense his transcriptions without losing the text’s meaning. Both 
earlier editions of Ethica held at the British Library correspond to Land’s text much 
more closely than they do to Beckett’s variations. Specifically, that is, none of these 
                                                
124 Murphy, p. 51. 
125 Opera vol. 3, p. 4. 
126 TCD MS 10971/6/7r. 
127 Opera vol. 3, p. 4. 
128 TCD MS 10971/6/7r. 
129 Opera vol. 3, p. 6. 
130 TCD MS 10971/6/7r. 
131 Opera vol. 3, p. 6. 
132 TCD MS 10971/6/7r. 
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missing words from Beckett’s transcriptions are also missing from either earlier 
version. Often, as seen here, Beckett’s paraphrasing amounted to little more than 
missing either the first word of a sentence or the occasional conjunction. Beckett 
studied Latin as one of the privileges of a Protestant upper-middle-class education at 
Portora Royal School, where it was a compulsory course taught first by, as Knowlson 
reports, the ‘much respected Mr A. T. M. Murfet’ and then by the Headmaster 
(Reverend Ernest G. Seale), ‘a good classical scholar’133. Consequently, while it must 
remain a remote possibility that Beckett consulted Geulincx in London prior to his 
Christmas 1935 move to Dublin, it seems beyond much reasonable doubt that if he 
did then he consulted Land’s Opera as he would at TCD. Claims such as by 
Engelberts, Frost, and Maxwell that ‘It seems more likely that Beckett began reading 
Geulincx in London’134 cannot be strongly maintained. Beckett’s deviations from 
Opera are the result of his confidence with Latin rather than of verbatim 
transcriptions from another version. These inductions, combined with evidence about 
the typewriter, indicate that Beckett most probably first came into contact with 
Geulincx’ original text in TCD, in January 1936. The remainder of Chapter 1 
addresses in more detail exactly what he found there. 
 
1.6 Reviving occasionalism 
 
Geulincx is most frequently named in the context of that minor niche he 
occupies within the history of philosophy were he holds, along with Nicholas 
Malebranche (1638-1715), the physician Louis de la Forge, (1632-1666), and Parisian 
lawyer Géraud de Cordemoy (1614-1684), what Han van Ruler calls ‘the dubious 
honour of being classed among those whom history has labelled “occasionalists”’135. 
This small group who melded complex and sometimes seemingly contradictory 
influences into a multifaceted system of metaphysics now reside predominantly in 
                                                
133 Knowlson 1996, p. 41. See Pilling 1995 for further details of Beckett’s uses of and expertise in Latin 
after his time at TCD. Pilling divides Beckett’s uses of Latin into three areas, and provides citations for 
occurrences in fiction and the notebooks of Beckett’s further reading in Latin (Horace, Spinoza, 
Bacon, a Kempis, and those extracts of Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy that tend to have their English 
translation alongside the Latin). 
134 Engelberts, Frost, and Maxwell (eds.) 2006, p. 145. 
135 Ethics, xxiii. De Vleeschauwer and Brian Cooney are among a minority of critics who consider 
Geulincx’ occasionalism not to be the nucleus of his thought, despite this being the epithet posterity 
has bestowed. See de Vleeschauwer 1957, pp. 14-23 and Cooney 1978. 
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historical footnotes. Yet certain of occasionalism’s underlying assumptions, 
particularly those regarding scepticism towards the knowability of natural causality, 
have much in common with other thinkers, ranging from Nicolas of Autrecourt in the 
fourteenth century to David Hume four hundred years later. Occasionalism itself, 
however, along with a group of eleventh-century Muslims theologians,136 distinguishes 
itself among this company in its extremism, in rejecting the possibility of causal 
relations in nature outright.  
Unfortunately for occasionalism’s proponents, the philosophy’s very proximity 
to other more prominent philosophies has frequently worked against it. At one time 
such proximity even formed part of a highly successful and concerted effort to 
marginalise Geulincx. Geulincx’ association with one particular name, his compatriot 
Spinoza, saw an effort to damage his reputation so determined that his work would go 
out of print for nearly two hundred years (after which time, with no little irony, it was 
only with money from ‘what remains of the Spinoza-fund’137 that Land was able to 
bring Geulincx back into print).138 
As van Ruler and Uhlmann point out of more recent scholarship, critics and 
philosophers as diverse as Slavoj Žižek, Martha Nussbaum and John Cottingham 
have, in very different works, all argued that the ultra-rational transcendent impetus, 
that which certainly motivated Geulincx’ project, testifies less to the real possibility of 
a revelatory logic than to a particular brand of psychological insidiousness. As these 
authors have argued, such an impetus might take root in, for example, the secretively 
                                                
136 Amongst whom the philosopher Abū al-Ghazālī (1058-1111), for example, is well known as a 
precedent for seventeenth-century occasionalist thought (even though it is more demonstrable that 
Malebranche was familiar with this period of philosophical history than Geulincx). See for example 
Fakhry, M. Islamic Occasionalism, George Allan and Unwin, London: 1958. al-Ghazālī, a Sunni, was an 
important member of the Asherite school of early Muslim philosophy. His most famous (among his 
more than seventy) works include The Incoherence of the Philosophers and his autobiography The 
Deliverance From Error. 
137 Land 1891, p. 224. 
138 This effort to suppress Geulincx came from his previously loyal admirer, Ruardas Andala (1665-
1727). As an admirer of Geulincx’ work at the height of its popularity towards the end of the 
seventeenth-century, Andala had championed it precisely as an antidote to the perceived atheism of 
Spinoza. However, once Andala came to believe himself duped he accused Geulincx of ‘having fallen 
into the “sin” of Spinozism’ (Nadler 1999a, p.165). Andala was influential and in turn others came to 
regard Geulincx as one of the ‘Spinozizing pseudo-philosophers’ (Lange 1727, cited by van Ruler 2006, 
p. 93). This followed what de Vleeschauwer describes as ‘an unbroken stream of polemical writings [in 
which Andala] fought against the long dead Geulinx [sic] so bitterly, that one would say it was a luring 
and personal foe against whom he was writing’ (de Vleeschauwer 1957, p. 25). For a survey of the 
sustained attacks Geulincx’ posthumous work became subject to, their shortcomings and their 
effectiveness, see de Vleeshauwer 1957. 
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legislative ‘Superego […] on the side of knowledge’ in Spinoza,139 according to Žižek, 
or the childishly permissive drives inherent in ultra high moral standards as 
Nussbaum argues (again targeting Spinoza).140 Cottingham similarly claims that 
rationalism can exhibit self-delusive drives that take little account of psychology.141 As 
the editors of Ethics point out, while these arguments all explicitly only target 
Spinoza, due to confluences in their thought ‘Where Spinoza is targeted, Geulincx is 
often implied’142. As a consequence of such influential criticism, ‘Reviving a 
philosophy from the past has therefore become a dangerous business’143. 
However, an investigation into Beckett’s fascination with Geulincx must 
necessarily set itself against a straightforward revival. While this study is intended as a 
contribution to scholarship on Geulincx’ legacy in the intertwined histories of 
literature and philosophy as well as to scholarship on Beckett, the contribution it 
might make to that on Geulincx is primarily a literary one, in terms of Beckett’s 
specific uses and understandings of Geulincx. Fortunately therefore the complications 
and complicities of ‘Reviving a philosophy from the past’ can be, for the most part, 
sidestepped and left to those focusing on the republication of Ethics itself. This caveat 
is important here because even though the following discussions deal with Beckett’s 
own refracted versions of Geulincx, nevertheless a laying out of Geulincx’ thought 
remains necessary because without this it will be much harder to understand how 
Beckett’s uses of it might deviate from mere appropriation of Geulingian thought as 
allegory or symbol.  
 
1.7 Arnold Geulincx 
 
                                                
139 See Žižek 2004, pp. 33-41. 
140 See Nussbaum 2001. 
141 See Cottingham 1998. 
142 Ethics, p. xxxiii. On these confluences see for example Uhlmann 2006a, p. 99, Ethics, p. xxviii, 
Garrett 1996, pp. 269-272, and Aalderink 2006. For discussion of specific textual congruencies 
between Geulincx and Spinoza see van Ruler 2006, pp. 94-99 where evidence for the hypothesis of 
Geulincx’ direct influence on Spinoza is weighed against that for a broader theoretical confluence and 
context. van Ruler concludes that ‘it is hard to prove anything with respect to possible connections 
between Geulincx and Spinoza’ (van Ruler 2006, p. 98), convincingly refusing to settle on easy 
comparisons, asserting that ‘the only thing that can be established with any certainty is that Spinoza 
had formulated most of his ideas before Geulincx had published his’ (van Ruler 2006, p. 99). 
143 Ethics, p. xxxiv.  
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Beckett probably knew little of Geulincx’ life. The biographical chronology in 
volume 1 of Land’s Opera is necessarily brief. Yet the circumstances of Geulincx’ life 
are not only intriguing in their own right, they also bear on Geulincx’ philosophy and 
on his legacy in philosophical and intellectual history. So while a summary biography 
must stray from material we could claim to have had a direct impact upon Beckett, it 
is nevertheless a suitable place from which to begin an introduction to his thought. 
Geulincx was baptized on 31 January 1624 in Antwerp’s St James’ church. 
According to van Bunge et al. Geulincx ‘probably had a sister and three younger 
brothers’144. He benefitted from his parents’ keenness to provide their children with a 
good education, and matriculated age sixteen at Leuven University. Geulincx 
continued to do well at Jansenist Louvain over the next few years, coming second 
place amongst 159 candidates in the exams competition of November 1643, where he 
obtained his licentiate. He went on to study theology and was appointed junior 
professor of philosophy at Leuven in December 1646. By 1652, as Land details, 
Geulincx ‘was entrusted with the treatment of the so-called Quaestiones quodlibeticae’ 
following a promotion to the grade of primarius. These Quaestiones took the form of 
propositions posed publicly by a single magister on general interest subjects. The 
magister then had to propose, ‘with intelligence and in agreeable form’145, reasons both 
for and against the given proposition. Certain of Geulincx’ Quaestiones are compiled 
in the first volume of Opera. Beckett’s notes from Land’s recording of these public 
and frequently playful debates are scant. He transcribed only five of the twenty-eight 
Quaestiones, leaving out the lengthy pros and cons that are also recorded by Land. 
They include fire-themed propositions such as the following: 
 
25. Atrocier est noster quam Jovis ignis. 
26. Mitior est naturalis quam artificiosus ignis. 146 
 
25. Atrocities belong to humanity like fires belong to Jupiter. 
26. Kindness is as natural to humanity as an artificial fire.147 
                                                
144 van Bunge, et al. (eds.) 2003, p. 322. 
145 Land 1891, p. 225. 
146 TCD MS 10971/6/1. 
147 Other of Geulincx’ Quaestiones, as Land details, include ‘whether riches, or the poverty usual in his 
state, is most profitable to a scholar; whether women should be admitted to philosophical discourses; 
whether it becomes well-behaved youths always to dress in the fashion; whether it is advisable to set 
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Unfortunately for Geulincx his popularity provoked a backlash among opponents of 
the new Cartesian philosophy, who closed ranks against the innovative thinker. 
Protective of Scholastic teaching a group led by the respected medical professor 
Vopiscus Fortunatus Plempius (1601-1671) fired the first of a series of shots across 
the bow in 1654 in the form of a letter soliciting a University-wide declaration against 
Cartesianism. The petition did not mention Geulincx by name, however, and it did 
not receive many signatures. Geulincx was still in a relatively powerful position within 
the Louvain academy as Dean of the Faculty of Arts from March to September of that 
same year, and he was designated for a canonry at the cathedral in Aix in 1657. His 
opponents, however, were successful in managing to keep Geulincx out of the 
esteemed position ‘ostensibly because he did not succeed in proving the legitimacy of 
his parents’ birth’148, and from here Geulincx’ misfortune snowballed. The most 
drastic situation may well have been caused in part by Geulincx marrying Susanna 
Strickers, his cousin or niece, which, as well as his growing popularity teaching 
controversial new philosophy, forced Geulincx from the University.149 
Geulincx and Strickers moved with very little money to the National University of 
Holland at Calvinist Leyden.150 Here Geulincx managed to secure a position among a 
faculty more open to Cartesianism, though the new thinking still predominantly 
operated in secret.151 Beckett himself summarised the situation of Geulincx in this new 
context in a paragraph in the ‘Philosophy Notes’, which situates occasionalism’s 
(those of that stripe here called ‘Cartesians’) place in philosophical history:  
 
                                                                                                                                          
good liquor before friends who come to pay you a visit’ (Land 1891, p. 225). Quaestiones quodlibeticae 
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Jansenists & Fathers of the Oratory, living in Augustinian-Scotist atmosphere, 
were friendly to new philosophy, while orthodox Peripatetics, and esp. Jesuits, 
opposed it violently. Thus old opposition between Augustinianism & Thomism 
was renewed in controversy over Cartesianism. To meet this attack the Cartesians 
(Louis de la Forge & Malebranche) insisted on connection with Augustine.152 
 
In terms of Geulincx’ Augustinian origins and later conversion, Land concurs: 
 
In later years, the learned adherents of Jansenius and of Descartes were mostly 
the same men; and we have every reason to suppose that Geulincx’ occupation 
with that Augustinian theology prepared the way for his going over in his mature 
years to the reformed confession.153 
 
Although Geulincx would never regain the level of prestige he had once held at 
Louvain, he did attain a measure of popularity at Leyden thanks to substantial 
support received from the professor of theology Abraham Heidanus (1597-1678), and 
later from certain of his students (to whom Geulincx would directly address parts of 
Ethica and who would edit his posthumous works).154 By 1667 he had published the 
first Tractate of Ethica.  
Unfortunately this hard-won fame was not to last long. Some time between the 
8 and 21 November 1669 Geulincx, along with a number of other faculty at the 
University, died of an unidentified plague. While lamenting the early death of 
Geulincx (and of his wife, who died the following January155) Land argues that 
Geulincx did at least manage, with his death, to avoid further misfortune. Remaining 
proponents of the new philosophy were steadily suppressed and their chairs made 
vacant by the ascendant Orange party and the ‘strict clericals’156 joined with it. Even 
the highly respected Heidanus lost his office. The university produced a bronze 
medallion commemorating those from the faculty who had died in the 1669 plague, 
yet it makes no mention of the ever-controversial and original Geulincx and 
consequently there is no surviving image of him. Land admits to being unable to find 
where he was buried. 
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Misfortunes and their consequences pervade Geulincx’ philosophy and must 
surely derive in part from his experiences of such in his own life. As van Ruler has 
described him ‘Geulincx was an unhappy man and his philosophy an unhappy man’s 
recipe for happiness’157. H.J. de Vleeschauwer calls him ‘the man of the serious word 
and the ungrateful life’158. His exasperated rhetorical questions in Ethics, such as ‘Why 
do so many and such great calamities conspire against me? Have I offended God in 
some way’159 clearly point towards some kind of autobiographical foundation. When 
discussing his seventh ethical obligation concerning the onus upon the ethical novice 
to find a good and realistic career, Geulincx even refers specifically to an academic 
life as one ‘in which study and a thousand tediums have to be endured, and which is 
subject to envy and criticism’160, with which he was intimately familiar.  
Even without an accompanying commentary, however, Beckett could not fail 
to notice such autobiographical passages that jut, at times quite sharply, into and out 
of Ethics. It is well known that Beckett was fascinated by the logical byways of 
seventeenth-century philosophy and by the implications for such closed systems of 
moments of alterity and slippage. These are moments that have their parallels in 
Beckett’s works. In Arsene’s falling off the ladder in Watt, for example, which plays 
out a farcical paradigm where the ineffable intervenes in the otherwise properly 
effable. Arsene is surprised by the ‘sentiment’, otherwise alien to his quid pro quo 
rationalism, ‘that a change, other than a change of degree, had taken place’161. 
Similarly, the protagonist of Company (1980) suddenly stands stock-still part way 
along a walk taken many times previously, their steps counted and the action repeated 
by a self that systematises the experienced environment. The sudden halt, which bears 
no relation to their usual numerical enfolding of the world, intrudes as one 
epistemology into another entirely irreconcilable with it. Geulincx’ system cannot 
break entirely from autobiography, just as the abstract, often mathematical 
systematising of many of Beckett’s protagonists cannot tear free of tangible 
connections to an experienced, remembered and lived-in world, a world that 
sometimes even recalls moments of Beckett’s own life (walks with his father in the 
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Wicklow mountains, for example, provide one such basis for imagery in Company). 
Of such collisions of systems and self, Molloy proclaims ‘Extraordinary how 
mathematics helps you to know yourself’162 with a characteristic mix of spite and joy. 
Mathematics does not, of course, in Beckett’s closed systems, help you to know 
anything other than more mathematics. Something ‘other than a change of degree’ is 
required by these systems in order that something other than itself can be admitted. 
Geulincx’ occasionalism is frequently characterised by just this kind of alterity. 
Summarising various interpretations of Geulincx, de Vleeschauwer writes 
 
His friends saw in him a disciple of Descartes; his open and covert enemies called 
him a follower of Spinoza; the Germans and French regarded him as a rival of 
Malebranche and Leibniz. His modern objective critics see in him a precursor of 
Kant […] and it is remarkable that up to this stage nobody has attempted to 
recruit Geulincx as a Christian existentialist.163 
 
Such a range of interpretation is partly due to the multi-faceted nature of Geulincx’ 
thought, to his willingness to admit what might seem irreconcilable with other aspects 
of his system. He was certainly a bold thinker with his own ‘pioneering spirit’, as 
Molloy describes a man who attempts to drag himself to freedom on Geulincx’ ship 
while knowing it to be doomed. As we will see, it is the coming together of such 
opposites as the ineffable and the super-rational that produces his system of 
simultaneously submissive and proactive ethics. The following summary of Geulincx’ 
occasionalism takes its contours from Metaphysica Vera and Ethica, Geulincx’ two 
major works and those from which Beckett took the majority of his transcriptions. 
 
1.8 Occasionalist metaphysics 
 
Broadly speaking, occasionalism arose among French and Dutch Cartesians of 
the second half of the seventeenth-century. As Jean-Christophe Bardout describes, it 
is 
 
usually thought of as a response to the difficulties that its proponents see facing 
Cartesianism. In particular, the so-called ‘mind-body problem’: How can the real 
and absolute distinction between two such heterogeneous substances as mind 
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and body be reconciled with the thesis of their substantial union in a human 
being?164 
 
As noted above it was through consequences of the ‘mind-body problem’ inherited 
from Descartes that Beckett too first encountered the solutions offered by 
occasionalism. However, occasionalism is much wider in scope than a solution to 
mind-body interaction. That particular solution is merely implied by the much more 
ambitious remit occasionalism sought of offering an account of all causal relations in 
the entirety of ‘created nature’165. While none of the thinkers grouped under it actually 
used the ‘dubious’ title occasionalism, historically the term has come to denote a 
unifying, usually monotheistic thesis seeking to prove that only one single agent causes 
interaction between a mind a body, between minds and other minds, and between 
bodies and other bodies.166 The movement’s name derives from Descartes’s unfinished 
Treatise on Man, published by Claude Clerselier in 1664 with notes by La Forge. In 
this Treatise the great progenitor of modern philosophy used the word ‘occasion’ 
during crucial discussions of mind-body interaction, and it struck certain followers 
that this needed further explanation. The Treatise contains phrases such as, for 
example, ‘fibres cause a movement in the brain which gives occasion for the soul […] 
to have the sensation of pain’167. The ill-defined term ‘occasion’ became the 
inheritance of later Cartesians seeking to account for problems presented by a pineal 
gland which, we might say (following Murphy), has ‘shrunk to nothing’168, having been 
drained of explanatory power via that uninformative but load-bearing word 
‘occasion’. In seeking to account for apparent divides and connections between minds 
and bodies, however, occasionalism was not always effective. La Forge was 
constrained a little by his fealty to Descartes, and despite Cordemoy’s striving to 
extricate himself from those same origins he and La Forge had in common a turning 
to the questions and solutions of occasionalism predominantly via physics and its 
issues of bodily causation.169 Geulincx distinguished himself among his peers by 
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turning more definitively towards epistemology and its consequences for ethics in a 
broader hope for a completion of the Cartesian project. It was routes such as these 
that would lead Geulincx, more explicitly than other occasionalists, to affirm the 
radical incapacity and impotence of the human mind, and to counsel the humility he 
concluded as a result. 
Geulincx begins Metaphysica Vera with the founding Cartesian axiom that 
Beckett duly transcribed: 
 
Prima Scientia. Cogito ergo sum.170 
 
Proposition 1. I think, therefore I exist.171 
 
However, Geulincx proceeds immediately to complicate the efficacy of such a 
conception of what it is to ‘think’, as Beckett also noted: 
 
Secundo S. Varios habeo cogitandi modos in infinitum.  
Cogito ergo, et infinitis modis cogito; sed illae res quas cogito num sic sint ut 
cogito, adhuc nescio.172 
 
Proposition 2. I have innumerable modes of thought. 
Therefore I think, and think in innumerable modes. But whether the things I 
think really are exactly as I think of them, I still do not know.173 
 
This ‘nescio’, a ‘to-not-know’, is central to Metaphysica Vera. In turn it will greatly 
impact Geulincx’ epistemology, before it has further important implications for his 
ethics. Ignorance and impotence are the cornerstones of Geulincx’ thought. Geulincx 
argues from this ‘Proposition 2’ that the things I think and which might not be 
‘exactly as I think of them’ might very well be far from as they appear to me to be. I, 
however, have no way of knowing whether things are as I perceive them to be or not. 
Specifically, and centrally as regards his legacy as an occasionalist, Geulincx argues 
that no human can cause actions in a physical world, and similarly cannot cause 
thoughts to occur in other minds. Even though it may appear to me as though I have 
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these capacities, according to Geulincx I emphatically do not and only God properly 
qualifies as a causal agent. These two conclusions (that I lack such capacities, and that 
God alone has them) derive from Geulincx’ central metaphysical argument, the major 
argument that distinguishes Geulincx amongst occasionalists as a metaphysical 
epistemologist. According to this argument, in order to qualify as performing an 
action (or causing anything, including thoughts) I must have knowledge of this action. 
Such knowledge must consist in being able to say, fully and with reason, ‘how’ an 
action happens. If I cannot say ‘how’ something happens, I cannot claim that it is my 
own action. The metaphysical axiom that summarises this appears in Beckett’s notes 
from both Metaphysica Vera and Ethica: 
 
Quod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis.174 
 
What you do not know how to do, is not your action.175 
 
If, as Geulincx wrote in dedicating Ethics ‘To The Curators Of The University Of 
Leiden […] In the Temple of Wisdom Ethics is the ceiling and the roof’176, then this 
metaphysical axiom is his supporting beam without which there can be no substantial 
building. Geulincx is at times so determined that his reader should accept his 
metaphysical axiom he contradicts himself, tripping over his own enthusiasm for it, 
asserting it to be so obvious that it does not require argumentation immediately prior 
to arguing for it: 
 
I have not claimed that what you do not know how to do does not happen, but: 
what you do not know how to do is not your action. Nor is there any need for 
arguments here, only anyone’s consciousness…I say…that if you are willing to 
describe yourself as the doer of anything that you do not know how to do, there 
is no reason why you should not believe that you have done or do anything that 
happens or has been done. If you do not know how motion is made in the body 
while being nevertheless quite sure that you made it, you could easily say with 
equal justification that you are the author of Homer’s Iliad, or that you built the 
walls of Nineveh, or the Pyramids; you could say with equal justification that you 
make the sun rise and set for us all, and the succession of days and nights, and of 
winter and summer.177 
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The philosopher Steven Nadler has written on how, similarly to Geulincx, the more 
famous Malebranche also introduced an epistemological criterion to what would 
otherwise be a purely metaphysical theory of causation, and which is discussed in the 
same images as Geulincx employs – the movement of an arm. Nadler asks the 
fundamental question of Geulincx’ extreme axiom: ‘Why would one think that there 
is an epistemic condition upon causality?’178 The only possible solution to the 
problems it raises, Nadler argues, that avoids category errors of confusing causation 
by volitional agents with causation by non-volitional agents (inanimate objects etc.), is 
to take ‘volitional agency to be the paradigm of causality’179, and this is precisely what 
Geulincx does.180 Geulincx takes the metaphysical arguments on this topic to their 
extreme. He argues that precisely and validly analogous with the impossibility of my 
causing the sun to rise and fall or my having built the Pyramids, is the impossibility of 
my causing my own arm to rise and fall. 
In defining what might qualify as knowledge of an event, such that knowledge 
passes his stringent epistemic tests, Geulincx argues that even an anatomist (in a 
paradigm of scientific knowledge) cannot properly say ‘how’ their arm is moved. 
There is, according to Geulincx, something missing from a purely physical account of 
such movement, of blood flow and what Geulincx calls the movement of ‘animal 
spirits’. Anatomy does not reach, cannot speak of, the ineffable ‘how’ of causation 
that is missing from such an account. Geulincx describes such scientific knowledge as 
merely a posteriori, according to which it is ‘no more than a consciousness and 
perception of the fact that motion is taking place’181. It is categorically not a 
substantive explanation of ‘how’ that motion takes place.  
This ineffable ‘how’ is hugely important for Geulincx, for it is with his idea of 
‘the ineffable’ that Geulincx distils and fuses his contrasting impetuses as a rationalist-
Christian-mystic. Something is ‘ineffable’, for Geulincx, because it cannot be stated 
within rational discourse: 
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Something is said to be ineffable not because we cannot speak or think of it (for 
this would be nothing, nothing and unthinkable being the same), but because we 
cannot think about or encompass with our reason how it is done. 
 
As Geulincx writes, ‘an ineffable something is always missing’182, there always remains 
a residue of experience not exhausted by knowledge of that experience. All possible 
rational description of physiological forces leaves out the irreducibly ‘ineffable’183. 
Only God, as Arsene in Watt might say of  ‘what has so happily been called the 
unutterable or ineffable’184, can properly know such ineffable forces. For limited, non-
knowing humanity, Geulincx would concur with the servant’s appraisal that ‘any 
attempt to utter or eff it is doomed to fail, doomed, doomed to fail’185. 
Geulincx’ metaphysics is synthesised, then, via the fusing together of two 
seeming irreconcilable opposites – extreme rationality and the ineffable. For Geulincx 
all that exists for humanity is what he calls, following Descartes, the ‘occasion’186 of my 
willing an action to happen, and there exists the ‘occasion’ (if I am making ethical 
decisions that accord with God’s perfect will), of that action happening. This is all I 
can say for certain. If that action I have willed does have occasion to occur this is only 
because God has caused it. We cannot, according to Geulincx, be reasonably said to 
have control over our bodily action or over our thoughts, and so over anything at all 
in the world. All humanity can do is hope and pray. It can perhaps be seen already, 
even in these broad terms which are elucidated in more detail below, how Geulincx’ 
world of ignorance and impotence bears thematic similarities with Beckett’s thoughts 
on humanity experiencing the world. As, for example, Beckett offered them in an 
interview in 1956: 
 
I think anyone nowadays who pays the slightest attention to his own experience 
finds it the experience of a non-knower, a non-can-er (somebody who cannot).187 
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The third and final chapter of Metaphysica Vera is entitled ‘Concerning 
God’188. Here Geulincx asserts that God ‘is an ineffable Father’189,  ‘Creator of the 
World’190, ‘a powerful Creator and Mover’191 is ‘a law unto Himself’192 and is 
‘supremely Perfect’193. These sections were certainly of interest to Beckett. He 
summarised all of them in three pages of notes. The core of Geulincx’ metaphysics, 
however, and what locates this metaphysics in relation to the notes Beckett took from 
Windelband earlier and goes some way to accounting for Beckett’s developing 
interest in the philosophy such that he would take a further 18 pages of notes from 
Ethica, typing those up and extending them in another 18, is Geulincx’ conception of 
impotence and ignorance as these relate to his ethics. 
 
1.9 Occasionalist ethics 
 
Geulincx’ emphasis on ignorance and impotence, his proposing humanity’s 
total powerlessness, prompts his further step into ethics. It is a step along the route 
where a Christian resolution to the unfinished Cartesian project, in an ethical 
conclusion, might be reached. According to Geulincx, humanity should be humble in 
the face of such limited capacity on our own part, and in the face of such limitless 
capacity on the part of God. The transition to ethics is summarised in the following 
passage, which Beckett transcribed from Metaphyscia Vera: 
 
Nunquam enim proprie fit quia ego volo, sed quia motor me volante vult, ut 
etiam me subinde volante non vulte…Atque hic se pandit excursus in Ethicam, 
hic est ostium fluminis moralis; sequitur enim, ex his, cum nihil valeamur in 
humana sorte, nihil etiam ut velimus; adeoque ut hoc sit primum, summum et 
generalissimum, quod omnem moralitatem complectitur, Ethice fundamentum, 
lumine naturae notissimum: Ubi nihil vales, ibi etiam nihil velis.194 
 
Nothing ever happens to me, properly speaking, because I will it, but rather 
because the true Mover wills what I will, just as He sometimes does not will what 
I will… And here we reach the estuary of the moral river, where the coastline 
broadens out into Ethics: for it follows from what I have said, that when it is not 
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our human destiny to have power to do anything, neither should we will 
anything. And because it involves the whole of morality, this principle is the first, 
the best, and the broadest foundation of Ethics, and the one most easily known 
to us by the light of nature: Wherein you have no power, therein you should not 
will.195 
 
As we have seen, Beckett cited the ethical axiom Geulincx offers as the foundation of 
ethics a number of times in correspondence as being a place from which commentary 
of his work, for those in the unfortunate position of attempting one, might also begin. 
Taken out of the context of the whole of Ethica the axiom’s apparent advocating of 
will-lessness has led to accusations that Geulincx ‘condemned man to passivity’196, 
where man has ‘nothing to do’ in the world of physical things as Beckett’s ‘Philosophy 
Notes’ had it, and against which de Vleeschauwer defends him. But the importance of 
humility in the face of humanity’s incapacity to cause action does not, for Geulincx, 
entail a total withdrawal from the world into the mind. Although Beckett’s earlier 
‘Philosophy Notes’ appear to point towards this interpretation, according to which 
‘Man has nothing to do in outer world’197, his longer transcriptions from Ethica testify 
to a much more thorough understanding of the axiom and how it coheres within 
Geulincx’ ethics. Before continuing to a more detailed look at Ethics, however, there 
are important things to be noted about this axiom itself.  
Firstly, there is the matter of translation. Uhlmann points out that the axiom 
 
has often been translated by Beckett scholars as “Where one is worth nothing 
one should want nothing”. The Latin, “valeo”, carries the meaning both of “to be 
able to, to have force” and “to be worth”.198  
 
Ackerley notes of his own translation that he ‘chose to retain the second person 
singular and something of the assonance of the original: “where you are worth 
nothing, there you should want nothing.”’199 Wilson translates the axiom in Ethics as 
‘Wherein you have no power, therein you should not will’, retaining his version from 
1999’s Metaphysics. As Uhlmann points out, Beckett makes use of both senses of the 
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first part of the axiom, employing ‘the formula where one is “worth nothing” in 
Murphy, and alternatively where one “can do nothing” in The Unnamable’200.  
However, for Geulincx there is only one axiom, and he was presumably well 
aware of its ambivalence in capturing the co-dependency between the metaphysical 
and the ethical where his occasionalism thrives. As Ackerley points out, the different 
renderings of the axiom emphasise either the metaphysical or the ethical at the 
expense of the other. For Geulincx, on the other hand, being ‘worth nothing’ was 
precisely a matter of being ‘able to do nothing’. Nevertheless, Ackerley laments 
Wilson’s retention of the earlier translation: 
 
The point that Wilson’s translation misses, I feel, is the verbal relationship of the 
phrase not so much to the metaphysics of motion (for in that context his 
weighting seems most apposite) as to the virtue of Humilitas, for Geulincx the 
core of his entire ethical system201 
 
This study uses Wilson’s translation of the axiom, keeping it consistent with other 
translations of Ethica. While Ackerley is surely correct in pointing to this version 
lacking ethical overtones, Beckett’s own uses of the axiom also (except in Murphy) 
tend to correspond to the metaphysical emphasis of the axiom. Yet it is also clear, as 
we will see in the axiom’s various deployments, that Beckett was well aware of the 
multiplicity of this densely woven axiom. Indeed, Geulincx’ rather playful 
ambivalence in his axiom might go part of the way to accounting for how a rationalist 
might be, at the very core of his system, as Beckett described him, not ‘very rational’. 
The Latin valeo is well chosen by Geulincx. It allows him to firmly situate his 
metaphysics in the realm of incapacity, as well as connoting a relationship already 
there between this incapacity and humility thanks to valeo’s intimation of 
worthlessness. The axiom itself renders that ‘estuary’ of the move into ethics as the 
transition from the first half of the axiom (the more strictly metaphysical half, 
whatever translation is used) to the second, ethical half. 
Before Geulincx stresses the importance of his axiom, however, Ethics begins 
with a chapter on what Geulincx calls ‘Virtue ‘in General’, defined as ‘the exclusive 
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love of right Reason’202. This intertwining of Virtue and Reason immediately sets the 
tone of Ethics as that of a rationalist’s belief in God. Taking on the unfinished 
Cartesian project as the production of an ethical system, Geulincx sought to build 
upon the Christian conception of the blessed life while incorporating the structuring 
rationalism of current thinking. However, as van Ruler points out, a narrative that 
accounts for Ethica solely in terms of ‘the invention of a Christian philosophy of 
morals’203 would fail to note the even wider-ranging context in which Ethics operates. 
Christian conceptions of the blessed life had for more than a century and a half been 
admitting elements of classical thought, and Ethics builds on this but goes even 
further, such that it is also ‘an extraordinary attempt to reinvest the ancient approach 
to ethics with an input of a genuinely Christian flavour’204. Critical of what he calls the 
‘pagan’205 ways of thinking, Geulincx nevertheless constructs important parts of his 
system in frameworks comparable to those of, for instance, Aristotle, whose ethics of 
the mean bears comparison to Geulincx’ diagrammed middle ground between ‘Vice 
of Excess, Vice of Defect’206. 
In Chapter 1 of Ethics Geulincx discusses ‘Virtue’ in terms of ‘Love’, ‘Reason’, 
and ‘Disposition’. While not as emphatically ‘ineffable’ as the realm of God and 
God’s causation, those of ‘Love’ and ‘Reason’ are both initially described as beyond 
the power of words. Of ‘Love’, for example, Geulincx writes ‘What love is, does not 
need to be stated…There is often a certain ambiguity in a name when the thing itself 
is perfectly clear’207. Similarly he adds of ‘Reason’, ‘What Reason is, is sufficiently 
known because of the fact that it is known at some point’208. Geulincx goes on to claim 
how ‘Reason’ ‘is sufficiently well known to all of us, as we have the distinction of 
being rational’209.  
Geulincx’ Augustinian foundations might be argued to partly account for his 
conception of ‘Disposition’, which shows him to be firmly an ethical intentionalist: 
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203 Ethics, p. xvi. 
204 Ethics, pp. xvi-xvii. 
205 Ethics, p. 8. 
206 Ethics, p. 324. 
207 Ethics, p. 313. 
208 Ethics, p. 315. 
209 Ethics, p. 316. 
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‘Whatever men do, they are all judged by their intention’210. Here Geulincx also breaks 
from his ancient and Scholastic contexts, and ‘Disposition’ becomes for him 
something much more absolute then a ‘disposition to act rightly, acquired by the 
frequent performance of good actions’211.  
Geulincx goes on to enumerate, following ‘Virtue in General’, ‘the Cardinal 
Virtues’212. These are ‘Diligence’ (a ‘perpetual grasping at Reason’213), ‘Obedience’ to 
Reason (and a concomitant avoiding of ‘what Reason forbids’214), and ‘Justice’, which 
‘is the fair application of Reason’215. At the end of this section on cardinal virtues is the 
section Beckett recommended ‘most heartily’ to Ussher on ‘Humility’. Geulincx 
writes: 
 
Humility is the most exalted of the Cardinal Virtues: when Virtue includes only 
Diligence, Obedience, and Justice, it is incomplete. Humility closes the circle: 
beyond it nothing more can be added to Virtue.216 
 
Humility consists (typically for a Geulingian concept) of further sub-divisions. Firstly, 
humility requires ‘Inspectio Sui’217 / ‘Inspection of Oneself’218. The section headed 
‘Inspectio Sui’ is by far the most detailed of Beckett’s Ethica notes. This inspectio sui 
corresponds to the first half of the ethical axiom Ubi nihil vales [Wherein you have no 
power]. Upon delving into our selves, into what Geulincx describes as into an 
‘innermost sanctum, in order to consult the sacred Oracle of Reason’219 as was 
similarly undertaken in Metaphysica Vera under the rubric of ‘autology’, we discover 
incapacity and ignorance. As it was in Metaphysics, Geulincx’s argument in Ethics is 
that I cannot cause a thing to happen because I do not know how I could do so. I 
realise upon inspecting myself that there is no capacity for action (ubi nihil vales), and 
so I should not try to act (ibi nihil velis): 
 
                                                
210 Ethics, p. 349. 
211 Ethics, p. 318. 
212 Ethics, p. 320. 
213 Ethics, p. 321. 
214 Ethics, p. 322. 
215 Ethics, p. 324. 
216 Ethics, p. 326. 
217 TCD MS 10971/6/32. Cf. Opera vol. 3, p. 30. 
218 Ethics, p. 327. 
219 Ethics, p. 19. 
 51 
Wherein you have no power; we read in this the inspection of oneself…Therein 
you should not will; we read in this…disregard of oneself, or neglect of oneself 
across the whole human condition, and resigning ourselves into the power of His 
hand, in which we are, indeed, whether we like it or not […] or what comes to 
the same thing, Do nothing gratuitously, do nothing in vain. 
 
Following discussions of self-inspection and self-disregard Geulincx details 
seven ethical obligations that are consequent upon this humility. The ethical project 
here becomes even wider in scope in its making a clear transition from theoretical to 
practical ethics. Obligations, Geulincx insists, are the inevitable rules to which one 
who lives a blessed life should adhere. ‘I must labour not over my own happiness, 
blessedness, or repose, but over my obligations alone’220 Geulincx solemnly asserts. 
Yet these obligations do not all counsel the total abstinence that might be expected 
from the conclusions of humility. In his sixth obligation Geulincx even describes 
getting drunk as a sure way to reveal one’s true ethical self, ‘In vino veritas [In wine 
there is truth]. Only a virtuous man, who never hides his true colours, comes out well 
here’221. The seven obligations are as follows: 
 
1. When God summons me from the living, and orders me to return to Him, I 
must not persist in refusal, but hold myself ready.222 
2. [..] not to depart this life unless God has summoned you.223 
3. The Third Obligation concerns the need to refresh the body. It arises from the 
Second Obligation; for if you do not refresh the body, it will fail; which the 
Second Obligation forbids.224 
4. 1. Choice of mode of life; 2. Devotion to this mode of life; 3. Constancy in this 
mode of life225 
5. To bear many things, to do many things; for sometimes I cannot find a mode 
of life that is productive and affords me sustenance.226 
6. […] consists in the rule that one should frequently relax the mind, lest it 
become jaded by incessant business.227 
7. I should look upon my birth as a good, never detest it, and never lament it. I 
must not rage with madness and impotence that I am punished by having been 
born. I must not revile those who engendered my body.228 
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Beckett’s notes begin to fade away towards the end of this section. That is, he did not 
type up all the handwritten notes on the seventh obligation, and following this 
obligation there is one small section on the ‘The Adminicule of Humility’229. This is 
Geulincx’ admonition to flee from happiness in order that it might pursue you, 
Geulincx arguing that a person will never attain happiness if they pursue it: 
‘Happiness is like a shadow: it flees from you when you pursue it; but pursues you 
when you flee from it’230. Geulincx’ note of ethical leave-taking appears to have been 
Beckett’s cue to take his leave from Geulincx. 
Beckett’s notes are all from Treatise 1 and its annotations. Ethica continues for 
a further 5 Treatises. It is important to point out, however, that the first Treatise, 
which occupies around two-thirds of the final version, was published by Geulincx as a 
stand-alone edition in 1667 as Van de Hooft-deuchden: De eerste Tucht-verhandeling.  
Many of the later sections of Ethica repeat material from Treatise 1. These later 
sections are accompanied by a small number of annotations, in contrast to the earlier, 
detailed accompanying notes. This is a consequence of Ethica being partially edited 
posthumously by Geulincx’ students. Treatises beyond the first comprise roughly a 
third of the volume, and include the chapters ‘On the Virtues Commonly Called 
Particular’231, ‘On the End and the Good’232, ‘the Passions’233, ‘the Reward of Virtue’234 
and ‘Prudence’235. However, in order to retain focus on the elements of Geulincx that 
Beckett himself focussed on these later sections are not summarised here. Instead, the 
following chapter turns to Beckett’s work, and the novel he was writing concurrent 
with researching Geulincx, Murphy. 
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Chapter 2 – Murphy 
 
2.1   Why Murphy? 
 
There are two major reasons why Murphy should be the first of Beckett’s works with 
which to begin an analysis of Beckett’s fascination with Geulincx. Firstly, and most 
importantly, is the consistency of Beckett’s own specific and repeated references to 
Murphy when referencing Geulincx in correspondence. This repetition makes clear 
that the novel must bear out some specific relation to the philosopher: ‘Murphy is 
break down between his ubi nihil vales ibi nihil velis’; ‘Dans la vieille phrase de 
Geulincx citée dans Murphy’; ‘If there is a queer real there somewhere it is the 
Abderites, mentioned in Murphy, complicated by – ibidem – the Geulincx’; ‘already 
in Murphy’. Beckett never cites Geulincx’ axiom in relation to any other novel or play. 
It is always Murphy that must somehow bear the weight of the obscure reference. 
However, the repetition does not make clear how the novel bears out this relation. 
Secondly, there are the arguments made by Matthew Feldman and other critics 
regarding ‘Beckett’s general practice of drawing upon his contemporaneous reading 
in his writings’1 that further indicate the likely relevance of Geulincx to the novel 
Beckett was writing in 1936. This ‘general practice’ is the case with much of Beckett’s 
early, Joycean method of filling notebooks with entries from his reading before 
integrating these into his prose or poetry, a process described in 1996 by James 
Knowlson: 
 
Beckett’s notebooks show […] that he too plundered the books he was reading 
or studying for material that he could then incorporate into his own writing. 
Beckett copied out striking, memorable or witty phrases into his notebooks. Such 
quotations or near quotations were then woven into the dense fabric of his early 
prose. It is what could be called a ‘grafting’ technique that runs at times almost 
wild. He even ticked them in his private notebooks once they had been 
incorporated into his own work.2 
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Knowlson and Feldman’s research builds on Beckett’s own description of his early 
work as being ‘soiled…with the old demon of notesnatching’3. Beckett would find 
ways to move out of the shadow of this old demon, but it was a significant shadow 
cast in large part by what he called the ‘epic, heroic’4 and encyclopaedic world-
affirming inclusiveness of Joyce’s ‘apotheosis of the word’5. In 1936, when Beckett was 
completing Murphy and transcribing from Geulincx, his working methodology was 
still in part determined by this approach. For example, notes derived from English 
Literature in the ‘Whoroscope’ notebook explicitly headed ‘For Interpolation’ reveal 
that, although Beckett may have realised that ‘“notesnatching” was actually deferring 
the moment when he could “put down last words of first version”’,6 he was still 
working with, and at times from, notebooks of quotations. In consequence, it is the 
argument of this chapter that contemporaneous with Beckett’s Geulincx research 
there are manifestations of this research grafted into Murphy. Murphy was begun in 
August 1935, when Beckett was still in London and before he had read Geulincx in 
any detail, and completed in Dublin in early June 1936. With the dates of Beckett’s 
Geulincx research at TCD fixed as accurately as possible it is clear that they must map 
onto the dates of Murphy’s composition in such a way that a tentative identification of 
the point at which Geulincx comes to enter the novel’s composition process could be 
attempted. Once this is determined then it may be possible to see how such a 
chronologically determined Murphy might account for Beckett’s repeated references 
to Geulincx. 
This important question of what precise point Geulincx comes to Beckett’s 
sphere of possible influence in regard to Murphy is, however, significantly hampered 
by the fact that the Sasha Murphy manuscript, the six notebooks comprising some 800 
pages in which Beckett drafted and made notes towards Murphy, is privately owned 
and unavailable to scholarly consultation. Exactly how far Beckett’s Geulincx research 
influenced any rewriting, or even the production of whole new sections, of Murphy is 
paradigmatic of the difficulty critics face with many questions of source-incorporation 
in Murphy. Ackerley suggests that Sasha Murphy would probably ‘not vary 
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significantly from the typescript’7 held at HRHRC, though this is in contrast to the 
assessment of Knowlson (who has viewed the manuscript for financial-valuation and 
verification purposes) that it ‘differs radically from the finished text at many points’8. 
Given the sheer number of pages and the simple fact that he has seen it Knowlson’s 
assessment is surely to be preferred. With these caveats noted, however, there 
nevertheless remain some useful assertions that can be validly made about Murphy’s 
composition. 
 
2.2   Murphy’s composition – Quantity 
 
Knowlson reveals that the Sasha Murphy manuscript was begun on 20 August 
1935.9 A month later Beckett wrote to MacGreevy with details of the work’s fitful 
progress: ‘I have been forcing myself to keep at the book, & it crawls forward. I have 
done about 9000 words’10. By 8 October he would report further strain along with his 
hope for the work’s completion: 
 
I have been working hard at the book and it goes very slowly, but I do not think 
there is any doubt now that it will be finished sooner or later. The feeling that I 
must jettison the whole thing has passed, only the labour of writing the 
remainder is left. There is little excitement attached to it, each chapter loses its 
colour & interest as soon as the next is begun. I have done about 20000 words.11 
 
On February 6 1936 Beckett wrote to MacGreevy of what must have been some relief 
as well as further difficulties: ‘There only remain three chapters of mechanical writing, 
which I haven’t the courage to begin’12. By this time Beckett was visiting TCD’s library 
and transcribing Geulincx, having told MacGreevy and Reavey in early January of this 
plan. Completing Murphy was nevertheless still to be a fraught business, and on 5 
March in the same letter in which he went into such detail about Geulincx, Beckett 
told MacGreevy that ‘Murphy will not budge’13. Then in the letter of 25 March in 
which Beckett described occasional forays out of the house he reported that the novel 
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‘goes from bad to worse’14; so much worse that he hoped to leave Europe altogether, 
having applied to study cinematography under Sergei Eisenstein.  
However, only two months after Beckett ‘could not finish the Ethic of 
Geulincx’ in early April he did manage to finish the more pressing Murphy, finalising 
a first draft by 7 June and getting it ready to send off to publishers over the following 
twenty days. While Beckett described his composition of this novel from start to finish 
as a struggle, the coincidence of dates indicates that Geulincx may be bound in some 
ways to Murphy’s final stages of composition, and may even have provided some helps 
towards Beckett’s finalising it. 
 
2.3   Murphy’s composition – Quality 
 
Beckett’s correspondence indicates, as far as can be discerned, that for the 
most part Murphy was written chronologically, a broadly uncontroversial factor but 
one which will be shown to be important when tracing the origins and progress of 
Geulincx’ impact on the novel. For instance, Beckett ‘went round the wards for the 
first time’15 of the Bethlem Royal Hospital in September 1935 with his friend Geoffrey 
Thompson, a research trip that manifests as Murphy’s employment at the Magdalen 
Mental Mercyseat (MMM), an institution first mentioned in Chapter 5 when Austin 
Ticklepenny introduces himself and offers to arrange for Murphy’s ultimately 
ungainful employment. On 2 October 1935 Beckett attended Jung’s third Tavistock 
lecture, which arguably provided Beckett with material that found its way into the 
chapter on ‘Murphy’s mind’16. In a letter to MacGreevy a few days after Jung’s lecture 
(the same letter in which Beckett reported having written about 20,000 words of the 
novel) Beckett described the lecture in which Jung had shown a tripartite diagram of 
the mind and, in the questions put to Jung following the written lecture (transcribed 
in the record of the lecture series), had discussed the famous case of the girl who had 
‘never been born entirely’17, a description that also finds its way into Watt’s addenda. 
Nearly six months later (in a letter of 25 March 1936) and close to the end of the 
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novel’s initial period of composition Beckett describes a trip to Galway with his 
brother Frank, a trip that Ackerley argues becomes incorporated into the 
‘Clonmachnois’ in Neary’s vision following the protagonist’s death.18  
If this chronological induction is correct it implies that when Beckett wrote on 
February 6 1936 that ‘There only remain three chapters of mechanical writing’19, the 
specific work being done on Murphy would have been, concurrent with his Geulincx 
research, on what became the last few chapters of the 13-chapter novel.  
 
2.4   Geulincx in Chapter 9 
 
This hypothesis, that Geulincx is likely to most clearly appear in some form in 
the later stages of Murphy, is indeed proved accurate. Geulincx is named and the 
ethical axiom quoted in Chapter 9 at the moment Murphy claims to commit himself 
to the ‘little world’ of his interiority: 
 
His vote was cast. ‘I am not of the big world, I am of the little world’ was an old 
refrain with Murphy, and a conviction, two convictions, the negative first. How 
should he tolerate, let alone cultivate, the occasions of fiasco, having once beheld 
the beatific idols of his cave? In the beautiful Belgo-Latin of Arnold Geulincx: 
Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis.20 
 
Beckett’s reference to Geulincx’ maxim in Murphy has a precedent in an entry Beckett 
added to the ‘Whoroscope’ notebook, which reads ‘21. Murphy: I am not of the big 
world, I am of the little world: ubi nihil valo, ibi nihil velo (I quote from memory) & 
inversely’21. In a 1993 article Rupert Wood made an important observation about the 
well-known citation of Geulincx in Murphy: 
 
It is unclear whether this particular conviction, as expressed by Geulincx, forms 
part of Murphy’s credo, or whether the line is simply a piece of narratorial 
intervention. 
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This ambivalence is ‘symptomatic’, for Wood, ‘of the general uneasiness about the 
intrusion of the philosopher, as name or figure, that pervades Beckett’s writing’22. 
However, Wood’s invocation of a ‘general uneasiness’ sidesteps the fact that such 
moments of ‘narratorial intervention’ or assertion of a character’s ‘credo’ are discrete, 
and alter dramatically throughout Beckett’s oeuvre. There is no ‘general’ uneasiness, 
though there are many specific instances of uneasiness. Similarly, if this is ‘narratorial 
intervention’ it might be far from being ‘simply’ so. It is complicated, for instance, by 
Beckett’s description in 1956 of Geulincx writing in a ‘frightful kitchen Latin’. This 
later description indicates that whoever is speaking in Murphy at this point, whether 
Murphy or narrator, the important thing is that they might be speaking with their 
tongue-in-cheek. While Wood is undoubtedly correct in imputing to Beckett’s work a 
frequency of uneasiness at moments of ‘intrusion’ from philosophers, by speaking 
only of ‘general’ uneasiness Wood runs the danger of missing what distinguishes this 
novel’s particular ‘moments’ of Geulincx. Indeed, in Murphy Beckett is a great deal 
less uneasy about the incorporation of a ‘name or figure’ than he will be in later 
works, something reflected in the welcomed ‘intrusion’ that Geulincx makes.  
Taking this first mention of Geulincx in Chapter 9 as crucial, I argue that there 
are a number of important consequences to Beckett encountering Geulincx too late 
into Murphy’s composition to drive larger aspects of the narrative throughout the 
novel, so late such that any influence earlier than Chapter 9 would largely be a matter 
of Beckett’s extensive revising and redrafting. While this late ‘intrusion’ is not the 
‘key’ to the novel Bair alludes to, it is welcomed by Beckett, who seizes upon 
Geulincx as a source of obscure allusions and a vehicle for themes and structuring 
devices already present in the novel. Rather than deepening these themes or narrative 
arcs in line with the complexity of Beckett’s newly detailed knowledge of Geulincx, 
however, Beckett appears to rely on a more insubstantial reading of Geulincx entirely 
derivable from the earlier ‘Philosophy Notes’. This is a reading according to which 
Geulincx’ only, categorical and stark conclusion is that, ‘Man has nothing to do in 
outer world’23. Beckett’s move, to summarise it, is one of substituting for this ‘Man’ a 
name that also begins from his favoured middle letter, Murphy. The impression that 
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this conception of Geulincx predominantly determines the incorporations into 
Murphy is strengthened by noting something regarding Beckett’s letter of 16 January 
1936, where he described realising of his non-puppet, ‘I suddenly see that Murphy is 
[a] break down between his ubi nihil vales ibi nihil velis (positive) and Malraux’s Il est 
difficile à celui qui vit hors du monde de ne pas rechercher les siens (negation)’. The 
thing to note is that Beckett appears to have ‘suddenly’ seen this ‘break down’ before 
he was extensively engaged in the research, as the letter describes the research as still 
planned, not yet undertaken: ‘I shall have to go into TCD after Geulincx, as he does 
not exist in National Library’ (my italics). While Beckett certainly appears to have 
known that TCD held a copy of Geulincx’ works, even if he had looked at Opera by 
this point he seems unlikely to have got very far with his transcriptions. Beckett was 
drawing broad conclusions about Murphy via Geulincx, then, without yet actually 
transcribing from Opera in extensive detail. 
The compliment to Geulincx’ ‘beautiful Belgo-Latin’ arises in the context of 
Murphy’s mistaken, naïve and narcissistic appraisal of the patients at the MMM. The 
narrator intimates a similar assessment of Murphy’s conceptions of the patients’ 
sufferings: 
 
The frequent expressions apparently of pain, rage, despair and in fact all the 
usual, to which some patients gave vent, suggesting a fly somewhere in the 
ointment of Microcosmos, Murphy either disregarded or muted to mean what he 
wanted.24 
 
Murphy believes that the patients have achieved a persistence of that singular state he 
loves in himself when ensconced in his chair or collapsed in reveries in the grass of 
Hyde Park, where he ‘has nothing to do in outer world’. Accordingly he hopes to one 
day attain the same level of exemption ‘from the big world’s precocious ejaculations 
of thought, word and deed’25, as the patients seem to him to have achieved. They have 
managed, so Murphy believes, to escape the daily world’s contingencies and ascend to 
a plane of pure self, and consequently ‘Murphy presupposed them, one and all, to be 
having a glorious time’26. Murphy is popular with the patients, and he refuses to 
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ascribe this to the farces and disasters of Suk’s stars. Instead he hoards this happy 
outcome as a consequence of his own agency, giving him further cause to align himself 
with the patients, to mistakenly think ‘that they felt in him what they had been and he 
in them what he would be’27. However, despite Murphy’s hopes to attain the patients’ 
state, to ‘clinch’ the matter, he is too tied to a world of physicality, too dependent on 
and distracted by the minor hedonistic pleasures of the big world, ‘as witness his 
deplorable susceptibility to Celia, ginger, and so on’. He is too narcissistic to forgo the 
possibility that certain things he desires which might appear to him to happen due to 
his agency are not in fact due to this, but result only from a skewed perception. 
Consequently, for Murphy, even though he seeks to avoid the perhaps somewhat 
occasionalist ‘occasions of fiasco’ in his little world, it  
 
was not enough to want nothing where he was worth nothing. Nor even to take 
the further step of renouncing all that lay outside the intellectual love in which 
alone he could love himself, because there alone he was lovable. It had not been 
enough and showed no signs of being enough. These dispositions and others 
ancillary, pressing every available means (eg, the rocking-chair) into their service, 
could sway the issue in the desired direction, but not clinch it.28 
 
The approach Geulincx offers to Murphy, to ‘want nothing where he is worth 
nothing’, is insufficient. That is, Murphy still wants, still desires things of the big 
world even though he might be capable of very little there. Tenuously, but 
persistently, Murphy is tied into a world he does not love, and wherein he is not 
lovable, and the rocking-chair will not serve to sever these ties. The narrator is not 
claiming that Murphy wants nothing in the big world, yet this wanting nothing is 
insufficient. Rather it is the case that Murphy cannot bring himself to want nothing in 
the big world. When the narrator notes that ‘it was not enough to want nothing where 
he was worth nothing’, he quotes the axiom as an impossibility for Murphy, not as 
something he has already achieved but found wanting. This is how the ascription of 
beauty to Geulincx’ ‘Belgo-Latin’ can be accounted for – it speaks of the unattainable, 
a futile hope of freedom.  
Murphy’s falling short reflects both how Beckett himself was enamoured of 
and resistant to Geulincx’ Ethica, determined to go to some lengths to research him 
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yet unable to reach the end of his major work, and it reflects the decisions and 
compromises Beckett was forced to make when nearing the novel’s completion, 
hoping for help yet resistant to too-massive change. In turn, the incorporations of 
Geulincx into Murphy, particularly this manifestation of Geulincx as the man of the 
little world, function as a microcosm of the broader compromises that arguably 
constrain this novel. While on the one hand a great achievement, the culmination of a 
decade of Beckett’s writing and an undoubted success, this success is not an 
unqualified one and Murphy arguably suffers at times from certain of the same things 
as it achieves – its semi-realist narration and its complex plot, for example. If 
Geulincx is a simple ‘key’ to open the complex lock of this wide-ranging novel, then it 
is one that can do so only by bringing into view the broader achievements and 
limitations of the novel. While Beckett appears to have striven to incorporate a 
number of allusions to Geulincx in the later parts of Murphy, before brilliantly and 
with little sign of awkward contrivance building him into the major climax of the 
novel over the chessboard, nevertheless all these incorporations, or welcomed 
‘intrusions’, are determined to a large degree by the uncomplicated binary 
conceptualisation of Geulincx that Beckett did not really need to venture into TCD 
for at all. 
The passage that cites Geulincx’ axiom appears towards the end of Chapter 9, 
the first of the three chapters that draw most heavily upon Geulincx, the others being 
Chapters 10 and 11. Chapters 12 and 13 rely for their narrative propulsion and scenic 
dénouements on the other characters finding Murphy burnt to a cinder, before 
leavening their regrets in a pastoral conclusion. It is predominantly, though not 
exclusively, where the novel focuses on Murphy himself that Geulincx becomes most 
useful for Beckett, as it is the ‘seedy solipsist’29 himself who suffers from the particular 
symptoms of occasionalism.  
 
2.5   Murphy’s dualism and the rocking-chair 
 
Chapter 6 describes Murphy’s mind and Murphy’s own experiences of it, and 
summarises the stark dualist schism with which the protagonist is aligned: ‘Murphy 
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felt himself split in two, a body and a mind’. Murphy is and feels that he is part 
constituted by an embodied and connected mind. A mind locked ‘bodytight’, and he  
 
did not understand through what channel intercourse was effected nor how the 
two experiences came to overlap. He neither thought a kick because he felt one 
nor felt a kick because he thought one. Perhaps the knowledge was related to the 
fact of the kick as two magnitudes to a third. Perhaps there was, outside space 
and time, a non-mental non-physical kick from all eternity, dimly revealed to 
Murphy in its correlated modes of consciousness and extension, the kick in 
intellectu and the kick in re. But where then was the supreme Caress? 
 
Certainly, Murphy’s lack of interaction between his thoughts and his body echoes 
Geulincx. For example, Beckett had transcribed from Metaphysics’ ‘Autology’ section: 
 
Proposition 8. Body, and its motions, have no natural capacity to arouse thoughts 
in my mind. 
In whatever way bodies come together, they do not pass into my mind. I am in a 
thing free of parts, as was said above; and one cannot pass into something that 
has no parts.30 
 
These arguments continue into Ethics, where they retain their similarity to Murphy’s 
thoughts. 
 
I do not know how, and through which nerves and other channels, motion is 
directed from my brain into my limbs; nor do I know how motion reaches the 
brain, or even whether it reaches the brain at all.31 
 
It is tempting to posit such earlier sections of the novel as those that were rewritten 
after Beckett’s Geulincx research. Chapter 6, after all, might be described as a 
discrete, stand-alone chapter, and would not have needed as much as other sections to 
be written in chronological order. But this cannot be confirmed and must, perhaps 
until Sasha Murphy sees the light of day, remain speculative. 
Murphy himself cares little about solving the issues that have led him to see 
himself in occasionalist terms: ‘The problem was of little interest […] Of infinitely 
more interest than how this came to be so was the manner in which it might be 
exploited’32. Concomitant with Murphy’s own avoidance of investigating this divide 
                                                
30 Metaphysics, p. 40. 
31 Ethics, p. 33. 
32 Murphy, p. 70. 
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head-on, so to speak, most critical investigations of the difficult and ambiguous 
Chapter 6, the chapter Ackerley describes as ‘that vitagraph of Murphy’s mind’33, 
appropriately annex themselves to a discussion of the rocking-chair. For it is only in 
this chair that Murphy is able to take leave of his body and access his deepest modes 
of mind. With a conarium that ‘has shrunk to nothing’34 Murphy suffers from a divide 
with a rather ‘disappointed bridge’35, to adapt Stephen Dedalus’ description of 
Kingstown pier. In a sense this chair is Murphy’s substitute conarium, the first in 
Beckett’s oeuvre of a series of mechanised props that mediate interaction, 
disappointed or otherwise, between a character and their surrounding world. 
Uhlmann has attempted the most sustained interpretation of Murphy’s chair in 
relation to Geulincx, drawing attention to parallels between the chair and one of 
Geulincx’ central analogies in Ethics, that of a child’s cradle.36 Geulincx argues that 
just as a child crying for its cradle to be rocked infers a principle of causation between 
its crying and the cradle being rocked, unaware as it is of the actual intervening cause 
(its ‘mother or nursemaid’37), so too humankind habitually thinks of itself as causing 
actions to happen by inferring comparable connections between willing something to 
happen and that thing’s happening. When in fact all there is in reality, according to 
Geulincx, is the disconnected and disappointed ‘occasion’ of willing, and the separate 
‘occasion’ of an action.  
According to Geulincx, when humanity fails to recognise the necessity of 
occasionalism it is in a similar position to the baby in the cradle. Humanity does not 
take account of the invisible hand that must belong to God. Geulincx discusses the 
analogy in a number of places, and it occurs three times in Beckett’s notes.38 Alongside 
the third of these instances (in the second fair copy – TCD MS 10971/6/26) Beckett 
adds two annotations. In the margin of the first of three paragraphs Beckett notes 
‘mater/’ [mother], and alongside the third paragraph notes ‘nostra/’ [our, or ours]. 
This marginalia condenses Geulincx’ extrapolation from the baby’s carer to all 
                                                
33 Ackerley 2008, p. 204. 
34 Murphy, p. 6. 
35 Joyce 1993, p. 25. 
36 See Uhlmann 2006a, pp. 78-85. 
37 Ethics, p. 340. 
38 See Ethics, pp. 332 & 340, corresponding to TCD MS 10971/6/15v (first fair copy), TCD MS 
10971/6/22 & TCD MS 10971/6/26 (second fair copy).  
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humanity, from a ‘mother’ to ‘ours’, Beckett foregrounding the neatness and elegance 
of Geulincx’ argument.  
In the second appearance of the analogy in Beckett’s transcriptions Geulincx 
qualifies its force, stepping back from the dangers of too-neat identifications: 
 
The analogy of the baby and his mother on the one hand, and of God and me on 
the other hand, is a lame one…(God makes motion, the mother does not make it; 
the baby moves his mother to move, I do not move God). But the whole force 
and energy of the analogy turns on this, that just as the motion or rocking of the 
cradle is made with the baby willing it, though this motion is not made by the 
baby, so equally, motion is often made with me willing it, though I never make 
it.39 
 
Uhlmann traces the recurrences of rocking-chairs from Beckett’s later works Rockaby 
and Film back to this cradle in Geulincx. His argument, that in ‘occluded’ ways these 
later chairs derive from Geulincx’ rocking-chair, is bolstered by Geulincx employing 
the image of the child in the cradle in connection with a discussion of the 
impossibility of suicide. Suicide in Ethics functions as a synecdoche illustrating simply 
that because any action is impossible unless God also wills such to happen, so too is 
an extreme action such as suicide. Uhlmann points out that rocking-chairs in 
Beckett’s oeuvre often similarly appear in the context of some relation between 
comfort and death (the death of Murphy, for example, the ‘apparent death of “O” in 
Film, and the imminent death of “w” in Rockaby’40). In a separate article on images in 
Geulincx and Beckett, Uhlmann describes the project of identifying these occluded 
imagistic congruencies: 
 
The ‘discovery’ of the genealogy of such images clearly brings something new to 
the texts, without in any sense solving them. The images will always remain in 
some ways occluded, as it is impossible to completely circumscribe their 
                                                
39 Ethics, pp. 340-341. 
40 Uhlmann 2006a, p. 85. The question of the extent to which Murphy is responsible for his own death 
is not a clear one and a number of critics have advanced various solutions. Rubin Rabinovitz proposes 
Cooper as perpetrator (See Rabinovitz 1984, pp.113-118), Ackerley proposes (with all due 
qualifications) Ticklepenny, and others assume Murphy himself. There is a clear-cut case of suicide in 
the novel. The Old Boy’s throat is cut by his own cut-throat razor for no better reason than, according 
to Ackerley and Gontarski, to cut his throat follows from the nature of his object (see Ackerley and 
Gontarski (eds.) 2006, p. 546). When it comes to Murphy, however, ‘a classical case of misadventure’ 
(Murphy, p. 164), the coroner’s vague diagnosis, fittingly un-resolves the issue. Beckett wrote in a letter 
to Mania Péron of 21 April 1951 that Murphy ‘pas de suicider’, that his will in this regard does not in 
the end even matter because he had already committed ‘suicider mental’ (Beckett to Mania Péron, 21 
April 1951, Carlton Lake Collection of Samuel Beckett Papers, Series 2, Box 17, Folder 19, HRHRC). 
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meaning. That is, the identification of points of resonance such as this allows new 
elements of the image to powerfully unfold, without in any sense exhausting their 
potential.41 
 
According to Uhlmann, these imagistic, apparently atemporal ‘points of resonance’ 
somehow simultaneously exist within a historical genealogical lineage of occluded 
imagery. However, given the chronology of Murphy’s composition outlined above it is 
unclear whether such a ‘genealogy’ would begin first with the chair of Murphy, or, as 
might be preferred from the point of view of a more straightforward study of 
influence, with Geulincx’ cradle in Ethics. As we have seen, Beckett began work on 
the novel in August 1935. The very opening scene of Murphy finds the protagonist 
ensconced in his chair, and this chair is so central to the novel’s development that it 
would perhaps be surprising were this an aspect of the novel Beckett inserted when 
redrafting. Indeed, Ackerley has clarified this issue as informed by the ‘Whoroscope’ 
notebook: 
 
The image of the central character (“X”) thus bound into his chair was present in 
the earliest drafts of the novel (in the Whoroscope Notebook), long before 
Beckett’s intensive reading of Geulincx; the question abides, therefore, as to 
precisely how and how far an Occasionalist reading is possible.42 
 
Contributing further analysis of how Murphy’s chair functions as part of a 
mind-body binary, Shane Weller has described how, like Mr. Endon’s ‘reliance’43 
upon chess, the chair is a symptom of dependence on precisely that which it seeks to 
negate – the outer reality. The chair is irreducibly a part of the physical outer, big 
world, while it is also a kind of bridge to the inner world.44 Similarly, Ackerley refers 
to Geulincx’ summary phrase that asserts ‘I am a mere spectator of a machine whose 
workings I can neither adjust nor readjust’45 to compare Murphy’s chair to Geulincx’ 
description of the surrounding world as a machine on which one depends: ‘In the 
                                                
41 Uhlmann 2006b, p. 94. 
42 Ackerley 2008, p. 204. For an entirely different perspective on the context in which chairs function in 
relation to ‘Beckett’s Seated Figures’, see Brater 2009. 
43 Weller 2005, p. 88. 
44 See Weller 2005, pp. 88-90. 
45 Ethics, p. 333. 
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‘Annotata’ [§21, 212], the machinery is identified as the world; in the novel the chair 
is referred to as a machine [30]’46.  
Authors other than Beckett have turned even more explicitly to Geulincx’ 
occasionalist disconnection conceived in terms of a fusion of and co-dependency 
between man and machine. In Fred Saberhagen’s 1979 science fiction novel Berserker 
Man, for example, a small group of human resistance fighters place their hopes with a 
child called Michael Geulincx, who due to a hybrid parentage is part human and part 
machine. Similarly to how Murphy seeks what he thinks of as ‘the best of himself’47 
within his man-machine hybrid world, where he becomes what Beckett calls ‘the 
entire machine’48, so too Michael Geulincx can only fulfil his potential as Christ-like 
saviour when he is fused into a further machine, in his case a special kind of space 
suit, one sympathetic to its context as both human (it is skin-like, self-healing), and 
machine (it is various kinds of life-support system and weapon). This suit (‘Lancelot’) 
provides Michael Geulincx access to a realm of experiences otherwise beyond his 
reach, comparable to how Murphy can only access his deepest zone of mind in the 
chair: 
 
Again Lancelot guided him into the realm that seemed to lie beyond time. And 
now Michael began for the first time to feel fully the stresses that Lancelot could 
impose upon a connected human mind.49 
 
This ‘realm that seemed to lie beyond time’, accessible only when plugged in to the 
machine to become more than the sum of its parts as ‘the entire machine’, is for both 
Michael Geulincx and for Murphy, the ‘best’ of themselves. That Michael Geulincx is 
able to access such a ‘realm’ as a ‘connected human mind’ might just save all 
humanity. That Murphy is able will not even save Murphy, who hopes for outcomes 
that are far more narcissistic. This narcissism is fundamental to Murphy, and it is born 
out partly via the complicities and complications in Beckett’s subversion of Spinoza, a 
subversion that relates to Geulincx in intriguing ways. 
 
                                                
46 Ackerley 2004, p. 29. 
47 Murphy, p. 46. 
48 Murphy, p. 21. 
49 Saberhagen 1988, p. 117. 
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2.6   Murphy and Spinozan self-inspection 
 
In his chair where Murphy is free from the machinations of bodily 
‘connection’ he seeks a kind of acquaintance with himself. He pursues inner 
explorations that might be considered analogous with Geulincx’ inspectio sui. 
Murphy’s investigations depend upon a freedom from contingency, just as Geulincx’ 
Cartesian investigation based on the cogito also does, and they purport to invite, 
rather than proscribe, the limits of selfhood as defined epistemologically. We might, 
therefore, want to assert that Murphy is a kind of philosopher. Yet Murphy loves 
wisdom only in so far as it is constituted by an experience of self. The only thing 
Murphy is interested in is ‘what he had not ceased to seek from the moment of his 
being strangled into a state of respiration – the best of himself’50. But Murphy is not a 
self-improver, a voyager. This ‘best’ Murphy cannot find venturing out in a world 
unless parts of this world act as his proxy, as with the patients at the MMM. Instead, 
he gathers himself together in the chair, and seeks to find the ‘best of himself’ deep 
within his own free-floating depths. In this surrendering self-inspection, Murphy’s 
‘surrender to the thongs of self, a simple materialisation of self-bondage, acceptance 
of which is the fundamental unheroic’51 as Beckett described it in a German diary 
entry of 18 January 1937, and as a narcissistic philosopher, might we want to assert 
that Murphy is wholeheartedly a Geulingian philosopher? 
An important qualification should be noted before Murphy’s inner 
explorations are entirely co-opted as a Geulingian inspectio sui. Importantly, it is 
explicitly in terms of Spinoza that Murphy’s self-regard is framed, in the epigraph to 
Chapter 6 that subverts Spinoza’s description of God: 
 
Amor intellectualis quo Murphy se ipsum amat52 
[The intellectual love with which Murphy loves himself] 
 
For Spinoza, knowing of the love God has for himself leads to the further knowledge 
of what mankind should do to secure its salvation: 
                                                
50 Murphy, p. 46. 
51 German Diary 4, UoR. 
52 Murphy, p. 69. 
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Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves mankind, and, 
consequently, that the love of God towards men and the mind’s intellectual love 
towards God are one and the same. […] From this we clearly understand in what 
our salvation or blessedness or freedom consists, namely, in the constant and 
eternal love towards God, that is, in God’s name towards men. This love or 
blessedness is called glory in the Holy Scriptures, and rightly so.53 
 
Murphy, however, finds no such ‘salvation’ resulting from his ‘love towards’ himself, 
whose self-regarding ‘love towards’ might be described as more masturbatory than 
procreative. Murphy defers only to himself and avoids all involvement in the big 
world, so there is no Spinozan ‘glory’ for the protagonist. Murphy’s ignominious 
petite mort is a logical consequence of his being ensconced in his little world.  
By tying the love of God into Murphy’s love of self, Beckett brings Spinoza’s 
dictum (Deus se ipsum amore intellectuali infinito amat54 [God loves himself with an 
infinite intellectual love]) down to earth via Murphy’s narcissism and arrogance. As 
Ackerley points out of the epigraph: 
 
Spinoza thus subverted is a convenient formulation for the rejection of the 
rationalist tradition, although Beckett finally relies more upon the very different 
Ethica of Geulincx, in which, however, the opposition of Ratio (reason) and 
Philautia (self-love) is a constant theme.55  
 
There are also, however, some interesting interrelations between Beckett’s uses of 
occasionalism and Spinoza along these lines. Geulincx elucidates a breakdown of 
‘Love’ into two divisions: ‘pleasant love, and effective love’. Pleasant love is itself 
composed of two further divisions: ‘sensible or corporeal love […] and spiritual love’. 
Self-love, in Wilson’s translation ‘concupiscent love’, is a sub-division of Effective 
love, which manifests as 
 
either benevolent love (which does not make for virtue, as we cannot do anything 
either good or bad for Reason), concupiscent love (and this makes for virtue even 
less, as with concupiscent love we love ourselves, not Reason), or obedient love 
(and this at last constitutes virtue, for no other love is consistent with Reason).56  
 
                                                
53 Spinoza 1992, p. 219 (Ethica V, proposition no. 36). 
54 Spinoza 1992, p. 218 (Ethica V, proposition no. 35). 
55 Ackerley 2004, p. 116. 
56 Ethics, p. 312. 
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As Beckett transcribed:  
 
Amor concupiscentiae…non est aliud quam amor sui, seu Philautia…et fomes 
Peccati, aut potius ipsissimum Paccatum.57 
Concupiscent Love…it is nothing other than Self-Love or Philautia…it is the 
tinder of Sin, or rather Sin its very own self.58 
 
In Chapter 10 of Murphy Wylie, former pupil of the Newtonian Pythagorean Neary, 
asserts his own Geulingian prerogative in similar terms: 
 
‘My attitude,’ said Wylie, ‘being the auscultation, execution and adequation of 
the voices, or rather voice, of Reason and Philautia, does not change.59 
 
Beckett annotated his Geulincx notes on self-love with a summary phrase added in 
English (here in bold): 
 
Humility foreign to the ancients… But self-love seduced them all; and here I 
excuse no-one, not even great Plato…60 
 
Humility is also foreign to Murphy, and self-love, following the subversion of 
Spinoza’s phrase, also seduces Murphy. It does so in such a way as to owe debts both 
to Spinoza and to Geulincx that become even more interwoven and complex when we 
consider Beckett’s earlier ‘Philosophy Notes’. These reveal that Beckett had 
previously aligned aspects of occasionalism with Spinoza’s axiom. The notes cite 
Malebranche’s concept of universal reason as a parallel to the Spinozan original of 
Murphy’s Chapter 6 epigraph: ‘(amor intellectualis quo deus se ipsum amat = raison 
universelle of Malebranche)’61. 
The incidence of the word Philautia in Murphy might at first appear to imply 
its provenance as deriving from Beckett’s Geulincx transcriptions, yet Beckett had 
noted Philautia earlier. It appears in the ‘Dream’ notebook (entry no. 779), where it is 
snatched from Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy as part of the entry ‘inexorable & 
                                                
57 TCD MS 10971/6/8v. 
58 Ethics, p. 315. 
59 Murphy, p. 134. 
60 Ethics, p. 311. In the first fair copy Beckett wrote this phrase as ‘Humility no virtue for the ancients’ 
(TCD MS 10971/6/7r). 
61 TCD MS 10967/188. 
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supercilious & arrogant & eminent philolau philautia’62. The occurrence of the word 
itself and the broader conceptual apparatus of self-love in Murphy, then, provide 
examples of how Beckett’s incorporations of Geulincx are sometimes more complex 
than at first sight they might appear to be. 
 
2.7  Geulincx in Chapter 11 
  
The word ‘adminicles’, which appears in Chapter 11, can with more 
confidence be said to derive from the Geulincx notes. Murphy feels himself the 
subject of a further binary division, this time of separateness from all his daytime 
involvement with the hospital patients, and ‘the gulf’ becomes tangible: 
 
There were the patients themselves, circulating through the wards and in the 
gardens. He could mix with them, touch them, speak to them, watch them, 
imagine himself one of them. But in the night of Skinner’s there were none of 
these adminicles, no loathing to love from, no kick from the world that was not 
his, no illusion of caress from the world that might be.63 
 
Here, as with Chapter 6, Beckett again melds psychology with philosophy. In an 
atmosphere of night ordained by the radical behaviourist psychologist B. F. Skinner, 
whose theories prioritised individual private experience (which more traditional 
theories of behaviourism necessarily lacked), Murphy’s own singular and private 
experience lacks the support of daytime distractions, the consolations of interaction 
with the patients.64 Following Geulincx’ section in Ethics on the seven ethical 
obligations that proceed from an acceptance of humility and the ubi nihil vales, ibi 
nihil velis axiom, is the penultimate section of Treatise 1 concerning what Geulincx 
calls the ‘Adminicle of Humility’65. Beckett’s notes to this section are all contained in 
the handwritten manuscript that continues from the end of the second fair copy. This 
                                                
62 Beckett 1999, p. 111. 
63 Murphy, p. 149. 
64 Skinner was involved in many psychological theories and projects, inventing ‘operant conditioning’, 
and receiving many awards (including the National Medal of Service, awarded by Lyndon Johnson). 
Skinner had a preference for pigeons as his experimental creature of choice, and during the Second 
World War concocted ‘Project Pigeon’, a plan for a pigeon-guided missile where the bird, trained to 
recognise a picture of the target, would peck at a directional screen in the nose cone of a missile. 
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word adminicle, derived from adminiculum and meaning prop or support, summarises 
Geulincx’ thoughts on humility as it pertains to happiness: 
 
Happiness is like a shadow: it flees from you when you pursue it; but pursues you 
when you flee from it. But you should be aware that it may not always pursue you 
when you flee; for if you learn cunning in the ways of happiness and flee from it 
in order that it may pursue you, it will not pursue you.66 
 
Geulincx insists on humanity finding a way to become solely compelled to follow its 
ethical obligations, not to more wildly or frantically pursue satisfactions of temporary 
happiness. This is not only because following the dictates of Reason, according to 
Geulincx, is the right thing to do (as we have seen, Geulincx argues that ‘Virtue is the 
exclusive Love of right Reason’67), it is also because pursuing happiness is futile 
anyway, because ‘it flees from you’ when you do so. It is Geulincx’ final lesson in 
Treatise 1 deriving from the instruction not to attempt what you cannot attain (ubi 
nihil vales, ibi nihil velis), and it is asserted with a florid boldness that Beckett 
transcribed: 
 
Let us forsake these inauspicious standards behind which with such great pomp, 
such great consent and concourse, so many impediments and burdens of studies 
and counsels, the human race marches. Day and night they seek Happiness; it is 
the Palladium for whose capture they compete…Nor are they ashamed of such 
disgraceful service, or rather servitude…Their watchword is public, and in the 
mouths of all: Let us be happy and prosper!68 
 
But what function does the word ‘adminicles’ have as a quotation in the 
context of Murphy? I want to suggest that it manifests a kind of middle ground as 
regards Beckett’s ‘notesnatching’ of fragmentary words and phrases from Geulincx. A 
number of other allusions to occasionalism in the novel do not require any strong 
integration between the allusion and its context in the novel. In Chapter 9, for 
example, Murphy questioned ‘the etymology of gas’, wondering whether gas might 
‘turn a neurotic into a psychotic’. He concludes: 
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68 Ethics, p. 353. 
  
72 
No. Only God could do that. Let there be heaven in the midst of the waters, let it 
divide the waters from the waters. The Chaos and Waters Facilities Act.69 
 
These wonderings are narrated as Murphy drifts off into himself in his chair. The 
intimation of an occasionalist God who is the only agent capable of causation is one of 
the first hints that Geulincx might be entering the peripheries of the novel. This 
peripheral presence becomes more subtly cohered with Murphy’s character in later 
allusions, and this is what happens with ‘adminicules’. The later ‘adminicules’ aligns 
Geulincx’ description of happiness as only possible in a turning away from happiness 
(in the hope that it might follow) with Murphy’s involvement with the shadowy 
patients at the hospital whom he pursues but who rarely pursue him. However, the 
word still juts out from the contextual text a little awkwardly, exhibiting its author’s 
expertise in Latin and manifesting a precision of intellectual omniscience at odds with 
the novel’s more determinedly ambiguous drives (such as bring about the more 
elusive Chapter 6), resulting in something comparable to the sections of the novel that 
Uhlmann critiques as occasional lapses into overly didactic uses of philosophy.70 
Consequently, it reveals, as do the infrequent but striking lapses into a didactic tone, 
that Beckett’s philosophical reading was still partly a hindrance to his firmly 
establishing his own voice. That is, Beckett’s Geulincx transcriptions provide a 
wellspring of complex concepts and ‘hard words’. But in instances such as this 
Beckett shows signs of struggling with the incorporation of these ideas. 
In the novel’s final few chapters there are further instances of fleeting allusions 
to occasionalism. Neary’s willingness ‘to count on the Almighty to pull off the rest’ 
after ‘the ice has been broken’71 in his hoped for relationship with Miss Counihan in 
Chapter 10, for example, subtly renders human wishes in terms of the deistic agency 
of occasionalism. As does the description of the sleeping patients: 
 
Those that slept did so in the frozen attitudes of Herculaneum, as though sleep 
had pounced upon them like an act of God. And those that did not did not by 
the obvious grace of the same authority.72 
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Yet even these are still fragmentary incorporations, and while they arguably import a 
level of irony they do not drive any major aspects of narrative, and little of the 
characterisation in the novel relies upon such interjections. Hence a description of the 
use of ‘adminicules’ as residing on middle ground, as marking a transition point in 
Beckett’s allusions to Geulincx where an apparently fleeting reference nevertheless 
deepens an understanding of the situation it is brought to bear on. 
There is an exception to these compromises of the middle ground, however, a 
place where Geulincx does not jut out at all obviously and which drives an important 
whole section of the novel’s dramatic structure and characterisation. The section is 
even more important than this, however, as it opens up for Beckett a wholly new area 
of literary expression. This is in the chess game of Chapter 11, and the following 
discussion reads this game in relation to Geulincx’ occasionalist philosophy of futile 
causation, and argues for the importance of the section as illustrative of Beckett’s 
aesthetics more broadly as they developed from Murphy to Watt. 
 
2.8  The failure of ‘vicarious autology’ in the chess game 
 
Geulincx argues for an epistemology, contra his philosophical progenitor 
Descartes, founded in ignorance, or ‘nehiscence’. We should follow a programme of 
self-inspection, but whereas Descartes found the cogito, a solid ground upon which all 
future knowledge could be confidently built, Geulincx finds ignorance of our place in 
a world and how we might interact with that world. In basing his philosophy on 
principles of incapacity rather than sure knowledge of self, Geulincx’ cogito, as 
Uhlmann points out, becomes a nescio (‘to not know’73). Geulincx’ eyes, as Beckett 
wrote in March 1936, turn ‘patiently inward’ (his principle of inspectio sui), but 
finding that we do not know anything about the things that we do, that we cannot 
therefore be said to actually do anything at all in the world, those eyes, which he does 
not ‘on that account […] repudiate […] like the terrified Berkeley’ or try to ‘put out 
[…] as Heraclitus did and Rimbaud began to’74, turn patiently outwards (the 
consequent despectio sui), in wonder and in humility. I argue that it is in this act of 
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turning, in the choice of direction in which he looks, that Murphy fails and falls short 
of Geulincx’ axiom. Murphy looks inside himself and finds there the joyous ‘pleasure, 
such pleasure that pleasure was not the word’75 and so finds no reason to look out 
again. Yet it will be while he is strapped into this closed space, in thrall only to 
himself, that he will clumsily set light to the big world around him and be gone 
forever. Thinking he was free from the big world’s elemental contingencies, Murphy’s 
rootedness in, literally his being tied to, the physical world, will be the cause of his 
death.  
Murphy is flattered that he appears to Ticklepenny to have ‘a great look of 
[the patient] Clarke’. For three weeks Clarke has been in a catatonic stupor in which 
he ‘would repeat for hours the phrase: “Mr. Endon is very superior.”’76 Murphy is 
flattered by his resemblance to Clarke because Murphy thinks the same about Mr. 
Endon. The patients in the MMM are to Murphy, like his own mind, a ‘Matrix of 
surds […] missile[s] without provenance or target, caught up in a tumult of non-
Newtonian motion’77. They are of interest to Murphy only in so far as they mirror his 
own sense of self. And for Murphy Mr. Endon is the apotheosis of this, the point at 
which to End-on. Mr. Endon for Murphy is the pinnacle of achievement of a self-
inspection, a staring at one’s ‘within’ (as is often pointed out in regard to Mr. Endon’s 
name, the Greek preposition endon means ‘within’). Knowlson points out of Mr. 
Endon that this figure ‘owes as much to Beckett’s readings about the unconscious, as 
it did to the patient whom Beckett saw in the hospital where Geoffrey Thompson was 
working’78. The real life precedent is revealed in the note that was the basis for 
Knowlson’s published assertion, in which Knowlson quotes Beckett saying Bethlem 
was indeed ‘where I saw Mr. Endon’79. The fictionalised Mr. Endon apparently suffers 
(though this may be such suffering that suffering is not the word, for he is numb and 
inviolable, not raging or in any apparent pain) from ‘a psychosis so limpid and 
imperturbable that Murphy felt drawn to it as Narcissus to his fountain’80. However, 
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79 This note belongs to the James and Elizabeth Knowlson collection, UoR. It is not yet catalogued. 
80 Murphy, p. 116. 
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as Murphy peers with an impatient eye through the Judas window into the little world 
of Mr. Endon’s cell the discrepancy between the two becomes clear: 
 
[…] the sad truth was, that while Mr. Endon for Murphy was no less than bliss, 
Murphy for Mr. Endon was no more than chess. Murphy’s eye? Say rather, the 
chessy eye. Mr. Endon had vibrated to the chessy eye upon him and made his 
preparations accordingly.81 
 
In a farce as ridiculous as the monkeys playing chess Beckett wanted as a frontispiece 
for the novel,82 the frustratedly stuck-in-the-big-world Murphy and the unwittingly 
stuck-in-the-little-world Mr. Endon will play out through Beckett’s favourite game of 
closed-space abstraction the Geulingian lack of causality, the ‘ethical yoyo’83, between 
themselves. For it is indeed Murphy’s failure to heed the axiom from Ethics during 
this game that is his undoing. That is, Murphy does not realise he has no power to 
cause any response in Mr. Endon, despite Mr. Endon being ‘voted by one and all the 
most biddable little gaga in the entire institution’84, and he persists with wilful 
determination, unable to cast his eyes with humility on the irreconcilable differences 
between himself and Mr. Endon. 
Even before the game starts a discrepancy between the two players is made 
clear. Mr. Endon must always play as Black, for ‘If presented with White he would 
fade, without the least trace of annoyance, away into a light stupor’85. The 
fundamental difference between Murphy and Mr. Endon is established here as their 
capacity for value judgements. Whereas Murphy casts his vote for the little world 
because of the value he places upon it, in sharp contrast to the loathed ‘occasions of 
fiasco’ he encounters when involving himself in the big world, Mr. Endon makes no 
such assessments about the world around him. If Murphy does not get his way he 
                                                
81 Murphy, p. 150. 
82 Publishers were not forthcoming. Beckett stated he would spend his life ‘regretting the monkeys’ 
(Beckett quoted in Ackerley and Gontarski (eds.) 2006, p. 380) after reminding Reavey a number of 
times to try to get this picture into the novel. He asked ‘what about apes’ (Beckett to Reavey, 13 
January 1938, HRHRC) then lamented further: ‘I suppose my apes have faded out as a possibility. I am 
disappointed’ (Beckett to Reavey, 17 January 1938, HRHRC)). 
83 Murphy, p. 69. Described in Ackerley 2004 (p. 120) as a reference to Geulincx’ Ethics, specifically to 
the post-Cartesian problem addressed therein of the interaction between mind and body, rather than to 
mediation between good or bad moral qualities.  
84 Murphy, p. 149. 
85 Murphy, p. 152. 
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rebels, twists the occasions to match his disposition. Mr. Endon does no such things, 
merely ‘fading away’ as subject to powers beyond his control. 
Murphy’s first move in the game, pawn to king’s fourth, is intriguingly a move 
that was also described in Beckett’s first published piece of fiction written seven years 
prior to Murphy in 1929. The first paragraph of the short story ‘Assumption’ contains 
the following: 
 
He spoke little, and then almost huskily, with the low-voiced timidity of a man 
who shrinks from argument, who can reply confidently to Pawn to King’s fourth, 
but whose faculties are frozen into bewildered suspension by Pawn to Rook’s 
third […] He indeed was not such a man, but his voice was of such a man86 
 
In this earlier story Beckett is willing to inscribe a specific move of chess with the 
force of a whole personality. This use of chess prior to Murphy gives a hint that we 
might be on a right track in thinking of Murphy’s own self as somehow inscribed in 
the moves of his game.  
Mr. Endon’s first move is knight to king’s rook third. Murphy tries mirroring 
Mr. Endon. Indeed his second, third, fourth, sixth and seventh moves all mirror those 
of Mr Endon. In the one instance of the game where Mr. Endon repeats a move 
Murphy has made (Mr. Endon’s eighth), he brings his pieces back to exactly the same 
positions they held when the game began. It might have been presumed from reading 
the annotation that describes this move as ‘An ingenious and beautiful début, 
sometimes called the Pipe-opener’ that this was a highly specialised real opening. In 
fact it is a comical manifestation of Mr. Endon’s mania for symmetry and his 
solipsism. He has merely rearranged his pieces in a monochrome visual pattern. After 
Murphy’s eighth move (mirroring Mr. Endon’s) the board is left just as it was after 
Murphy’s very first move of the game, as if Murphy had only played his pawn to 
king’s fourth opener. While the very first move of the game, not this eighth or the 
ninth, was described as ‘the primary cause of all White’s subsequent difficulties’87, this 
is only because it is the first move, Murphy’s necessary assertion of self that he can not 
take back. The primary cause of Murphy’s difficulties is just this, himself – his sanity, 
                                                
86 CSP, p. 3. 
87 Murphy, p. 152. 
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his normality in playing pawn to king’s fourth, and its rootedness in the world he 
longs to escape. 
In a series of moves calculated to solicit recognition of them, to force Mr. 
Endon to recognise Murphy as an independent agent, Murphy takes another 
approach to its extreme and tries desperately to give up his pieces. He moves a knight 
into a losing position three times and tries valiantly with what the narrator calls ‘the 
ingenuity of despair’ at move twenty-seven to sacrifice his queen, trying again at forty-
one, yet still Mr. Endon’s non-reaction is unshakeable. Neither approach causes Mr. 
Endon to produce anything like a competitive move. Just as Mr. Endon saw not 
Murphy at his Judas window but the ‘chessy eye’, similarly he follows the abstract 
rules of chess in a further abstraction. He does not follow them competitively, but 
instead adheres to them only in so far as they allow him, without actually breaking any 
of them, to monomaniacally rearrange a monochrome visual pattern according to a 
strict plan of symmetry, a closed system. Indeed, Mr. Endon’s manipulation of the 
pieces to rearrange symmetry is the single most determining factor of his moves in the 
game. On a further five occasions he manages to manoeuvre his pieces into a different 
symmetrical pattern, at move 21, 23, 27, 39 (this with his rooks upside down, though 
this does not upset the symmetry) and 41. 
Mr. Endon’s turns taken, the claim being that we cannot really call them his 
responses, during Murphy’s abject begging for quittance are described as his 
‘irresistible game’88 when rather than taking Murphy’s queen he returns a knight to a 
corner square, revealing his pieces in the comic symmetry of move 27. Murphy’s 
pieces of course end in utter disarray. Murphy is by turns confused, imitative, 
desperate, seemingly random, then suicidal, finally giving up the ghost when forced 
into a winning position by Mr. Endon’s most likely (but illegal) 44th move that would 
establish his pieces in a seventh occurrence of symmetry.89 Murphy can see that Mr. 
Endon is not going to notice him and is about to form another symmetrical pattern, 
and he cannot bear the consequent realisation that Mr. Endon does not see him as a 
                                                
88 Murphy, p. 153. 
89 It may be interesting to note that Murphy’s travails with conduits between the two worlds of the big 
and the little (the chair and Mr. Endon) are bookended by instances of the number six nearly but not 
quite becoming the number seven: Murphy’s seven scarves in the novel’s opening scene actually lack a 
seventh. 
  
78 
partner, an equal. So Murphy suddenly ‘surrenders’90: ‘Further solicitation would be 
frivolous and vexatious, and Murphy, with fool’s mate in his soul, retires’91. 
Geulincx wrote in Ethics: 
 
We have no power to affect either our own or any other body; this is perfectly 
obvious from our consciousness alone, and no sane man would deny it.92 
 
This Cartesian founding principle ‘obvious from consciousness alone’ is Geulincx’ 
clear and distinct realisation of impotence. Murphy does not realise he has no power 
to affect Mr. Endon. Instead his hubris prolongs the fruitless manoeuvres in a game 
he can only lose, and in his consequent frustration we might well hear an echo of 
Geulincx’ realisation that ‘I am a mere spectator of a machine whose workings I can 
neither adjust nor readjust. I neither construct nor demolish anything here’93. If only 
Murphy would try the alternative approach of Geulingian restraint he might just beat 
this catatonic at his own game. If Murphy would cast his eyes with humility upon his 
impotence and realise that where he cannot act, where he is worth nothing, he should 
not try to act, then he might at least stand a chance of failing this game in a better way. 
But Murphy is not a humble man. Geulincx asked rhetorically ‘How will [a humble 
man] listen to what Reason says if he listens only to what he himself says’94. Besotted 
with his own company, in the words of Malraux Murphy seeks out only those others 
who are like himself, listening only to himself or his vice-existers, and forcing the 
oblivion. Presaging Geulincx’ terminology as used by Beckett writing in 1946 to 
Duthuit, Murphy had been transfixed by a ‘vicarious autology he had been enjoying 
[…] in little Mr. Endon and all the other proxies’95. However, Murphy’s self-regard 
will get the better of him and when his inferno engulfs him it will be while he is still in 
thrall to himself and his own ‘autology’.  
Following the collapse of the game Murphy stares into the unresponsive 
cornea of Mr. Endon and sees ‘horribly reduced, obscured and distorted, his own 
                                                
90 Murphy, p. 152. 
91 Murphy, p. 153. 
92 Ethics, p. 243. 
93 Ethics, p. 333. 
94 Ethics, p. 220. 
95 Murphy, p. 118. Beckett uses this term again only three paragraphs later in an instance of repetition 
unlike his other uses of ‘hard words’ derived from Geulincx in Murphy. 
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image’96. This instant of non-perception has been described as a ‘Geulincxian critique 
of the Proustian moment, which redeems nothing’97. Murphy is horrifyingly still 
himself, unwilling to let go of his sanity’s rootedness in the big world. The cost of 
letting go is too great for the variously impecunious hero. O’Hara has described 
Murphy in this scene as reproducing ‘the pose of Narcissus, bent over the stream to 
see himself’98. This is the point at which Murphy in his narcissistic way blooms. To 
pursue this analogy briefly (while leaving O’Hara’s Freud to one side in favour of 
Ovid, whose Metamorphosis Beckett was fond of), if Mr. Endon is Murphy’s Echo, 
with his psychosis perhaps a little of Juno’s curse, this is only after Murphy has in vain 
and in vanity tried to sound the echo of Mr. Endon’s moves in the game. However, 
Murphy will be ‘melted, consumed by the fire inside him’99 as is the fate of Narcissus, 
rather than turning to stone. The game has unmasked him as the selfish Narcissus, not 
the selfless Echo. By the following day he will be dead and dust, even more literally ‘a 
speck in Mr. Endon’s unseen’100. Murphy, unable to resign himself to the Geulingian 
knowledge that ‘whatever I do stays within me; and that nothing I do passes into my 
body, or any other body, or anything else’101, persists with the misguided belief that 
there might be something to achieve in this game. There is not, and for Murphy as for 
anyone else Geulincx would offer the simple restraint: ‘It is vain to attempt what I 
cannot undertake’102. Murphy cannot properly seek out the company of others like 
himself, as he sees Mr. Endon (à la Malraux), yet nor can he sufficiently adhere to 
only his own (as with Geulincx). He will indeed ‘break down’, as Beckett described it, 
between these two in his dying whilst tied to the chair, to his ‘disappointed bridge’ 
that is neither here nor there, neither wholly of the big world nor of the little, just like 
Murphy. 
Chess is a frequently recurring motif in Beckett’s oeuvre. He is quoted 
describing a German production of Endspiel, for example, the title of which derives 
from the final phase of a chess game: ‘Hamm is the King in this chess game lost from 
                                                
96 Murphy, p. 156. 
97 Ackerley 2004, p. 202. 
98 O’Hara 1997, p. 60. 
99 Ovid 2004, p. 16. 
100 Murphy, p. 156. 
101 Ethics, p. 331. 
102 Ethics, p. 339. 
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the start. He knows from the start that he is only making senseless moves… He’s only 
trying to postpone the inevitable end… He is a poor player’103. Hamm’s autocratic 
attempts to position himself in relation to the dimensions of the room, hugging the 
walls before making sure he is dead centre, are movements that form part of a lineage 
in Beckett’s oeuvre that finds its first strong foothold with Mr. Endon’s solipsistic 
symmetry, though also goes back further to ‘Assumption’. According to Ackerley and 
Gontarski, when Beckett calls on chess this is frequently in order to ‘illustrate [a] 
paradox of freedom and restriction’104. Such a motif serves particularly well the 
demands of a narrative driven by occasionalist incapacity, that is with the appearance 
of freedom and the reality of restriction. The chess game of Murphy also elaborates 
the theme already in the novel of closed systems,105 in this instance given a Geulingian 
impetus. In both this and in its exceptionality in the novel as a game, an enumeration 
of specific, ludic moves, the chess game anticipates the many logistical and numerical 
systematic machinations to which Beckett will subject his next protagonist, Watt, and 
to which Watt will attempt to subject the world. 
Murphy’s chess game section was, therefore, hugely important to Beckett. 
Through all the difficulties trying to get the novel published Beckett remained 
steadfast in refusing to alter this section. Beckett had even considered ‘putting the 
game of chess there in a section by itself’106, and on 20 December 1936 flatly pointed 
out his frustration and incredulity at a publisher’s wishes to cut some of the book: 
 
I can’t imagine what they want me to take out. I refuse to touch the section 
entitled Amor Intellectualis quo M. se ipsum amat. And I refuse also to touch the 
game of chess. The Horoscope chapter is also essential. But I am anxious for the 
book to be published and therefore cannot afford to reply with a blank refusal to 
cut anything.107 
 
Nearly thirty years later when Murphy was reprinted by John Calder’s Jupiter imprint 
Beckett was again working on this chess game, altering Mr. Endon’s penultimate 
                                                
103 Ackerley and Gontarski (eds.) 2006, p. 96. 
104 Ackerley and Gontarski (eds.) 2006, p. 95. 
105 Those adumbrated by Ruby Cohn as ‘the park, Miss Dwyer’s figure, Murphy’s mind, and the horse 
leech’s daughter are all closed systems’ (Cohn 1962, p. 61). A closed system is a tightly bordered zone 
where any ‘quantum of wantum’ (Murphy, p. 38) is self-contained. An amount of desire becomes, in a 
closed system, a self-perpetuating ratio of desire to suffering. Closed systems by definition do not leak, 
and serve well as playthings of the monomaniacal and the insane. 
106 Beckett to MacGreevy, 7 July 1936. CL, p. 350. 
107 Beckett to Reavey, 13 November 1936. CL, p. 380. 
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move, number 42. Ackerley describes how ‘in many editions of Murphy Mr. Endon’s 
move 42 is incorrect, being printed as K-Q2, an illegal final move into check’, and 
continues: 
 
The Routledge original, the Grove Press printing and the French translation are 
correct; the error crept in when the novel was reset for the 1963 Jupiter edition, 
and was replicated in the Picador version where it went unnoticed even by those 
(Taylor and Loughery, 1989; myself, 1998) writing specifically on the game.108  
 
Ackerley could not have been aware when publishing this in 2004, as Beckett’s 
correspondence with Barbara Bray was not publicly available until 2006, that in this 
correspondence Beckett refers to the following alteration to the move:  
 
Checked Murphy’s game of chess and made a small change. Mr. Endon’s 42nd 
move: K – Q2 instead of K – K2. Pretty feeble joke the whole thing. Could do it a 
little better now – but not much.109 
 
The new move would place Mr. Endon’s King at the mercy of Murphy’s Queen on an 
adjacent square, which is an illegal move. The publishing ‘error’, however, in fact 
appears to be in reprinting the earlier K – K2, not in fixing the move to reflect legality. 
There is an argument to be made that this modification by Beckett was itself the error, 
as it is the only move in the game that breaks the rules of chess. Beckett may have had 
this pointed out to him. In a letter to Bray of early the following year Beckett reports 
he looked again at ‘Murphy proofs’ and writes ‘I thought there was an error in the 
Endon affence, but there does not seem to be, or I could not find it’110. With either 
move, however, the central point remains that Murphy refuses to end the game by 
making winning moves, but K – Q2 makes the ‘feeble joke’ of Mr. Endon’s lack of 
recognition that much more explicit, while also retaining the possibility that his next 
move would complete the symmetry.  
 
2.9   Occasional(ist) Reviews 
 
                                                
108 Ackerley 2004, p. 195. 
109 Beckett to Bray, 7 February 1962, TCD MS 10948/1/170. 
110 Beckett to Bray, postmark unclear but early-mid-January 1963. TCD MS 10948/1/219. 
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In 1938 Coffey wrote a review of Murphy that J.C.C. Mays argues presumably 
pleased Beckett enough to have been a major reason for his gifting Coffey the novel’s 
manuscript (the now privately owned Sasha Murphy discussed above, which Coffey 
sold sometime in the 1960s). In the allusion-heavy ‘review’ Coffey also asserts the 
chess game to be the novel’s climax, and writes of the scene following the game’s 
collapse: 
 
Communication – the crash together in space of two granite blocks – ends at the 
finger-nails. He does not undesire but through pain of loss. The experiment 
failed again.111 
 
For Coffey, as for Beckett, the chess game is the novel’s climactic ‘crash together in 
space’, revealing Murphy as he has studiously avoided seeing himself. How this climax 
comes about for Coffey, who frames the issue in terms of ‘Communication’, is through 
the very Geulingian concept of ‘undesire’. The realisation of the failure of Murphy’s 
‘experiment’ is a consequence of his inability to ‘undesire’, to undo his desires, to 
‘want nothing’.  
In a much more negative 1938 review, in which he wrote that ‘“Murphy” is 
difficult, serious, and wrong’, thanks in part to Beckett selling ‘his bluffs over the 
double counter’, Dylan Thomas did at least recognise the intelligence of the work, 
calling Beckett ‘a great legpuller and an enemy of obviousness’. This was not enough 
to redeem the novel in its entirety however, and Thomas concludes that the novel 
‘fails’: 
 
It fails in its purpose because the minds and the bodies of these characters are 
almost utterly without relation to each other.112 
 
Thomas’s central criticism of the novel, then, is one rather peculiarly framed in terms 
that point to the novel’s occasionalist concerns. The disconnections between mind 
and body, residing in the novel as we have seen as a ‘problem […] of little interest’ 
neither to be solved or even necessarily neatly rendered but rather ‘exploited’, is for 
                                                
111 Coffey 1938. Cited by Mays 2010, p. 89. 
112 Thomas 1938, p. 454. Beckett in his turn appears to have not been overly enamoured with Thomas. 
In a 1958 letter to Bray he wrote: ‘I listened to Dylan Thomas reading his fat poems and being witty on 
poetry, poets and him-self and didn’t like any of it, the pulpit voice and hyper-articulation and 
sibilation, but I’m lousy public’ (Beckett to Bray, 29 November 1958, TCD MS 10948/1/13). 
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Thomas only one that invokes ‘walking, gesticulating brains’113. Thomas’ imagery, 
however, is well suited to a depiction of Geulingian occasionalism. A ‘walking, 
gesticulating’ brain figures what for Geulincx is the essential ineffable mystery of all 
human life. That is, given that I have a brain and that I appear to do things (like walk 
and gesticulate, examples Geulincx even uses114), what is there constituting me but 
these two separate events upon which, with no rational justification, I impose a causal 
relation? If I reflect on the other hand ‘with reason’ then I will see that this causal 
relation is entirely impossible. According to Geulincx we are indeed just such 
‘walking, gesticulating brains’. As Coffey did, Thomas also gets to the heart of Murphy 
as a novel founded on occasionalist disconnection. For Coffey this is a disconnection 
between minds, between Mr. Endon’s and Murphy’s, and it instances the brilliance of 
the novel’s climactic non-climax. For Thomas it is between minds and bodies and 
shows the flaws in what he thinks of as the work itself not properly transited from 
Beckett’s own mind to the page. 
If, as argued, Beckett’s substantial encounter with Geulincx comes too late 
into the composition of Murphy for the philosopher to make a significant impact upon 
earlier stages of the novel (that would not be the result of extensive revisions), but 
when he does come to have an impact, as revealed in the chess game, this is an 
important one, might we therefore be inclined, or even forced, to think of the 
importance of Geulincx for Beckett in terms of a broader place in the oeuvre, focusing 
on the ‘already’ of Beckett’s ‘already in Murphy’ offered to Kennedy in 1967? If 
Geulincx was ‘already’ in Murphy then he would also be, this ‘already’ hints, in later 
works. The Geulincx notes taken in 1936 remained with Beckett all his life, in 
contrast to many other papers donated to archives at Reading or elsewhere, hinting 
perhaps that, as Uhlmann has suggested, ‘they were made […] for works he might 
write after Murphy’115. While Uhlmann’s stark assertion of what the notes were ‘made 
for’ is at odds with an ambiguity in the notes being ‘of uncertain status’ in this regard, 
nevertheless the proposed chronology of how Beckett’s transcriptions map onto 
Murphy’s composition, if even close to accurate, may have implications far beyond 
                                                
113 Thomas 1938, p. 454. 
114 Geulincx wonders, for example, how ‘when I want to walk, my feet are flung forward’ (Ethics, p. 
33). The focus on gesticulating as the movement of a hand or arm is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
115 Ethics, p. 303. 
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Murphy. Murphy shows signs of occasionalism right from the start of the novel’s 
composition in August 1935, something that alone implies that Beckett’s enthusiasm 
for Geulincx at the time of the 1936 research was less to do with the discovery of an 
entirely new and revolutionary paradigm of knowledge. It speaks rather of accretion, 
sympathy, and cohesion, and perhaps a little serendipity. As a consequence, it might 
not be accurate to describe Murphy as ‘the most Geulincxian of the works’116, nor to 
describe Geulincx as really ‘the key of his novel Murphy’. That Geulincx does 
arguably come to play an important role in the final stages of Murphy, as climax rather 
than ‘key’, perhaps holds out the more tantalising promise that works beyond Murphy 
might also be subtly constructed, in synchronicity more than in sympathy, with 
aspects of Geulingian philosophy more complex than those Beckett derived from the 
stark dualism of Murphy. The next chapter explores this potential, and how it 
interacts with a new context of Beckett’s shift away from an earlier ‘notesnatching’ 
methodology, to become fundamental to the major, transitional novel, Watt. 
 
                                                
116 Cohn 1960, pp. 93-94. 
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Chapter 3 – Watt 
 
3.1   Watt in Beckett Scholarship: ‘the series’ 
 
In the same chapter in which he argued for the importance of Spinoza to Murphy the 
critic P.J. Murphy wrote of Beckett’s enigmatic English-language novel Watt, written 
over a protracted period between 1941 and 1945, ‘Watt is perhaps the decisive work 
for reappraising Beckett’s relationship to the philosophical tradition’. Murphy focuses 
the claim, however, to substantiate the narrower argument that ‘Watt is a Kantian 
novel’1. Watt has also been read as detective fiction, as a specifically cryptic text, a 
farce of cruelty and absurdity, and as its influential initial critical studies had it, a 
parody of Cartesian rationality.2 There have been many other readings.3 Ackerley and 
Gontarski suggested as recently as 2006 that ‘the novel could sustain infinite 
exegesis’4. 
A persuasive critical commonality has come to obtain in recent years as regards 
Watt, a commonality that reflects a more nuanced version of a view such as Murphy’s. 
According to this recent reconceiving of Watt, the novel is a vitally important juncture 
in Beckett’s oeuvre in the context of his relationships with philosophy, psychology, 
and how these interact with a changing working methodology as regards source-
incorporation. In 2009 Feldman wrote, while criticising Murphy’s going too far with 
Kant, ‘Watt may be seen as the pivotal novel in Beckett’s oeuvre’5, whereby, according 
to Feldman, Watt was Beckett’s breakthrough in ‘beginning to write 
phenomenologically’6. Similarly, Weller argues for the transitional status of Watt and 
its original ways of enacting and performing as a defining characteristic. According to 
Weller Watt is the point at which Beckett achieves ‘an actualization’, rather than (as 
was the case in earlier works, particularly Murphy) ‘the thematization’, of what Weller 
calls ‘the Schizoid voice’7. Watt, then, the last long fiction Beckett would begin and 
                                                
1 Murphy 1994, p. 229. 
2 See respectively Smith 2006, Benjamin 1997, Doherty 1971 pp. 34-48, and Hoefer 1959. 
3 For a useful summary of these up to 1984 see Büttner 1984, pp. 7-26. 
4 Ackerley and Gontarski 2006 (eds.), p. 629. 
5 Feldman 2009b, p. 13. 
6 Feldman 2009b, p. 14. 
7 Weller 2009, p. 43. 
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finish in English until From an Abandoned Work in 1956, has come to the fore of 
philosophical and psychological studies of Beckett’s oeuvre.  
Beckett himself had a characteristically more diffident assessment when it 
came to describing the novel he is often said to have referred to as his ‘ugly duckling’8. 
Harvey quotes Beckett saying Watt was ‘“a game”...a means of “staying sane”, and a 
way “to keep [his] hand in.”’9 In 1947 while Reavey (acting as agent) was having great 
difficulty placing the novel with a publisher Beckett described how circumstances had 
imposed compromises on the novel he would come to call ‘our old misery’10, yet at the 
same time he intimated how the novel’s importance might be gauged: 
 
It is an unsatisfactory book, written in dribs and drabs, first on the run, then of 
an evening after the clod-hopping, during the occupation. But it has its place in 
the series, as will perhaps appear in time.11 
 
Watt’s status as part of a series has indeed been appearing in time, ‘its place’ now 
being properly recognised by Feldman, Weller and others. This is a series Beckett also 
spoke of to Reavey in 1948: 
 
I am now retyping, for rejection by the publishers, Malone Meurt, the last I hope 
of the series Murphy, Watt, Mercier & Camier, Molloy, not to mention the 4 
Nouvelles & Eleuthéria.12 
 
Also important to note in this context is the fact that Watt is not only part of a series 
of published works. It manifests seriality in a number of ways. Once Watt is inside the 
house, continuing the series that is the lineage of perpetually replenished servants, his 
movement between levels of the house is also passed as part of an indefinite series. On 
a more micro scale, Watt’s thought processes at these various stages themselves 
                                                
8 There is, however, no reliable citation for this quote, despite its frequent critical deployment. In a 
letter to Reavey after the war Beckett wrote of publication troubles ‘I knew H.H. was hatching a dead 
egg. Or rather that Watt was under a dead hen’ (Beckett to Reavey, 18 November 1947. HRHRC). The 
‘H.H.’ presumably refers to the publisher Hamish Hamilton, who had ‘sat on Watt for several months’ 
(Pilling 2006a, p. 102) before rejecting it. 
9 Harvey 1970, p. 222. This and certain other quotes Harvey attributes to Beckett (such as pertain to 
the ‘syntax of weakness’) are frequently misquoted. Typically this appears as quoting Beckett stating 
Watt was ‘only a game’, whereas in fact Harvey attributes the two words ‘a game’ to Beckett, adding 
the ‘only’ himself. The difference is perhaps both minor and major. The originator of the error may be 
Bair, who bases her reading of Watt as autobiographical psychological self-therapy partly on this 
misquotation. See for examples of this Bair 1978, p. 346 and Ackerley 2005a, p. 12. 
10 Beckett to Reavey, 12 May 1953. HRHRC. 
11 Beckett to Reavey, 14 May 1947. HRHRC. 
12 Beckett to Reavey, 8 July 1948. HRHRC. 
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involve the management of numerous serial processes. It is the novel’s serial 
enumerative reasoning, occasionally entropic and that which Deleuze subtitled the 
‘Langue I’ of Beckett, that constitutes so much of its critique of rationalism.13 The 
protracted and experimental process of Watt’s composition also manifests seriality, 
further complementing the novel’s other intrinsic and extrinsic serial aspects. A 
playful visible residue of the composition process is retained as the novel’s addenda, 
the partly jettisoned material functioning as a synecdoche pointing toward the novel’s 
own prior existence as a process of decision-making about parameters of language. 
The full extent of this complex serial existence, as characters, places and scenes slowly 
emerge through a number of transitions and amendments, is preserved in the so-
called ‘white whale’14 of Beckett scholarship; the stages at which the novel exists in the 
six notebooks and single typescript held at HRHRC and commonly referred to as the 
‘Ur-Watt’15. 
This multiplicity of serial existences is of direct relevance when approaching 
the potential importance of Geulincx to Beckett’s composing Watt. Primarily this is 
because it is reasonable to expect that given the timing of Beckett’s Geulincx research 
(when much of Murphy was already written) Geulincx’ presence in Watt would be 
more pervasive than in the previous novel. In support of this hypothesis and 
Uhlmann’s arguments regarding it discussed above, is the fact that Beckett noted at 
the top of folio 31, the first of the manuscript folios, the annotation 
‘COMMEABUNT’16 [let us visit this often17]. This suggests at least that even though 
Beckett declined to type up these final pages, they were not therefore of negligible 
importance, perhaps even that they were intended to be returned to repeatedly whilst 
writing further works. What appears to be more accurately the case, however, is that 
Geulincx features more overtly in the novel’s protracted process of composition in the 
Ur-Watt’s six notebooks and single typescript, while much of this presence was 
refined out of the work during the latter stages of this process. Tracing this fleeting 
                                                
13 Mary Bryden concisely describes Deleuze’s system: ‘Langue I, is what Deleuze calls ‘cette langue 
atomique’ [this atomic language] (Deleuze, 1992: 66). It is a language of enumeration, in which 
combinatory relations replace syntactical ones. This language is associated with the novels, culminating 
in Watt, where words proliferate in circles or permutation’ (Bryden 2002, p. 85). Translation by 
Bryden. 
14 Lake 1984, p. 76. 
15 See for example Cohn 2001, p. 109. 
16 TCD MS 10971/6/31r. 
17 Translation by Engelberts, Frost, & Maxwell (eds.) 2006, p. 146. 
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presence as it shifts from the explicit to the implicit, from its manifestations in the 
composition process to its more refined forms in the final novel, is of some interest as 
regards both Beckett’s uses of Geulincx and the broader concern of Watt’s place in a 
‘series’. It reveals important points at which central preoccupations of Beckett’s, his 
conceptions of psychological interiority and the inevitability of insatiable needs, for 
example, find new routes of creative possibility by mapping onto literary explorations 
of communicative possibility. In the parts he plays in this shifting emphasis of 
Beckett’s works, Geulincx becomes central to a conception of Beckett’s ‘series’ as one 
that moves with an increasing agility from description to performance, from 
‘thematization’ to ‘actualization’ in a number of ways. Watt is an important step, 
albeit at times a faltering one not dissimilar to Watt’s own way of walking, on the way 
towards the abstracted voices of Beckett’s middle period works. 
An important aside is worth noting here with regard to Beckett’s working 
methodology finding its own stable ground in breaking from an earlier Joycean 
‘notesnatching’ procedure and concomitant aesthetic. Beckett was forced to leave 
behind many of his belongings in Paris when he had a short time to pack fleeing likely 
Nazi arrest in 1942, and we might well infer that he left behind many notes. 
Consequently, both personal and very public factors contributed to the ways Beckett’s 
work would progress via Watt. Affixing the monumental post-war shift to the 
epiphany in his mother’s room does not take full account of extrinsic circumstantial 
evidence surrounding Beckett’s shifting into more abstract, minimal terrain, factors 
like ‘the clod-hopping’ Beckett pointed out to Reavey. With Watt Beckett began to 
work with fragmentary shards of knowledge, taking the limitations imposed upon him 
by the impossibility of his previously verifiably accurate ‘notesnatching’ approach, and 
turning this to his advantage as he focussed on actualising the themes of ignorance 
and impotence. 
As we have seen, Beckett’s rediscovery of the word prurit is a good model of 
his appropriation of Geulincx more broadly: while he had previously been occupied 
with a number of themes that are foregrounded by Geulincx his treatment of them 
subtly shifts after this encounter. Also important to note is that if there are any 
Geulingian analogies in place we would do well to expect Beckett to want to keep 
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them, as with Dante in the choice of ‘layers’ in Murphy, ‘out of sight’18. We have also 
seen how interiority was such an important aspect to Murphy, and how in a number of 
ways Geulincx’ ethical axiom and dualism delimits this interiority. Taking Watt to be 
a novel in a ‘series’ that will develop aspects of Murphy, the following discussion 
begins with the broad concept of an inward investigation, what Geulincx called 
autology. This allows us to trace, in certain instances, Beckett’s refining Geulincx out 
of existence, his making sure Geulincx too would be ‘out of sight’. Firstly, tracing the 
various uses Beckett makes of the concept of autology and its derivations and 
deviations, along with his uses of the word itself, promises to reveal a similar dynamic 
– albeit on a much larger canvas – to that suggested by the variations of pruritus. 
 
3. 2 Autology 
 
Interiority as literary operator was of course familiar to Beckett before he read 
Geulincx’ idiosyncratic formulations. Dream of Fair to Middling Women, for example, 
completed four years prior to Beckett’s short but intense period of Geulincx research, 
finds Belacqua ‘nesting in a strange place’19, where for two months he ‘lay lapped in a 
beatitude of indolence’, in homage to his namesake’s purgatorial stasis. During this 
restful phase of the protagonist’s otherwise hectic schedule his internal state is 
described in a passage that foreshadows Murphy’s mind: 
 
If that is what is meant by going back into one’s heart, could anything be better, 
in this world or the next? The mind, dim and hushed like a sick-room, like a 
chapelle ardente, thronged with shades; the mind at last its own asylum, 
disinterested, indifferent, its miserable erethisms and discriminations and futile 
sallies suppressed; the mind suddenly reprieved, ceasing to be an annex of the 
restless body, the glare of understanding switched off.20 
 
The point hardly needs making that Beckett did not discover the categories or 
imagery of the mind as a closed-space or a mortuary chamber in Geulincx. On the 
surface, at least, it would seem possible to take a rather un-grand tour from Belacqua’s 
resting place to Murphy’s mind, through the room in which Malone himself lays 
                                                
18 I.e. ‘Choose “layers” carefully, on some such principle as V.’s distribution of sins and punishments. 
But keep whole Dantesque analogy out of sight’ (Entry no. 8 in the ‘Whoroscope’ notebook. Cited in 
Feldman 2006, 64). 
19 Dream, p. 43. 
20 Dream, p. 44. 
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‘lapped’ in bed and on to the closed-space short later works without noticing the need 
for much recourse to Geulincx at all.  
There are also more extrinsic precedents for Beckett’s focus on internal 
investigations. It is well known that Beckett underwent psychoanalysis in London in 
1934-5. This ‘truncated’21 analysis is no less significant for being an autobiographical 
self-exploration. Along with the reading in psychology and notes undertaken 
alongside it, Beckett’s analysis further attests to the complications and complicities 
amongst his various familiarities with delving into a self, either on his own or 
accompanied by another (Wilfred Bion acting as Beckett’s Virgilian guide in the 
Tavistock clinic). Nonetheless, a change in Beckett’s depictions and descriptions of 
interiority does seem to emerge after his encounter with Geulincx.  
As with Geulincx’ Cartesian inheritance, Beckett first summarised Geulincx’ 
inspectio sui as filtered through Windelband in the ‘Philosophy Notes’: 
 
Geulincx reduces self-activity to immanent mental activity in man. The ‘autology’ 
or inspectio sui is not only epistemological starting point, it is also ethical 
conclusion of his system.22 
 
In these notes the term is given as interchangeable with that favoured in Ethica: 
inspectio sui, and Geulincx himself points to these as interchangeable when he writes 
in Ethics that ‘I discussed this kind of inspection that I called Autology’23 in the earlier 
work Metaphysics. Autology is the first stage (the ‘epistemological starting point’) in 
establishing the humilitas that Beckett found so captivating. The second stage is the 
turning from self that proceeds from the discovery that self is comprised of ignorance 
and impotence (the ‘ethical conclusion’). Beckett records the word ‘autology’ itself, in 
the one instance in which it appears in his 1936 Geulincx notes, in Greek, following 
the convention in Land’s 1891-3 collected edition. Beckett noted the title of chapter 
one of Metaphysica Vera in Land’s Opera exactly as it appears there: 
 
Pars Prima: De Me Ipso, sive AYTOΛOΓIA24 
 
                                                
21 Connor 2008, p. 12. 
22 TCD MS 10967/189v. Cf. Windelband 1901, p. 417 n. 2. 
23 Ethics, p. 241. 
24 TCD MS 10971/6/2r. Cf. Opera vol. 2, p. 147. The Greek subtitles for each of Geulincx’ three 
chapters are all handwritten by Beckett, as is to be expected. 
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Martin Wilson translates this in Metaphysics: 
 
PART ONE  Concerning Myself, or AUTOLOGY25 
 
This autology is a fundamental distinguishing factor of Geulincx’ thought. For it is 
due to an epistemological inspection of the self that Geulincx’ occasionalism 
culminates in the assertion of nescience: humanity depicted as ignorant and utterly 
impotent in the face of God, and despite the infrequency with which Beckett records 
the word itself, this single word’s legacy throughout Metaphysics and Ethics is 
immense. Beckett recorded from Metaphysics some of Geulincx’ most fundamental 
assertions about the agency of self as derived from autology, such as ‘I am a thing one 
and simple’26, ‘I have thoughts that do not depend on me’27, and ‘My human condition 
is completely independent of me’28. Geulincx goes into some detail regarding these 
headings in Metaphysics, but is in Ethics that such ideas come to a fuller fruition. 
 
3.3  Autology in Watt 
 
If Watt were to look inside himself to inspect what he knows of himself, ‘in a 
careful enquiry into the nature, condition, and origin of oneself’29, as Geulincx 
describes self-inspection, he would, one might expect, not discover very much. Any 
force of personality Watt has is as bland as the milk Mr. Hackett believes is all he lives 
on.30 Early in the novel Watt finds that he cannot hear Mr. Spiro’s responses to the 
question of what should be done with a rat that ‘eats of a consecrated wafer’31. He 
cannot hear ‘because of other voices, singing, crying, stating, murmuring, things 
unintelligible, in his ear’. Sometimes, of these voices, ‘Watt understood all, and 
sometimes he understood much, and sometimes he understood little, and sometimes 
he understood nothing, as now’32. Such is Watt’s flawed, limited, inspection of 
himself. Bearing out a conception of ‘the series’, and of the composition of Watt 
                                                
25 Metaphysics, p. 29. 
26 Metaphysics, p. 33. Cf. TCD MS 10971/6/2r. 
27 Metaphysics, p. 34. Cf. TCD MS 10971/6/2r. 
28 Metaphysics, p. 43. Cf. TCD MS 10971/6/2v. 
29 Ethics, p. 329. 
30 See Watt, p. 21. 
31 Watt, p. 26. 
32 Watt, p. 27. 
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specifically, as characterised by a shift from reliance on a more overt conceptual 
apparatus to one where explicit philosophical and psychological vocabulary is refined 
away from the work, the first-person plural narrator of the Watt typescript bears a 
stronger similarity in this regard to Murphy.33 Both Murphy and this narrator have a 
firmer sense of their own interiority and its importance. When asked, for example, 
where exactly it is the narrator is planning to ‘get along’ to following his proposed 
departure from Arsene, the narrator replies: 
 
“To some other place” we said, “some other scene, some other field of activity.”  
“Nothing more definite than that?” said Arsene. “Think well before you reply.”  
We thought well and then we replied. “Perhaps deep down in our unconscious 
mind – “ 
Arsene rubbed his hands. “Ah” he said. “the unconscious mind! What a subject 
for a short story!” 
“Perhaps deep down in those paleozoic profounds, midst mammoth Old Red 
Sandstone phalli and carboniferous pudenda, lurked the timid wish to leave 
you.” 
“More!” cried Arsene. “Again! Again! Further! Deeper! The Upper Silurian! 
The Lower Silurian! The truth! The truth!”34 
 
Ackerley has discussed how in drafts of Watt such exploration of a stratified mental 
world was ‘defined as ‘autospeliology [sic]’’35. Ackerley relates this geological zoning 
to the broader elemental imagery of mud, rocks, and geographical zones in the 
Beckett Country. The neologism also recalls Geulincx’ sub-title ‘autology’, but it is 
removed from the novel before its final version. ‘Arsie’, as the narrator nicknames 
Arsene, wills the narrator on to delve into these rocky domains: ‘Dig! Delve! Deeper! 
Deeper! The Cambrian! The uterine! The pre-uterine!’36 The later Watt’s mind as 
                                                
33 This typescript, as Ackerley details, does not ‘constitute or correspond with any one period of 
creation’ (Ackerley 2005a, p. 22.) It does not neatly interpolate material from the early notebooks, to 
which the later notebooks only add material. However, despite some overlap of material the typescript 
can be seen to roughly correspond to a stage of composition following production of the first four 
notebooks and prior to completion of the final two (see Ackerley 2005a, pp. 239-243). 
33 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 149. 
34 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 149. 
35 Ackerley 2005b, p. 152. 
36 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 149. The narrator has a limit, however, replying that the pre-uterine, a 
step too far, ‘reminds us of the rocks at Greystones’. Greystones was a fishing village in County 
Wicklow that served as a seaside holiday resort for Beckett’s family in his youth where, according to 
Knowlson, ‘The Beckett and Roe children used to play on the stony beach with its large grey and pink 
pebbles’ (Knowlson 1996, p.  28). This autobiographical injection is further evidence of Watt’s 
composition process as partly one of refinement from the explicit to the implicit. 
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published has become, in contrast to this zone of stony penises, planty arses and 
womb-ages, a jumble of voices. Watt has lost whatever capacity this earlier narrator 
had for an awareness of, or at least vocabulary for, his ‘unconscious mind’. The later 
Watt instead turns his attention more fully towards the world, to his role as servant 
within it, and to what might be characterised as a form of despectio sui, where a 
servant must disregard their own desires in order to function more properly in that 
role. 
Beckett’s imagining psychological space as delineated according to geological 
periods is earlier pointed to in the ‘Whoroscope’ notebook, where Beckett notes ‘the 
geology of conscience – Cambrian experience, Cainozoic judgements, etc...’37. This is 
derived from Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’Imagination. As Pilling details ‘Sartre (141, 144ff) 
speaks of a “géometrie” in Husserl; Beckett is using “conscience” in the French sense, 
to mean sensibility’38. What the fascinating amalgam of references indicates is how 
Beckett transforms a derivation from one source (Sartre) in its first appearance in the 
‘Whoroscope’ notebook, and then reconfigures it further via a Geulingian inflection 
in the composition of Watt. Beckett also used the term in a letter to MacGreevy in 
August 1936 where he wrote of his reading Faust that he could understand how 
‘“keep on keeping on” could function as a ‘social prophylactic, but not at all as a light 
in the autological darkness’39. 
Unlike the later Mr. Knott, Quin also had some interest in autology.40 His 
internal depths are primarily determined by a ‘prevailing sensation [...] of 
nothingness’41, and Beckett wrote a long passage on ‘The Nothingness’42 as it pertains 
to Quin’s interiority, with ‘The Sky’43 above and ‘The Waste’44 below, between which 
Quin abides as ‘a dark nothing between the dark thing above and the dark thing 
beneath’45: 
 
                                                
37 ‘Whoroscope’ notebook. Cited in Pilling 2005, p. 46. 
38 Pilling 2005, p. 46. 
39 Beckett to MacGreevy, 19 August 1936. CL, p. 368. 
40 James Quin is an early incarnation of the novel-to-be’s central character. Gradually through the Ur-
Watt he becomes Mr. Knott. 
41 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 53. 
42 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 55. This section in the notebook was originally called ‘The Isolation’, 
but the title was crossed out with ‘The Nothingness’ replacing it. 
43 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 61. 
44 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 63. 
45 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 61. 
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The feeling of nothingness, born in Quin with the first beat of his heart, if not 
before, died in him with the last, and not before.46 
 
Yet, similarly to Watt, Quin’s ability to inspect these depths of ‘nothingness’ is limited 
by a number of factors, one of which recalls a neologism that was noted in the 
‘Dream’ notebook (entry no. 1123), ‘Autopornography’47: 
 
Not that Quin, regarding this and other traits of his nature, was quite devoid of 
curiosity. But each time he set himself to give it satisfaction, he was filled with 
that selfsame chagrin as is the man, the woman, or the child, who seeks to obtain, 
without the aid of a reflector, a clear view of his or her own anus.48 
 
Quin not only suffers from a sense of nothingness, he cannot even glimpse this 
nothingness. Such doubled incapacity, here in a man literally and comically doubled 
over, recalls the incapacity Geulincx argues characterises the self’s causal agency. Not 
only can we do nothing, but we also cannot even comprehend this lack of agency 
because causal agency is the ineffable domain of God alone. We simply watch the 
world, and do nothing in it. Geulincx, however, manages at times to contrive from 
this impotence of spectatorship some degree of consolation, unlike many of Beckett’s 
characters. Beckett transcribed the following from Geulincx’ summary of how ‘I am 
but a spectator of the World’: 
 
God alone can produce that spectacle. [...] And He does so in such an ineffable 
and incomprehensible manner that among all the stupendous miracles with 
which God favours me on this scene, I myself, the spectator, am His greatest and 
most enduring miracle.49 
 
For Quin, despite insurmountable obstacles, lack of proper tools or any religiosity he 
might harbour, compulsion to his own version of self-inspection is less a matter of the 
‘stupendous’ and is merely, and unfortunately, inevitable: 
 
And the time comes, alas, in the life of each one of us, however godfearing that 
life may have been, and wholesome, and upright, when a clear view of that part, 
if without synecdoche it may be called a part, would more than Baiae’s [sic] 
Strand, the Vale of Avoca, or the lakes of Killarney, gratify the eye. In this 
respect, as in others adjacent, the dog, and indeed quadrupeds in general, with 
                                                
46 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 55. 
47 Beckett 1999, p. 161. 
48 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 55. 
49 Ethics, p. 336. 
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the regrettable exception of the heavier pachyderms, will be found superior to 
the man, to the woman, and to the child.50 
 
Interiority was Murphy’s raison d’être. As noted, the only thing Murphy finds 
worthwhile is his interiority as ‘the best of himself’, a ‘best’ he finds via compromises 
and caveats (the chair of the big world, and his being powerless to prevent even the 
tiniest of big world events such as the ringing of a telephone from happening), but 
which nevertheless exists for Murphy as the only worthwhile zone of experience. 
Belacqua too had few reservations about his own ‘wombtomb’, Belacqua whose 
interiority ‘was real thought and real living, living thought’51. However, there was to 
be no comparable ‘best’ of anyone’s interiority after Beckett read Geulincx, and little 
of any characters’ interiorities at all in the final version of Watt. As we have seen, for 
Quin inspection of self is the inspection of a void. Whereas Murphy’s access to his 
nothingness was an index of his freedom, ‘the nothingness’ in the Ur-Watt evinces a 
shift into interiority as a different kind of emptiness, an unmasterable ignorance and 
impotence that comes after Beckett transcribed his lengthy notes on Geulincx’ own 
comparable convictions about such an exploration. Geulincx summarises these 
discoveries of incapacity and ignorance in the following sentence: ‘I cannot get 
beyond I do not know, there is nothing I can add to this I do not know’52.  
In the third notebook of the Ur-Watt Beckett uses the term ‘autology’ to 
describe Watt’s thinking about the abstract and for him inexplicable Mondrian-style 
circle and dot painting he discovers in Erskine’s room (and which in the novel brings 
him to a state of impotent tears): 
 
As to whether the formation was the fixity of self-indifference or – Watt sought 
for a word, found one, found two, three, four, approved them, related them, 
approved the relation, disapproved them, disapproved the relation, let them 
stand and was discontent – the regulated turmoil of autology’s autoscopy, the loss 
in each case was the same, because it was the loss of all.53 
 
                                                
50 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 55. Presumably the spelling is intended to be Baile’s, perhaps an 
allusion to W.B. Yeats’ 1904 play On Baile’s Strand. Or perhaps just to Baile’s Strand, the seashore 
around Dundalk, County Louth. It may even be a joke at the expense of the Irish coast, opting in 
preference for the sunnier Baiae on the bay of Naples. 
51 Dream, p. 45. 
52 Ethics, p. 334. 
53 Beckett, Watt notebook three, HRHRC. Cited in Pilling 1997, p. 180. The OED defines an autoscope 
as ‘An instrument invented by [Ernst] Coccius for the self-examination of the eye’. It is then, perhaps, 
the kind of instrument that Quin’s more auto-erotic explorations lack. 
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As Pilling has described this scene in the notebook of Watt examining the picture: 
 
This anticipates the moment when Watt can find no words to assuage his ‘need 
of semantic succour’ (79). But Watt as a whole is a product of the tensions 
dramatized here. The novel exhibits Beckett working with whatever can be 
‘found’, in the certain knowledge that ‘loss’ will ensue. With every intention of 
creating ‘regulated turmoil’, Beckett is nevertheless obliged to content himself, or 
discontent himself, with the ‘fixity’ which any ‘formation’ – visual or verbal – 
confers upon its constituent ingredients.54 
 
Though left out of the final novel, what this use of Geulincx’ term reveals is that it is 
possible to locate at a kind of theoretical centre of the project that became Watt a 
conception of its own communicative possibilities conceived in Geulingian terms. 
This is where a linguistic manifestation of ‘autology’s autoscopy’, a language of self-
critique, is a critique incapable of penetrating that ‘veil’55 of language Beckett 
described in 1937 because construed in that self-same language. Here Beckett makes 
an important shift, a shift away from a language of description to a description of 
language. Although there are numerous other places in the novel, notebooks and 
typescript of Watt that bear on the status of language to communicate meaning or 
change the status of something in the world, the transition from metaphysics to 
epistemology implied in this linguistic autology instances Beckett’s ‘series’ developing 
linguistic terms in which the possibilities of a self-analysis of language can at least be 
framed, if not satisfactorily resolved. That Beckett thought about aspects of this 
transition in terms derived from Geulincx has previously gone unnoticed by critics.  
Beckett had noted a similar word to ‘autology’ in the ‘Whoroscope’ notebook: 
‘autolysis’56. Autolysis is a physical process whereby cells of the body are destroyed by 
their own enzymes, and is more commonly referred to as self-digestion. It is a process 
perhaps not dissimilar to Watt’s own self-induced communicative entropy that 
manifests in the asylum. Watt’s entrapment in his fatalist philosophical method drives 
him eventually to this even more lowly refuge, where his inability to look into his own 
working methods with those self-same working methods is shown to be as flawed an 
enterprise as Quin’s attempts without the aid of an autoscope to look up his own arse 
to see himself. Watt’s predicament here is the impossibility of ‘autology’s autoscopy’, 
                                                
54 Pilling 1997, p. 180. 
55 Disjecta, p. 171. 
56 Cited in Pilling 1992, p. 20. 
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of critiquing the confines of his language from within. It is a more linguistic version of 
Geulincx’ insistences upon the impossibility of discovering a self that is capable of 
agency from within that same self. Its being traceable back to this use of ‘autology’ in 
the Ur-Watt’s third notebook provides evidence that for Beckett Geulincx’ 
metaphysical and ethical ideas were becoming increasingly flexible, amenable to more 
determinedly literary ends. 
 
3.4  Coming, being, going 1 
 
In the first monograph study on Beckett, Hugh Kenner argued that instances 
of the ‘partially congruent’57 in Beckett’s oeuvre bear a mark of Geulincx’ influence in 
their playing out the central theme of occasionalist metaphysics – a lack of identifiable 
causation. Examples of Geulingian partial congruence in Watt, according to Kenner, 
include Watt’s way of walking and the frog song where ‘each frog attends only to its 
own private schedule of croaks’58. In situations such as these a coincidence, a harmony 
of sorts, appears, but only appears, to occur – Watt advances forwards, and the frogs 
produce what is heard as song. Such congruity, however, occurs by accident rather 
than design. Watt does progress forward, but this is not something easily predictable 
from his Monty-Python-esque shambling. Although the frogs do not intend to 
produce a coherent ‘song’, Watt hears the sounds the frogs produce as music. These 
are instances of the ‘pre-established arbitrary’,59 rather than the harmonious 
Leibnizian alternative. According to Kenner such almost-connect between events and 
the perception of these events, as in these coincidences, ‘qualifies him [Geulincx] for 
repeated mention in the Beckett canon’, because such incongruity derives from 
Geulincx’ ‘doctrine of the “bodytight” mental world, around which, or perhaps 
attached to which, the body performs its gyrations according to laws the mind need 
not attempt to fathom’60. Kenner could not have known, but Beckett even transcribed 
specific examples that bear out these arguments. Recalling Watt’s ‘headline 
                                                
57 Kenner 1961, p. 83. 
58 Kenner 1961, p. 86. 
59 Watt, p. 132. 
60 Kenner 1961, p. 83. 
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tardigrade’61 Geulincx wrote, for example, ‘These feet are not moved because I wish 
to go on my way, but because another wishes what I wish’62 in the same arguments in 
which he established the cradle analogy. 
However, broken or partial connections appear throughout Beckett’s oeuvre in 
many divergent guises. Kenner marshals these as all Geulingian, and while this 
grouping does find a way to track the possible influence of Geulincx on Beckett that 
stands the important test of cogency when brought to bear on different works, and 
thereby hints at possible repercussions across the oeuvre of the importance of 
Geulincx, it also makes too neat and complete a comparison of Geulincx. The 
viability of Kenner’s reading across various works is at the cost of making Geulincx an 
equivalent force in manifestations of causal incongruity or partial congruence across 
all these works, and it thereby offers little in the way of a strategy for distinguishing 
between widely divergent forms of disconnect. 
Nonetheless, in Kenner’s enumeration of the implications for Beckett’s works 
of Geulincx’ ‘“bodytight” mental world’ lies the kernel of something that has both 
far-reaching and yet more clearly identifiable boundaries and specificities than that of 
his dualist conception. In his discussion of how ‘Geulincx and his school are driven to 
a treatment of motion as grotesquely analytic as the work sheets of a Disney 
animator’63, Kenner quotes Geulincx on the importance of what he calls abitus, 
transitus, and aditus, citing the following from Physica Vera and Annotata ad 
Metaphysicam: 
 
‘Sicut in omni corpore sunt tres dimensiones,’ writes Geulincx, ‘as in all bodies 
there are three dimensions, so in all motion three tendencies, abitus, transitus, 
aditus; for in all movement there is a parting from somewhere, a passage 
somewhere, a going to somewhere. But there is no departure without transit and 
arrival, no transit without departure and arrival, etc.’64 
 
                                                
61 Watt, p. 28. 
62 Ethics, p. 332. 
63 Kenner 1961, p. 87. While Kenner’s reference to what was, Kenner claimed in 1961, ‘the type of all 
up-to-date technology’ (Kenner 1961, p. 87) might now seem quaint, his point remains a strong one 
underlined by his insight, still pertinent, that Beckett was ‘profoundly right in finding the seventeenth-
century Occasionalists aesthetically relevant to an age that has no difficulty in diagnosing their 
speculative shortcomings’ (Kenner 1961, p. 85). 
64 Kenner 1961, pp. 87-88. 
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I want to argue that as a specific type of non-causal narrative Geulincx’ metaphysics 
of coming, being, and going appear and reappear in Beckett’s oeuvre as both shadowy 
thematic and narrative structure. Geulincx emphasises the importance of coming, 
being and going in Ethica where it appears in the section on humility Beckett lauded. 
Geulincx argues, in a passage that in its English translation retains Beckett-like 
brevity, that in relation to God 
 
Totus fum (totus huc veniendo, totus hic agendo, totus hinc abeundo).65 
I have my whole being (in coming hither, acting here, departing hence).66 
 
Such a tripartite existence is, in relation to the house of Mr. Knott, Watt’s. If there is a 
narrative trajectory in the novel to be spoken of, it is surely this movement. That is, we 
could say that Watt’s whole being is determined by his status as coming hither, acting 
here, or departing hence, his being part of ‘the series of servants’67 as it was explicitly 
called in the typescript. Watt comes to the house with the intention of becoming a 
servant, he acts at the house as a servant, and then he departs having been a servant. 
Yet this coming hither, acting here, and departing hence is non-causal. Inside the 
house, when servants move from one floor to another, even though ‘every going, every 
being, every coming consisting with a being and a coming, a coming and a going, a 
going and a being’ gives Watt the impression of cause and effect, this is inaccurate: 
 
Tom’s two years on the first-floor are not because of Dick’s two years on the 
ground-floor, or of Harry’s coming then, and Dick’s two years on the ground-
floor are not because of Tom’s two years on the first-floor, or of Harry’s coming 
then, and Harry’s coming then is not because of Tom’s two years on the first-
floor, or of Dick’s two years on the ground-floor,68 
 
Rather, all these changes are somehow simply ‘because Tom is Tom, and Dick Dick, 
and Harry Harry, […] of that the wretched Watt was persuaded’69.  
In earlier drafts of Watt death was the crucial factor, if not quite the cause, in 
the serial transition of servants. In the typescript Arsene and the narrator finish an 
                                                
65 Opera, vol. 3, p. 37. 
66 Ethics, p. 337. 
67 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 353. 
68 Watt, p. 132. 
69 Watt, p. 133. Bearing in mind the serial transitory nature of Beckett’s servants it is perhaps worthy of 
note that much later, in 1962, in a typescript of Play sent to Bray Beckett used the name Arsene before 
he later altered it to Erskine (TCD MS 10948/1/195a). 
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early, dialogic, version of Arsene’s ‘short statement’70 and rather than leaving of his 
own accord Arsene dies in the narrator’s arms, thereby inaugurating a new stage of 
servants in the house. The narrator, later to become Watt, then seems another of 
Beckett’s seedy solipsists: 
 
The man must have been literally exhausted with what he had been through. But 
we not at all. Not yet. The time would come, and perhaps sooner than we 
thought, when we too would be tired, we had not the slightest doubt in our mind 
about that, but for the moment we were not in the least tired, so the tiredness of 
our partner could not be expected to interest us particularly.71 
 
Ruby Cohn has detailed how Watt the character emerges in the notebooks via the 
conceptual apparatus of coming, being, and going: 
 
It is in A3, penned in several places while Beckett eluded the Nazis, that the 
character Watt moves to the forefront. On the very first page Beckett lists: “1. 
The Coming; 2. Downstairs; 3. Upstairs. [These are grouped as “The Being.”] 4. 
The Going.”72 
 
Some of this tripartite structuring of character is retained and echoed, in a refined 
form, in the final novel: 
 
Mr. Knott was harbour, Mr. Knott was haven, calmly entered, freely ridden, 
gladly left.73 
 
In concert with Mr. Knott being the haven that is ‘calmly entered, freely ridden, 
gladly left’, Watt’s own relations to Mr. Knott map onto these as ‘The Coming’, ‘The 
Being’ and ‘The Going’. 
For Geulincx all his life, all his ‘coming hither, acting here, departing hence’ is 
determined entirely by God, ‘For He who joined us to our body can alone remove us 
from it’74. For Geulincx God provides the causal connections between ‘coming hither, 
acting here, departing hence’, and these three thereby become fully congruent. For 
Watt there is no such congruency between events. As Murphy did, Watt also lives 
without any explicit consolations of the all-powerful. Nevertheless, Watt’s coming, 
                                                
70 Watt, p. 37. 
71 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, p. 173. 
72 Cohn 2001, p. 110. ‘A3’ is the third notebook of six, according to Cohn’s own system. 
73 Watt, p. 133. Such tripartite delineation also structures narratives of later works, such as How It Is, 
with its three parts ‘before’, ‘with’, and ‘after Pim’. See Chapter 6. 
74 Metaphysics, p. 113. Cf. TCD MS 10971/6/6r. 
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being, and going is shadowed if not by comparisons between himself and Christ or 
admiration of himself as an ‘enduring miracle’, then by a vague ‘purpose’ which 
shadows this empty space between events. Arsene asks Watt the following rhetorical 
questions, among others, on the matter of the servants coming and going: 
 
But […] is there a coming that is not a coming to, a going that is not a going 
from, a shadow that is not the shadow of purpose, or not? For what is this 
shadow of the going in which we come, this shadow of the coming in which we 
go, this shadow of the coming and the going in which we wait, if not the shadow 
of purpose, of the purpose that budding withers, that withering buds, whose 
blooming is a budding withering. I speak well, do I not, for a man in my 
situation. And what is this coming that was not our coming and this being that is 
not our being and this going that will not be our going but the coming and being 
and going in purposelessness?75 
 
Arsene implies with his longing for the alternatives that he had been seeking a kind of 
purposelessness via his employment as servant, action free from ‘the shadow of 
purpose’, and although he admits he might appear to be departing the house in 
purposelessness, this (as with other causal incongruities) is appearance only, and Watt 
should not get too carried away with the appearance.  
There may be no cause and effect, but this does not mean there is no ‘shadow 
of purpose’. Figuring the terms of coming, being and going as floral metaphors 
Arsene inverts any hopeful pastoral connotations by diagnosing waste and ruin in 
every hope that seeks its own fulfilment, where every budding necessitates a 
concomitant withering. It is a self-annihilating structure that echoes, in a complex 
weave of Beckett’s philosophical analects, his description of Bruno’s identified 
contraries in Dante…Bruno.Vico..Joyce of ‘generation’ and ‘corruption’, where ‘The 
maximum of corruption and the minimum of generation are identical: in principle, 
corruption is generation’76. It also instantiates a further development of the closed 
system, the ‘horse leech’s daughter [whose] quantum of wantum cannot vary’77 of 
Murphy. Every action in such a closed system is shadowed by its contrary: Mr. Endon 
by Murphy, Arsene by Watt, budding by withering, purpose by purposelessness.  
 Taking Arsene at his word, I want to ask the following questions about ‘this 
shadow’, and to argue that they can be answered via recourse to Geulincx. Might it be 
                                                
75 Watt, pp. 56-57. 
76 Disjecta, p. 21. 
77 Murphy, p. 38. 
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possible, without psychologising the literary figment too reductively, to elucidate what 
underlies, what the ‘purpose’ is of Watt’s coming, being and going in relation to the 
house of Mr. Knott, if anything? Can a reader infer what this ‘shadow of purpose’ is 
that is cast over Watt’s tripartite literary life, knowing it is never explicitly stated, and 
knowing the novel to be comprised of many frequently discrete and self-sufficient 
scenes that work to confound a generalised critical appraisal of this novel of 
fragments? One possible solution, I want to claim, resides with a conception of ‘need’ 
which, in order for it to be explicated properly benefits from reference to Geulincx.  
 
3.5  Watt and Need 
 
While visiting Germany in January 1937 Beckett read Friedrich Stieve’s Abriss 
der deutschen Geschichte von 1792-1935, and found that it ‘was not the reference book 
on German history he was seeking’78 as Nixon details. Beckett vented his frustrations 
regarding Stieve’s impulse to reduce historical chaos to rational order in his diary: 
 
I am not interested in a “unification” of the historical chaos any more than I am 
in the “clarification” of the individual chaos, + still less in the 
anthropomorphisation of the inhuman necessities that provoke the chaos […] I 
say the background + the causes are an inhuman + incomprehensible machinery 
+ venture to wonder what kind of appetite it is that can be appeased by the 
modern animism that consists in rationalising them. Rationalism is the last form 
of animism. Whereas the pure incoherence of times + men + places is at least 
amusing.79 
 
The diary entry gives a clue not only to Beckett’s politics, at least to his ‘distrust of the 
political and historical assertions encountered in Nazi Germany’. It also, as Nixon 
argues, renews Beckett’s  
 
attack on anthropomorphism as a falsification of essential incoherence, and 
reasserts an emphasis on the “incomprehensible machinery”, which had 
determined outer reality in Murphy and resurfaces as the “pre-established 
arbitrary” in Watt.80 
 
                                                
78 Nixon 2005, p. 186. 
79 German Diary 4, 15 January 1937, UoR. Cited in Nixon 2005, pp. 186-187. 
80 Nixon 2005, p. 187. 
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Undoubtedly, one thing Watt seeks is to order the ‘essential incoherence’ of the world 
and his knowledge of it in such ways as they correspond, one to the other. In the 
frequently cited case the pot, for example, ‘was not a pot of which one could say Pot, 
pot, and be comforted’81. Of this pot Ackerley reports that Beckett was ‘particular 
about this capitalization’82 as it reflects a Platonic discrepancy between idea and 
instance, between Platonic form (‘Pot’) and specifically instantiated matter (‘pot’). 
Watt is anguished in correlation with how far the instance (the lowercase) differs from 
the idea (the uppercase). But this is not because the instances differ greatly. On the 
contrary it is because they very nearly coincide, and ‘if the approximation had been 
less close, then Watt would have been less anguished’83. Although Watt requires his 
words and his world to correspond, when they are just such an apparently negligible 
distance apart all analysis and categorisation would be easier for Watt if they would 
just separate fully and have done with it. It is the temptations of partial-congruence 
that taunt him. However, ascribing this frustrated critical impulse to Watt as his 
fundamental motivating factor might be said to itself run the risk of conflating matter 
and form. Watt is a consistently, determinedly, unremittingly rationalist protagonist. I 
want to leave aside a reading of Watt in terms of its parodying Cartesian rationality, 
however, and argue that Watt’s rationalism is born of something much more 
elemental, that it has roots in the ‘incomprehensible machinery’ of something far more 
chaotic than its systematising manifestations. Hovering as a backdrop to this 
frustrated supra-rationalist’s precision is insatiability, instability, and unremitting need 
born of a different ‘kind of appetite’. 
 Beckett had ideas of need in mind in relation to Geulingian terminology 
shortly before the composition of Watt. In ‘Les Deux Besoins’ (‘The Two Needs’), a 
still untranslated critical essay written in 1938, Beckett picks up the theme of need in 
the following way, where he places the Geulingian term ‘autology’ at the boundaries 
of a project involving artistic conceptions of need: 
 
Besoin d’avoir besoin (DEF) et besoin dont on a besoin (ABC), conscience du 
besoin d’avoir besoin (ab) et conscience du besoin dont on a besoin – dont on 
avait besoin (de), issue du chaos de vouloir voir (Aab) et entrée dans le néant 
d’avoir vu (Dde), déclenchment et fin de l’autologie créatrice (abcdef). Voilà par 
                                                
81 Watt, p. 78. 
82 Ackerley 2005a, p. 99. 
83 Watt, p. 78. 
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exemple une façon comme une autre d’indiquer les limites entre lesquelles 
l’artiste se met à la question, se met en question, se résout en questions, en 
questions rhétoriques sans fonction oratoire.84 
The need to need (DEF) and the need that one needs (ABC), the awareness of 
the need to need (ab), and the awareness of the need that one needs – that one 
needed (de), the result of the chaos of wishing to see (Aab) and the way into the 
nothingness of having seen (Dde), the beginning and end of creative autology 
(abcdef). That, for example, is one way of indicating the limits within which the 
artist begins to question, puts himself in question, turns into questions, into 
rhetorical questions without an oratorical function. 
 
‘Les Deux Besoins’ elaborates a framework Beckett described immediately prior to it 
that same year in a review of Denis Devlin’s poems: 
 
As between these two, the need that in its haste to be abolished cannot pause to 
be stated and the need that is the absolute predicament of particular human 
identity, one does not of course presume to suggest a relation of worth. Yet the 
distinction is perhaps not idle, for it is from the failure to make it that proceeds 
the common rejection as ‘obscure’ of most that is significant in modern music, 
painting and literature.85 
 
An assertion of a ‘predicament of’ need rather than the rush to overcome it is the goal 
of worthwhile art. An assertion of the impossibility of achievement, rather than merely 
the overcoming of a gulf recognised, saluted, in passing. 
Ackerley has argued that Mr. Knott’s progenitor, Quin, is named according to 
‘“Quî ne,” negative intentionality’86. This gives a hint of Beckett imbuing Mr. Knott 
early in the composition process with a sense of desire, of purpose, and a concomitant 
void. In German one word for need is Not, where die Not is potentially both ‘the 
need’, and also ‘the emergency’. If we think of Mr. Knott’s name as compound, as 
character-names in Beckett are frequently thought of,87 then we can see that beginning 
with his incarnation as Quin, Mr. Knott is in some sense a figure, or a figuring, of 
need, yet perhaps also of something more panicked and less controllable, the 
                                                
84 Disjecta, p. 56. 
85 Disjecta, pp. 91-92 
86 Ackerley 2005b, p. 156. 
87 For example, Lawrence Graver reads that most famous of Beckett’s names as self-reflexively 
compound: 
Closest in sound is godet, the name of a popular cognac, but also the French 
word for ‘a wooden bowl’ or ‘mug’, which in different usages refers to the bowl 
of a pipe (smoked by Pozzo who carelessly refers to Godot as Godet) and a small 
glass of wine (which washes down Pozzo’s chicken). [...] Inevitably, as Colin 
Duckworth has concluded, the receptacle called a godet might in the broad sense 
hold any meaning put into it. (Graver 1989, pp. 44-45) 
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‘emergency’. According to the novel’s ostensible narrator, Sam, the only two surmises 
Watt makes of Mr. Knott of any validity whatsoever concern the issue of Mr. Knott 
not needing: 
 
For except, one, not to need, and, two, a witness to his not needing, Knott 
needed nothing, as far as Watt could see. 
If he ate, and he ate well; if he drank, and he drank heartily; if he slept, and he 
slept sound; if he did other things, and he did other things regularly, it was not 
from need of food, or drink, or sleep, or other things, no, but from the need 
never to need, never never to need, food, and drink, and sleep, and other things. 
This was Watt’s first surmise of any interest on the subject of Mr. Knott. And Mr. 
Knott, needing nothing if not, one, not to need, and, two, a witness to his not 
needing, of himself knew nothing. And so needed to be witnessed. Not that he 
might know, no, but that he might not cease. This, on the subject of Mr. Knott, 
was Watt’s second, and closing, conjecture not entirely gratuitous.88 
 
There is a Berkeleyan impetus of connotation here in Watt’s second ‘conjecture’ 
concerning Mr. Knott’s need for witness. Aligned here also, however, in Watt’s ‘first 
surmise’ is a conception of need that can be formulated in relation to Geulincx’ 
axiom. That is, necessary for adherence to the ethical axiom ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil 
velis is the requirement, the need, not to need. Without finding it possible to need 
nothing, a person will never achieve Geulincx’ advocated ethical consciousness 
wherein one’s will is determined by occasionalist impotence. Freedom from futile 
desiring is just such a freedom from need. If one is to follow Geulincx’ ethics then one 
needs to not need. Via Watt’s non-relations with Mr. Knott, however, Beckett insists 
upon the impossibility of a freedom from need. Watt rarely gets close to Mr. Knott, 
and never attains anything like his determining status. He sees him fleetingly and 
serves him variously, orbiting the fixed point of Mr. Knott and going away again, and 
this non-encounter plays out the insatiable nature of need: Watt, as servant, takes the 
place of Mr. Knott’s needs – it is thanks to Watt that Mr. Knott needs nothing. Yet 
Watt is left always having to need, always willfully acting in order to bring about some 
outcome in the world. Watt’s entrapment in a paradoxical state of need, whereby he 
must get rid of all of his own needs at the same time as he must always act on the 
needs of someone else, underlies his rationalist method with a ‘purpose’ that is at once 
ineffable and elemental. 
                                                
88 Watt, p. 202. 
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Important to a reading of Watt as concerned with conceptions of need, 
specifically with an inevitability of insatiable need, is an anomalous aside late in the 
novel, a rather quiet, if not quietist, aside placed incongruously among the noisier 
enumerations of Mr. Knott’s footwear: 
 
To think, when one is no longer young, when one is not yet old, that one is no 
longer young, that one is not yet old, that is perhaps something. To pause, 
towards the close of one’s three-hour day, and consider: the darkening ease, the 
brightening trouble; the pleasure pleasure because it was, the pain pain because it 
shall be; the glad acts grown proud, the proud acts growing stubborn; the 
panting the trembling towards a being gone, a being to come; and the true true 
no longer, and the false true not yet. And to decide not to smile after all, sitting in 
the shade, hearing the cicadas, wishing it were night, wishing it were morning, 
saying, No, it is not the heart, no, it is not the liver, no, it is not the prostate, no it 
is not the ovaries, no, it is muscular, it is nervous. Then the gnashing ends, or it 
goes on, and one is in the pit, in the hollow, the longing for longing gone, the 
horror of horror, and one is in the hollow, at the foot of all the hills at last, the 
ways down, the ways up, and free, free at last, for an instant free at last, nothing 
at last.89 
 
Here the ‘instant’ spoken of is in some sense of a ‘pause’ in a present, between a 
‘being gone’ and a ‘being to come’, in a ‘three-hour day’ as a microcosm of the 
tripartite life of coming, being and going. Such a moment of ‘nothing at last’ equated 
with being ‘free at last’ coheres with Geulincx’ conception of nothing expressed in the 
axiom where the only freedom possible is a freedom that is a recognition of a kind of 
nothingness (ubi nihil vales – wherein you have no power). It is a negative kind of 
freedom, a freedom-from rather than a freedom-to, the only possible, true to life 
consequence of which, according to Geulincx, is abstention from futile desiring (ibi 
nihil velis – therein you should not will). Ann Beer has argued that this aside is the 
‘one passage where the underlying narrator seems to speak in his own voice’90. Such a 
claim finds support in a letter from Beckett to Bray of 1958 in which Beckett 
described an ‘acute crisis about my work’ in similar terms: 
 
have decided that I not merely can’t but won’t go on as I have been going more 
or less ever since the Textes pour Rien and must either get back to nothing again 
and the bottom of all the hills again like before Molloy or else call it a day.91 
                                                
89 Watt, p. 201. 
90 Beer 1985, p. 57. Beer makes the argument that apart from a couple of treatments by Bair and 
Harvey (who draws out Dantean interpretations from the passage), this aside’s ‘deeper implications 
have been ignored’.  
91 Beckett to Bray, 29 November 1958. TCD MS 10948/1/13. 
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While it might be more in keeping with the numerous instances of myse en abyme in 
Watt to describe the passage as an exhibition of what such an interventional authorial 
passage would look like if such a thing could exist, if it could find a sure enough 
foothold, it is an important passage for the novel. This is in part because it implicitly 
describes Watt’s goal motivating his exhaustive enumerations: in emulation of his 
master Mr. Knott, Watt seeks a refuge from need, he longs for ‘longing gone’, and 
accordingly he seeks a place where he is worth nothing, at the house. Implicit in the 
paragraph Beer considers to be the novel’s ‘core of the onion’92, is Watt’s need to not 
need (or need to need (k)nott). 
The aside’s emphasis on freedom from need as a kind of nothingness, on ‘the 
longing for longing gone’ has a precedent in Arsene’s earlier statement to Watt. 
Arsene guffaws, in Democritean fashion, at the disappointing and fleeting nature of 
his transcendent fall from the ladder. The moment echoes the story of Mr. Hackett’s 
hunch, received in similar fashion as a boy, his place of origin described as ‘there I fell 
off the ladder’93. Beckett himself insisted the ladder reference is to an obscure Welsh 
joke, and the appearance in Murphy of the line ‘Do not come down the ladder, they 
have taken it away’94, a syntax reappearing in Watt as ‘Do not come down the ladder, 
Ifor, I haf taken it away’ would seem to bear out this assertion by Beckett that there is 
a specific syntactic source for the joke, a source which, given the syntax in which 
Geulincx’ ladder is situated, means that this ladder cannot wholly derive from 
Geulincx. Nevertheless, it is redolent of Ethics in a number of ways. 
Arsene goes on to describe, in terms of constrained needs, his reasoning that 
followed from the fall: 
 
And yet it is useless not to seek, not to want, for when you cease to seek you start 
to find, and when you cease to want, then life begins to ram her fish and chips 
down your gullet until you puke, and then the puke down your gullet until you 
puke the puke, and then the puked puke until you begin to like it. The glutton 
castaway, the drunkard in the desert, the lecher in prison, they are the happy 
ones. To hunger, thirst, lust, every day afresh and every day in vain, after the old 
                                                
92 Beer 1985, p. 57. Cited as Beer though the quote refers to Beckett’s ‘nux-vomica [added to] an 
apértif of metaphors – the heart of the cauliflower or the ideal core of the onion’ from Proust, offered 
as a ‘tribute to the labours of poetical excavation’ (Proust, p. 29). 
93 Watt, p. 14. 
94 Murphy, p. 118. The punch line to the joke is ‘Too late, I’m halfway down already’ (Ackerley and 
Gontarski (eds.)  2006, p. 307). 
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prog, the old booze, the old whores, that’s the nearest we’ll ever get to felicity, 
the new porch and the very latest garden. I pass on the tip for what it is worth.95 
 
Sentiments expressed by Arsene can and have been productively read in terms of both 
Schopenhauer’s will-lessness and Leopardi’s extinguishing of desire.96 However, 
Arsene’s statement also revolves around certain Geulingian aspects. In accord with 
Geulincx’ ‘Adminicule of Humility’, Arsene describes how ‘when you cease to seek 
you start to find’. This parallels Geulincx’ cautioning that ‘No-one ever attained 
Happiness by doing something to attain it’97, and that in order to properly pursue 
‘Happiness’ one must cease to seek it. This ‘Adminicule’, ‘prop’ or ‘support’, and its 
relation to seeking and serving perhaps provide us with a further clue as to the 
significance of the ladder in Watt, the support or prop from which Arsene 
temporarily, unwittingly and clumsily descends. Arsene claims in the above extract 
that it may be possible for a seeker, such as Watt, to find what they might seek, but 
unfortunately such discovery yields a sickening result. When Arsene fell off the 
ladder, achieving a flawed momentary transcendence, the ‘incident’98 gave up little 
more than a fleeting awareness that he had, indeed, just fallen off the ladder. It gave 
Mr. Hackett less than this, yielding only back problems.99 Better, Arsene tells Watt, is 
to be in a place where one desires, but where one cannot act on, let alone fulfill, these 
desires. Such a place, in Geulincx’ terminology, is where one has no power, where one 
cannot achieve what one nevertheless needs. Arsene’s conclusion as a prior servant, 
going as Watt is coming, is that the best of all is to desire intensely, even slavishly, in a 
place where precisely that thing you desire is that which you cannot have. The upshot 
of Arsene’s tip is that desire, need, is inevitable if one is not to have rammed ‘down 
                                                
95 Watt, p. 43. 
96 See for example Ackerley 2005a, p. 66, which mentions both Schopenhauer and Leopardi. 
Leopardi’s ‘e fango è il mondo’ [‘the world is mud’] was an epigraph for Proust, though it does not 
appear in the English Calder edition. Ackerley quotes Schopenhauer on ennui: ‘the absence of 
satisfaction is suffering, the empty longing for a new wish, languor’. More concisely in On The Suffering 
of the World Schopenhauer states ‘Want and boredom are indeed the twin poles of human life’ 
(Schopenhauer 1970, p. 45), boundaries which Malone perhaps alludes to with his ‘Dish and pot, dish 
and pot, these are the poles’ (TN, p. 185). 
97 Ethics, p. 353. 
98 Watt, p. 41. 
99 It is implied in the novel that the fall off the ladder in the farmyard was the cause of Mr. Hackett’s 
hunch. According to Ackerley, Mr. Hackett’s ‘pose is that of Punch’ (Ackerley 2005a, p. 30). If this is 
the case then perhaps such an introductory character might be seen as ushering a reader gently in to a 
very ‘guignol world’. 
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your gullet’ all the puke of ‘habit’, that ‘great deadener’100. Such needs in the physical 
world cannot be willfully ignored, as Murphy tried to do by plugging himself into his 
chair and his internal depths while yet still subject to his ‘deplorable susceptibility to 
Celia, ginger, and so on’. As we have seen, Murphy’s ties to the physical world that 
enable his mind’s coming alive will, as accessories, also kill him. Nor can such needs 
be reasoned or worked away, as Watt in his domestic servitude attempts, his serving 
the needs of Mr. Knott. This merely results in a different kind of closed system, one of 
self-perpetuating almost-entropy. So, if we cannot prevent desires and the desperate 
hope of action and fulfilment unless resigned to the banality and ‘puke’ of satisfaction 
become habit, then, Arsene says, we should embed ourselves in desires precisely 
where we cannot fulfill them. Thereby, in an ironic fait accompli, imprisoning them as 
our own torturers.  
Such a conclusion breaks in half Geulincx’ well-balanced axiom. It dispenses 
entirely with the possibility of wanting nothing, leaving only the validity and 
inevitability of a place where one has no power, where one is worth nothing, where 
one cannot get what one will inevitably need. We might well conclude that such a 
place is the domain Beckett wrote of to Duthuit, where the all-encompassing 
importance of Geulincx’ phrase is imagined as a place, ‘a domain where one is worth 
nothing’ that there is little chance of ‘exaggerating the scope of’.  
 Feldman has also traced Arsene’s ladder in Watt back to Geulincx, though to 
a specific instance of a ladder in Ethics Geulincx uses as a metaphor for the pragmatic 
workaday ways in which we must, at God’s behest, keep ourselves alive: 
 
The virtuous man is always ascending and descending this ladder: he seeks ease 
that he may be fit for work; he wants to be fit for work that he may work; he want 
to work that he may have something else to eat; he wants to eat that he may live; 
he wants to live because God has ordered it, not because it pleases him, and not 
because life (as it has become popular to say) is so sweet.101 
 
Feldman argues that ‘Arsene’s entire statement is powered by an appropriation of 
Geulingian ineffability’, and that compared to the importance of Mauthner’s Kritik or 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Arsene’s analogy ‘would seem to make more sense in the 
                                                
100 CDW, p. 84. Vladimir in Waiting for Godot asserts in his final soliloquy that ‘habit is a great 
deadener’, which echoes Beckett’s earlier railing against habit in Proust, where he proclaimed that 
‘Habit is the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit’ (Proust, p. 19). 
101 Ethics, p. 327. 
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context of Geulingian detachment, or withdrawal into consciousness’102. The fall off 
the ladder, for Feldman, is a fall away from an everyday world of working and serving.  
 
3.6  The Ineffable 
 
 Yet this ladder carries even more resonances of Geulincx than these of the 
everyday world and of the prop or support from which one must, in humility and 
aware of the futility of seeking satisfaction, turn away (or jump/fall off). Arsene 
wistfully tells Watt of his experience of the fall. Of his momentary ‘existence off the 
ladder’103: 
 
I felt, that Tuesday afternoon, millions of little things moving all together out of 
their old place, into a new one near by, and furtively, as though it were 
forbidden. And I have little doubt that I was the only person living to discover 
them. To conclude from this that the incident was internal would, I think, be 
rash, for my – how shall I say – my personal system was so distended at the 
period of which I speak that the distinction between what was inside it and what 
was outside it was not at all easy to draw.104 
 
This fleeting, unspeakable moment of ‘reversed metamorphosis’ was Arsene’s 
maximal point of his time at the house, his climax, and as per Bruno’s identified 
contraries it was simultaneously his minima. This moment of change that is ‘other 
than a change of degree’105 instantiates a moment of simultaneous pathos and bathos, 
of budding and withering. Inevitably shadowing with ‘purpose’, Arsene questions and 
questions again what this event was, only to conclude with banality that it was, indeed, 
‘not an illusion’106. In its being real but unspeakable Arsene’s experience of the fall is 
ineffable, what Arsene describes as ‘what has so happily been called the unutterable 
or ineffable, so that any attempt to utter or eff it is doomed to fail, doomed, doomed 
to fail. ’107 This ‘ineffable’ was described in more detail earlier in Watt’s composition 
process: 
 
                                                
102 Feldman 2009a, p 50. 
103 Watt, p. 42. 
104 Watt, pp. 41-42. 
105 Watt, p. 42. 
106 Watt, p. 43. 
107 Watt, p. 61. 
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what we know partakes in no small measure of the nature of what has so happily 
been called the unutterable or ineffable, so that any attempt to utter or eff it is 
doomed to fail, the discourse being frequently interrupted by long loud bursts of 
crying and of laughing, and finally brought to a standstill, without any useful 
information having been imparted.108 
 
The section Beckett cut from the final novel reveals that attempting to think the 
ineffable coheres with Beckett’s concerns with an impossibility of communication, 
whereby it is the bodily, physical outbursts of a rootedness in the world (‘crying’, 
‘laughing’) that shut off the possibility of imparting information from one mind to 
another. 
The ‘ineffable’ is central to Geulincx’ thought. Indeed, this is the primary 
epistemological criterion he applies to the category of knowledge that distinguishes 
his work among his fellow occasionalists. As we have seen, for Geulincx it is the 
impossibility of being able to know how something happens that forces us to admit 
we therefore cannot be said to do that thing. When this is the case, as with any action 
in the physical world or thought in the mind, these things are said to be ‘ineffable’. 
When something is ineffable for Geulincx, however, this is not only because ‘we 
cannot speak or think of it (for this would be nothing, nothing and unthinkable being 
the same), but because we cannot think about or encompass with our reason how it is 
done’109. According to Geulincx, this ineffability is the proper domain of God alone: 
‘He is a Father, and the manner in which He is the Father of us all is stupendous and 
ineffable’110. The ‘ineffable something’111 that remains unaccounted for in a rational 
description of experience in the world can only be properly known by God. It is 
primarily via ‘the ineffable’ that Geulincx reveals his mystical leanings, and it is along 
comparable lines that Watt is revealed as more then a novel of Cartesian rationalist 
entropy. It too is shadowed by the ‘ineffable’, by the unknowable residual realm of 
experience that is not exhausted by Watt’s otherwise exhaustive method. Arsene 
warns the next in line that the ineffable will elude, even confound, the rationalist’s 
capacities for assimilation, and his underlying insatiability is doomed, either way, to 
dissatisfaction or worse, to satisfaction. 
                                                
108 Watt Typescript, HRHRC, pp. 242-243. 
109 Ethics, p. 334. 
110 Metaphysics, p. 97. Cf. TCD MS 10971/7/5r. 
111 Ethics, p. 334. 
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3.7  Mercier and Camier in Watt’s ‘series’ 
 
Towards the end of Mercier et Camier a bombastic incarnation of Watt 
appears. This Watt looks backs at his own previously strange questing past and, as 
Pilling has read it, announces Beckett’s own future aesthetic horizons, ‘predict[ing] 
what Beckett will attempt in narrative terms when, as soon, Mercier et Camier will be 
done with’112: 
 
Il naîtra, il est né de nous, dit Watt, celui qui n’ayant rien ne voudra rien, sinon 
qu’on lui laisse le rien qu’il a.113 
One shall be born, said Watt, one is born of us, who having nothing will wish for 
nothing, except to be left the nothing he hath.114 
 
This second version of Watt announces here the coming of the masterworks of voice, 
of the first-person narrators and their narratives that will arise from the ashes of 
Mercier, Camier, Murphy and Watt. The raucous Watt is, then, invested with 
responsibility for ‘the ordaining of a being to come by a being past, of a being past by 
a being to come’115. He ordains both the coming of the wish-less voice and also the 
status of his own previous namesake, altered post-facto in relation to these identities-
to-come, giving this earlier version of himself an important role in this series of 
incarnations, and turning Beckett’s protagonists into a series not unlike that of the 
servants in Watt. In the English version Watt performs his ceremonial invocation with 
Biblical solemnity in the style of a drunken John the Baptist, ‘hath’ translating grandly 
the more colloquial French; Watt is very serious about this being to come. Yet he 
makes it while causing a fuss in a pub, raging while drunk. Perhaps, then, his solemn 
tone is a little sullied by its context, Beckett’s tongue a little in his cheek. It must be 
asked, despite the grandiosity of the announcement being undermined, why might it 
fall to Watt, a Watt notably different from his prior namesake, to announce this future 
coming? Secondly it must also be asked why such an announcement is framed in the 
terms of ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis borrowed from Geulincx? 
                                                
112 Pilling 1997, p. 209. 
113 Beckett 1970, p. 198. 
114 Beckett 1974, p. 114. 
115 Watt, p. 134.  
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Beckett wrote Mercier et Camier between July and October 1946116 after 
completing Suite (an early version of La Fin) and immediately prior to beginning 
Premier amour. During this time the manuscript of Watt was rejected by a number of 
publishers, continuing the pattern begun over a year earlier by Routledge, despite 
their previous ‘whole-hearted enthusiasm for’117 Murphy. Beckett wrote to Reavey of 
the issue: 
 
My book Watt has been turned down by Routledge. Mr. Ragg and Mr. Read 
agreed that it was wild and unintelligible and felt very sorry for the author of 
Murphy.118 
 
Perhaps this chronological overlap might go some way to explaining the strange 
appearance of a raging, frustrated Watt in the later French pseudocouple novel, with 
both works current in Beckett’s mind and one the source of some practical 
frustration, not only for Beckett. But such speculation does not tell the whole story. A 
more substantial answer to the question of why Watt appears in this later work to 
proclaim Geulingian prophesies lies in Beckett’s conception of the earlier Watt as 
having ‘its place in the series’. This is a series which this second-coming Watt reaches 
into explicitly, and the fact that he does so in the borrowed terms from Geulincx hints 
that Beckett’s thoughts on ‘the series’, which were clearly determining much of his 
focus during the intensively creative period that, according to Bair, Beckett called the 
‘siege in the room’119 of the immediate post-war writings, were in part determined by 
Geulincx. With this possibility in mind the following chapter turns to the novella The 
End/La Fin and its pre- and post-publication versions and variants, with specific focus 
on a paragraph that names Geulincx, to investigate how Geulincx comes to play a 
new part in the evolution of Beckett’s ‘series’, one that Beckett felt could be viably 
framed in terms of Geulincx’ axiom. 
                                                
116 See Pilling 2006a, pp. 98-99. 
117 T.M. Ragg to Beckett, 6 June 1945. Cited in Knowlson 1996, p. 342. 
118 Beckett to Reavey, 20 June 1945. HRHRC. 
119 Bair 1978, p. 346. 
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Chapter 4 – Suite / La Fin / The End 
 
4.1  What Follows1 
 
Suite et Fin, the two-part French novella that would become La Fin after its first part 
was published as Suite and be translated as The End, was begun (though at that stage 
lacking a title) in February 1946.2 Suite was published in Sartre’s Les Temps modernes 
in July of that year, though this truncated publication would lead to acrimony 
between Beckett and the magazine’s editors.3 Begun in English, partway through 
composition Suite became Beckett’s first extended foray into writing prose in his 
adopted French, thereby inaugurating the famously productive stages of his middle 
period during the so-called ‘frenzy of writing’,4 the author under ‘siege in the room’. 
Suite was translated by Richard Seaver with Beckett and published as The End in 
Merlin 2.3 (1954). Beckett was furious with this version, however, and the translation 
was extensively revised for publication in Evergreen Review 4.15 (November-
December 1960). This latter now standardised English language version of the novella 
has been republished a number of times in England and America.5 La Fin was first 
fully published in Éditions de Minuit’s Nouvelles et Textes pour rien (1955).  
The following discussion focuses on a single passage in The End, a passage that 
describes the narrator-protagonist being gifted by a now dead tutor a copy of 
Geulincx’ Ethics. Beginning with a reading of the standard version of this passage I 
then go back to its origins to trace the versions of the passage in a lineage that begins 
                                                
1 Christopher Ricks opts for translating the fragmented title Suite as What Follows. With its complete 
title it is perhaps closer to Continuation and Conclusion, a double, oxymoronic moniker similar to the 
audibly multi-faceted Comment c’est. See TE, p. vii. 
2 Cohn dates this as 7 February (Cohn 2001, p. 129), Pilling as 17 February (Pilling 2006a, p. 96). 
3 Beckett wrote to Simone de Beauvoir at Les Temps modernes expressing his disappointment and 
frustration at Suite’s being severed in half, thereby killing off too soon ‘one of my creatures’. De 
Beauvoir had refused to publish the second part of Suite et Fin in what Beckett called ‘Sartre’s canard’ 
(Beckett to Reavey, 27 May 1946, HRHRC), citing her (misconceived) anger that Beckett had sought 
slyly to publish in two issues, pushing his luck as a relatively unknown author. According to Knowlson 
the ‘many references to itches in the privates and the arse and far too much pissing and farting to be 
compatible with the tone or, as Beckett put it later, ‘la bonne tenue’ of the review’ (Knowlson 1996, p. 
359) may have also played a part. 
4 Beckett in an undated interview with Harvey. Cited by Knowlson 1996, p. 358. 
5 See, for example, Calder’s No’s Knife: Collected Shorter Prose 1945-1966 (1967, reprinted in 1984 as 
Collected Shorter Prose 1945-1980), Grove’s Stories and Texts for Nothing (Beckett 1967), and Calder’s 
Four Novellas (Beckett 1977), among other places. Its more recent publication has been by Grove (as 
CSP in 1995), Penguin (Beckett 2000) and in 2009 by Faber & Faber, which reprints Calder’s Collected 
Shorter Prose of 1984 (TE). 
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with Beckett’s ‘Suite’ notebook, and proceeds through diverging published versions 
up to its final translations.  
What I will call the ‘Geulincx passage’ instances a kind of crucible in which a 
number of important aspects of Beckett’s work of this period are inscribed and 
reworked. Beckett makes his hugely important turn from writing prose in English to 
French at the precise point of this passage. Yet this turn towards untrammelled 
possibilities is coupled with a backwards glancing at Beckett’s own prior education. 
The resulting struggles manifest as subtle textual choices, altering through different 
versions of the novella, that speak to Beckett’s uses of source materials and his 
previously expansive approach to self-education as it might impact his work, in a 
more decisive and purposeful rejection of anything resembling ‘notesnatching’ than 
earlier in the ‘series’. The passage also reveals important manoeuvres in Beckett’s 
translation and self-translation.  
 
4.2  The End: vision and the tutor 
 
The reading I want to put forward of the Geulincx passage depends primarily 
on the importance in it, and to it, of sight. As a specific moment of the importance of 
sight in Beckett’s oeuvre the passage has implications for thinking about sight in the 
wider oeuvre, while it is itself partly produced by these other instances of sight. 
Seeing, looking, gazing and staring, in various forms, become powerful elements from 
this point in Beckett’s oeuvre. The Unnamable’s narrator, for example, will gaze 
straight-ahead, eagle-eyed and unwavering, complementing the narrative propulsion 
of a novel deriving from its will to ‘go on’6, coupled with a paradoxical inability to do 
the same. It is thanks to these staring eyes that the fictionalised narrator sees his 
earlier avatars whirl round him, and through them he expels what might be either 
tears or ‘liquefied brain’7. Film will open with a full-screen shot of an eye opening, 
blinking and staring, before the work explores for purposes of merely ‘structural and 
dramatic convenience’ the Berkeleyan maxim Esse est percipi [to be is to be 
perceived]. Comparably, Rockaby ends with the unseen speaker aligning W’s being, 
                                                
6 TN, p. 418. 
7 TN, p. 295. 
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her esse, with a capacity to perceive via the eyes, where the implication is that W’s life 
is fucked at the same moment that her eyes are stopped: 
 
rock her off 
stop her eyes 
fuck life 
stop her eyes 
rock her off 
rock her off8 
 
Beckett had also utilised imagery associated with sight prior to Suite. In the very early 
drafts of Watt, for example, a long passage in the first notebook entitled ‘The Eyes’9 
details those of Erskine. The passage is separated and titled similarly to how 
categories of Scholasticism had determined from the first page of the notebook the 
novel’s proposed structure and contents (‘who, what, where, by what means, why, in 
what way, when’10). In this sense ‘The Eyes’ are as important as the ‘Where’ which 
would become ‘The Nothingness’, later the house, and the ‘Who’ which would 
become Quin, later Mr Knott. Beckett’s even earlier descriptions of psychological or 
imaginative life as proximate to sight include a letter to MacGreevy of 1936 in which 
Beckett aligns the creative impulses of his mind with where it physically sits – ‘behind 
the eyes’: 
 
I have neither written anything nor wanted to, except for a short hour, when the 
frail sense of beginning life behind the eyes, that is the best of all experiences, 
came again for the first time since Cascando, and produced 2 lines and a half.11 
 
This fascination with sight and seeing as related to knowledge, experience and 
creativity is one that also has roots in Beckett’s early interest in what he called 
Rimbaud’s ‘eye-suicide – pour des visions’12. As cited above Beckett referred to 
Rimbaud’s sightless seer as falling short of Geulincx’ twin-sighted abilities, his ‘Janus 
or Telephus eyes’. It has already been noted how Beckett detailed the powerful 
impressions Geulincx made upon him via intertextual comparisons based in sight, 
                                                
8 CDW, p. 442. 
9 Watt Notebook 1, p. 91. HRHRC. 
10 Watt Notebook 1, p. 3. HRHRC. 
11 Beckett to MacGreevy, 16 February 1936. CL, p. 447. 
12 Beckett to MacGreevy, 11 March 1931. CL, p. 73. 
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where of Geulincx’ eyes Beckett sensed they were ‘very patiently turned outward, and 
without Schwärmerei turned inward’. By 1946, however, evidence indicates Beckett 
no longer felt that seeing, either through the eyes or as part of an internal ‘life behind 
the eyes’, was any longer ‘the best of all experiences’, and the Geulincx passage in The 
End speaks to precisely this change.  
Quoted below is the version of the passage published by Beckett’s long-term 
American publisher Grove Press. It comes immediately after a sudden change in the 
narrative. The narrator had earlier been wrestling with a cow in a forest, before 
getting back on a road and attempting to get run over by passing carts. Then, ‘The 
day came when, looking round me, I was in the suburbs, and from there to the old 
haunts it was not far, beyond the stupid hope of rest or less pain’13. 
 
So I covered the lower part of my face with a black rag and went and begged at a 
sunny corner. For it seemed to me my eyes were not completely spent, thanks 
perhaps to the dark glasses my tutor had given me. He had given me the Ethics of 
Geulincx. They were a man’s glasses, I was a child. They found him dead, 
crumpled up in the water closet, his clothes in awful disorder, struck down by an 
infarctus. Ah what peace. The Ethics had his name (Ward) on the fly-leaf, the 
glasses had belonged to him. The bridge, at the time I am speaking of, was of 
brass wire, of the kind used to hang pictures and big mirrors, and two long black 
ribbons served as wings. I wound them round my ears and then down under my 
chin where I tied them together. The lenses had suffered, from rubbing in my 
pocket against each other and against the other objects there. I thought Mr Weir 
had confiscated all my belongings. But I had no further need of these glasses and 
used them merely to soften the glare of the sun. I should never have mentioned 
them.14 
 
The primary claim I make in regard to this passage is that there is a complex 
association, one that is pushed to the point of identification, between ‘the Ethics’ and 
‘the glasses’. So when the narrator writes that he has ‘no further need of these glasses’, 
he is thereby also writing that he has no further need of ‘the Ethics’. These two objects 
in a certain sense become fused as one and the same object through the act of reading 
the passage. Specifically, it is Beckett’s highly attuned syntax that makes these two 
                                                
13 This sentence leading into the passage on Geulincx itself has a particular occasionalist resonance. 
Decrying the possibility of a ‘beyond’ these two innocent hopes as ‘stupid’ not only describes an 
awfulness, a situation where all is so unrelentingly terrible there is no point hoping for respite. It also 
insists on the futility of any will to change circumstance itself. Both ‘rest’ and ‘less pain’ are 
paradigmatic, whereby hoping for anything is equally ‘stupid’. In French the point is made more clearly 
with the words ‘stupide espoir’ [stupid hope] functioning as a near visual and aural pun on désespoir 
[despair]. 
14 CSP, pp. 91-92. 
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ontologically distinct objects appear inseparable. More specifically, it is a lack of the 
adverb ‘also’ from the sentence naming Geulincx that by its very absence brings about 
this strange melding, where this lack of distinguishing boundary allows the two 
objects to collapse into each other. The sentence in question (third in the passage) is 
enclosed by two sentences both of which make no mention of ‘the Ethics’, but refer 
explicitly only to ‘the glasses’. These are the three sentences (the second, third and 
fourth) quoted separately:  
  
For it seemed to me my eyes were not completely spent, thanks perhaps to the 
dark glasses my tutor had given me. He had given me the Ethics of Geulincx. 
They were a man’s glasses, I was a child. 
 
The lack of conjoiner is glaring, yet its implications are subtle. If the tutor had also 
given the young student Geulincx’ Ethics then the two objects (treating Ethics at this 
point specifically as a physical object, a book) would be categorically distinguishable 
from each other. Without this also, the echo of ‘glasses’ that sounds in ‘Ethics’, where 
the two-syllable ‘glasses’ forms part of an alliterative pattern almost but not quite 
rhymed by ‘Ethics’, as similarly happens with the ‘tutor’ and ‘Geulincx’, forces the 
objects beyond the point of mere contiguity. Instead, the echoes of the objects and 
authors in each other collude in an implicit though imperfect identification.  
The identification between the glasses and ethics is not only paradigmatic, 
however, it is also, to borrow Roman Jakobson’s term, syntagmatic. It is partly 
through the rhythm of these sentences that Beckett achieves this shading, a greying or 
vaguening, of one realm of existence into another. Excising also results in exact 
repetition of the three words ‘had given me’. These two instances of ‘had given me’, 
separated only by a period and the single word ‘he’, similarly contribute to the sense 
that these things are fused. A residual presence of the object of ‘had given me’ from 
the first sentence (‘the glasses’) becomes present again, is subtly recalled, when we 
read ‘had given me’ in the second sentence, the ostensible object of which is solely 
‘the Ethics’. Before a reader’s eye even reaches ‘the Ethics’ the repetition of ‘had given 
me’ carries an expectation, what we might even call a prejudice, that the object is 
already ‘the glasses’. 
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There are a number of other stylistic manoeuvres that intensify the impression 
of objects fused. For example, the issue is partly one of punctuation when the narrator 
notes the apparent ownership of both items: 
 
The Ethics had his name (Ward) on the fly-leaf, the glasses had belonged to him. 
 
In this sentence not only is there a missing ‘also’ or ‘and’ which if in place would make 
the ontological distinction between the two objects clear and distinct. But further, if 
these two objects are to be considered as separate a reader might expect that the 
comma halfway through the sentence would instead be a period. Beckett’s subtle 
choice of a comma rather than a period manages to fuse two otherwise entirely 
distinct realms of existence, two distinct objects. Paul Auster called Beckett ‘the 
master of the comma’15. Its use here instantiates again Beckett’s ability to manipulate 
rhythm as a carrier of implied meaning. In this sentence about the ‘fly-leaf’ what 
follows after the midway comma reads as if it were a qualification of what came before 
the comma. That is, it reads as a qualification of ‘The Ethics’. It follows from the fact 
of the name on the fly-leaf that the glasses had therefore belonged to the tutor, and so 
that they are the same object. Yet, perhaps comically, this ownership only literally 
follows from the previous proposition. It comes after, but it is not therefore necessarily 
caused by, what comes before. A reader would perhaps do well to bear in mind 
Arsene’s cautioning Watt about the impressions of cause and effect when all there is 
in reality is incongruent simultaneity. As in Geulincx’ occasionalist causation there is 
no truly ‘effable’ interconnecting agency. All apparent cause and effect imputed to 
experience is an illusion. Here with a simple single comma Beckett actualises the 
theme Kenner called the ‘partially congruent’, allowing mere simultaneity of 
ownership to more fully imply the identification of one object with the other via an 
illusory impression of cause and effect. 
 
4.3  The End: pockets of philosophy 
 
 If this reading of the first part of the Geulincx passage is persuasive then the 
curious enquiry might be made to set out the ends to which Beckett orchestrates this 
                                                
15 Auster 2003, p. 346. 
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irresolvable melding of the glasses and Ethics. A first step in addressing this requires 
recollection of Beckett’s often cited authorial programmatic statement made in Dream 
of Fair to Middling Women. Importantly as regards this statement, taken as it often is 
and as I do so here, out of the book’s broader context, it was Belacqua who ‘mused’ 
and ‘submused’ about the possibilities of fiction. That is, the elusive ‘programme’ is 
itself fictionalised. Nevertheless, the ‘smartness’ and ‘slickness’ outlined by that 
fictional protagonist in the first novel echo with implication through the rest of the 
oeuvre: 
 
The blown roses of a phrase shall catapult the reader into the tulips of the phrase 
that follows. The experience of my reader shall be between the phrases, in the 
silence, communicated by the intervals, not the terms, of the statement, between 
the flowers that cannot coexist, the antithetical (nothing so simple as antithetical) 
season of words, his experience shall be the menace, the miracle, the memory, of 
an unspeakable trajectory.16 
 
In the fusion of objects in the Geulincx passage Beckett manifests just this ‘catapult’, 
first described in 1932. While Beckett’s middle period prose is markedly less flowery 
than these earlier aesthetic epiphanies of Dream of Fair to Middling Women, at 
moments it nevertheless achieves certain of the intentions dormant in the earlier work 
as regards being flung between these ‘roses’ and ‘tulips’, existing in ‘the intervals’. The 
experience in the Geulincx passage is just that of needing to be ‘between the phrases’, 
where the simplicity of the antithetical is entirely insufficient, and it is in the act of 
reading this Geulincx passage that such a space ‘between’ is opened.  
A second way to frame the ambiguities in the Geulincx passage, to ask why 
they are there, resides with Beckett’s changing attitude to the incorporation of 
potential source material. In earlier works, with Dream of Fair to Middling Women the 
earliest long prose work and concomitantly the most extensively and explicitly woven 
from recycled fabrics, from what that novel calls ‘the tag and the ready-made’17, 
moments of intertextual ‘intrusion’ were often welcomed, were not dismissed as 
radically as they appear to be here in The End, where the narrator with regret 
bemoans ‘I should never have mentioned them’. The Geulincx passage is a specific 
instance of what Wood called Beckett’s ‘uneasiness’ about the ‘intrusion’ of 
                                                
16 Dream, p. 138. 
17 Dream, p. 48. 
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philosophical voices and figures. Geulincx’ name is invoked at the same moment as it 
is turned from. It is only half-remembered and is somehow only of singular, pragmatic 
use to the narrator – it shades the ‘glare of the sun’. Perhaps Geulincx is invited here 
to stand for the intellectual fascination of all previous narrators, as a paradigm empty 
of specificity but full of force. While this might be a neat, it is also an inaccurate 
resolution. There is specificity working against this supposition – the specific name 
‘Geulincx’ and that of ‘Ethics’. Geulincx’ barely recognisable, almost forgotten name 
as it stands in the margins of the history of philosophy is perfectly pitched to evoke 
the fragmentary and partially lost knowledge Beckett’s first-person narrator’s insist 
upon as the only possible knowledge. Yet this evocation also becomes, by dint of 
naming Geulincx, a highly specific fragment of knowledge the narrator invokes at the 
moment of his simultaneous turning away from it. This is in fact a highly Geulingian 
manoeuvre, bearing comparison with Geulincx’ invoking the capacities of self only to 
assert more forcefully a turn away from them in order to properly conceptualise 
humility. The second incarnation of Watt spoke of a narrator to come, ‘one is born of 
us, who having nothing will wish for nothing, except to be left the nothing he hath’. 
In putting away Geulincx by invoking Geulincx the narrator of The End makes just 
such a manoeuvre. They wish for nothing except to be left the nothing they have, yet 
this nothing wished for is necessarily only thinkable in terms derived from things they 
have. 
Beckett here produces a particular kind of ‘actualization’ of that double 
manoeuvre determining so many of his fictional characters of a contradictory impulse 
to leave, coupled (or pseudo-coupled) with a commitment to stay. The passage enacts 
a crucial moment of struggle and ‘uneasiness’, inflected in part with Beckett’s turning 
to philosophical sources such as Geulincx in times of major transitions of his fiction – 
in those Scholastic categories of knowledge with which he programmatically began 
Watt, for example. Originally in the first notebook the paradigm referred to Socrates 
as its ‘who’, a paradigm which as Ackerley points out broadly ‘generates the later 
Watt (NB1, 7ff) and the Beckett protagonist of the next forty years’18. Similarly, 
Murphy’s interiority was summarised in subverted Spinozan terms, and we have seen 
how Geulincx positively enabled Beckett to go further in the later stages of the 
                                                
18 Ackerley 2005a, p. 233. 
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troubled gestation of Murphy. The Geulincx passage in The End shows too that there 
is no moving away in Beckett’s oeuvre that is not also a being tied back, no freedom 
that is not also constrained by or in some way responsible to its own history. 
The passage’s insistence upon the fragmentary and the residual is made more 
forceful through its second half, which turns on the contents of the narrator-
protagonist’s pockets. The glasses/Ethics that have been rubbing together while in the 
narrator’s pockets are a highly effective, though (as Uhlmann uses the word) 
‘occluded’ image of the refining and amalgamating of possible sources for Beckett’s 
works of this period post-Watt. In the possession of this new first-person 
narrator/protagonist, fragments of previously tightly delineated systems of knowledge 
are pushed and scraped together, having ‘suffered, from rubbing’, such that each 
element of a system becomes so distorted by complementary others that none can be 
seen through clearly, individually. The image draws out further resonance of 
Feldman’s description of Beckett’s allusions. In reference to Molloy’s pockets of 
sucking stones, and based on entries about Protagoras and Zeno in Beckett’s 
‘Philosophy Notes’ resulting in partial-quotations in Endgame and Mercier and 
Camier, Feldman writes ‘Allusions become like revolving stones to be shifted and 
manipulated, all the while hidden in pockets of age-old trousers’19.  
These glasses not only instantiate an image of fragments of knowledge 
‘rubbing’ together, but the flimsy coherence of systems of knowledge that allows such 
mutual engraving is figured into this imagery too as the glasses being strung together 
by makeshift ribbons and wire. This ‘brass wire’, used normally for hanging ‘pictures 
and big mirrors’, impersonates a system of connections, represents in makeshift 
fragments that only roughly approximate an original. Both of the more usual uses for 
the wire imply a gaze, a despectio gaze outward at the world in ‘pictures’ of it, or 
inward at the self, in ‘big mirrors’. Yet this crumpled mess of patched-together copies 
implies that neither direction can now be distinguished clearly. These degraded and 
distorted lenses, handed-down and fit only for single and limited pragmatic purpose, 
sit at the border of self and outer world, neither wholly preventing the outside world 
from getting in, nor enabling an inward gaze. As elements of what would once have 
been discrete instances of Beckett’s ‘notesnatching’ are in The End indelibly engraved 
                                                
19 Feldman 2006, p. 36.  
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by each other, Geulincx here by unnamed others, so too each is committed to an 
earth, buried, en-graved, in the stratified geological/psychological zone the 
investigation of which is that ‘autospeliology’ of the Watt drafts. Molloy says of 
burying Lousse’s dog that ‘I contributed my presence. As if it had been my own 
burial. And it was’20. In a sense too the burial of Geulincx enacted in The End is also 
the narrator of The End’s burial.  
However, this is not to argue that these glasses should be read as only a 
metaphor for the Ethics of Geulincx. It is all too neat and convenient at this stage of 
the ‘series’ to alight comfortably on such one-sided conveniences of correspondence. 
But this does not mean that alighting uncomfortably is therefore to be avoided 
entirely. Beckett’s art of nonrelation, described in 1937 to Kaun, calls forth a 
‘literature of the unword’21 that seeks to dissolve what Beckett called the ‘terrible 
materiality of the word surface’22. From the mid-1940s onward immateriality in 
Beckett’s oeuvre is effectively focussed in opposition to an art of ‘allegory, that 
glorious double-entry, with every credit in the said account a debit in the meant, and 
inversely’23, as he described it in a review of Jack B. Yeats of 1936. What is crucial in 
reading works from this period is less a locating what might at first sight be a 
persuasive correspondence, but rather a foregrounding of the blurred ontological 
boundaries between the realms of existence Beckett’s imagery occupies. Easy 
correspondences are the dangerous neatness that can function as a trap for the ‘gentle 
skimmer’ mocked in Murphy. As Uhlmann and other critics have argued, it is not the 
case that Beckett simply rejects philosophy outright, but rather that ‘Beckett’s works 
continue to interact in important ways with works of philosophy’24. While tracing 
these ‘important ways’ becomes increasingly complex and at times self-undermining, 
it is nevertheless a fruitful, indeed necessary exercise when tracing the continuity of 
Geulincx’ influence across the oeuvre. 
Perhaps, however, there is a more pragmatic, simpler and rather more bathetic 
resolution to the ambiguities in the Geulincx passage, according to which the 
ambivalences in intentional omissions and punctuation details argued for above might 
                                                
20 TN, p. 37. 
21 Beckett to Kaun, 9 July 1937. Disjecta, p. 173. 
22 Beckett to Kaun, 9 July 1937. Disjecta, p. 172. 
23 Disjecta, p. 90. 
24 Uhlmann 2006a, p. 65. 
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be merely typographical errors. Errors have appeared in this passage through various 
published versions, the most obviously striking of which is a misspelling of the name 
‘Geulincz’ that appears in a number of published versions of the novella: the 1958 La 
Fin in Nouvelles et Textes pour rien published by Minuit25, and in numerous English 
texts including Grove’s Evergreen Review of 196026 and the Calder No’s Knife of 
196727 and Collected Shorter Prose of 198428. Editing The End for publication by Faber 
and Faber in 2009 Christopher Ricks used Calder’s 1984 text as the basis for an 
edition entitled The Expelled, The Calmative, The End & First Love, and this also 
reprints the misspelling.29 The page proofs of Calder’s 1984 Collected Shorter Prose are 
held at HRHRC, and they reveal that although Beckett deleted a repetition of ‘He had 
given me’ (thereby reducing to two the appearances of ‘had given me’), he made no 
further corrections or alterations to the passage, leaving the spelling as ‘Geulincz’.30 
Typographical errors are an important issue regarding the novella’s anomalous 
incarnation in Merlin (see below). Yet we will not be able to properly address this 
hypothesis without recourse to earlier manuscript versions of the text. So with the 
above reading of the passage as instantiating an important irresolvable ambivalence 
and a simultaneous rejection via an embrace of Geulincx on the one hand, along with 
the more banal possibility of textual errors with ‘Geulincz’ as precedent on the other, 
I turn now to the origins of the passage in its earliest incarnation in the ‘Suite’ 
notebook, before looking at further versions including the French La Fin and its 
translation in the English language Merlin and beyond. This sub-series of versions of 
this one work both complements and complicates the reading given above. It reveals 
that Beckett’s reshaping and translating the passage plays out certain of the struggles 
that reach their ambivalent finality in the later standard version, yet this is via some 
intriguing instances of textual error and amendment. 
 
4.4 Suite 
                                                
25 See Beckett 1958, p. 105. 
26 See Beckett 1960, p. 33. 
27 See Beckett 1967, p. 58. 
28 See Beckett 1984, p. 62. 
29 Ricks’s justification for resorting to this base-text is the fact that Calder’s was ‘the last edition in 
Beckett’s lifetime’ (TE, p. xviii). 
30 See Collected Shorter Prose 1945-1980, corrected galley proofs, pp. 62-63. Carlton Lake collection of 
Samuel Beckett papers, Series I, BV4, HRHRC. 
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The Geulincx passage would have been the opening paragraph of the second 
part of Suite et Fin had de Beauvoir consented to publish as Beckett thought was 
agreed. That is, if Beckett left the paragraphs in the order we might expect them to be 
in, based on how later versions are published. The final sentence of Suite as published 
in Les Temps modernes ends ‘au delà du stupide espoir de repos ou de moindre peine’31, 
translated later as ‘beyond the stupid hope of rest or less pain’. Following this as the 
intended opening of the second part of the story would have been the Geulincx 
passage. In the English Merlin publication of the novella (1954) where it is titled The 
End, a line break, the only one in the work, separates these paragraphs. This gives us a 
clue as to the centrality this passage plays in the novella’s various incarnations, a 
centrality even more pronounced in the ‘Suite’ notebook. 
As Cohn has detailed following Knowlson’s discovery of the ‘Suite’ notebook, 
a volume Cohn describes as ‘a manuscript treasure’, it is precisely at the point of the 
Geulincx passage in this notebook where Beckett turns to writing in French: 
 
Until recently, it was thought that Beckett […] shifted after the war to creation in 
French. However, the ‘Suite’ notebook modifies that view of Beckett as a French 
writer […] On March 13 – often a significant number for Beckett – he stopped 
ten lines down on the twenty-eighth page of his manuscript and drew a 
horizontal line across the page. In his rushed handwriting, he recapitulated in 
French a passage he had written about the narrator-protagonist’s tutor, who had 
given him dark glasses and The Ethics of Geulincx, and who was found dead on 
the floor of his water closet (cf. CSP, 91). The death of the tutor was the occasion 
of Beckett’s birth as a major French writer.32 
 
There follows a transcription from the ‘Suite’ notebook of the Geulincx passage that 
adheres line-by-line to the text as it appears in the notebook. While this gives the 
impression of the novella as written with a short-line, poem-like structure, this is 
rather a result of Beckett’s elongated, right-leaning ‘rushed handwriting’, and the size 
of the notebook.  
 
Being now for the moment 
virtually decent – far changed – 
as far as my face was concerned, 
                                                
31 Beckett 1946, p. 119. 
32 Cohn 2001, p. 129.  
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capable of no expression but the 
other than that of ?33 gravity 
nor of any sound but the sound 
but the most formal sound, I ?34 
to cover its lower part with a black  
cloth and to entreat alms on a  
sunny corner, a south-western 
corner. For it was my belief I suspected that  
my eyes were not as yet totally  
extinguished, thanks no doubt  
to the smoked glasses that my 
tutor had given me, together with  
the Ethics of Geulincx, when I was 
13 or 14 ^years old^. He had  the foresight  
to They were a very fine pair of glasses, 
full size, with gold branches. He 
was a far seeing man. He was found 
dead one morning ^on the floor^ in his W.C., his 
dress in shocking disorder, xxxx A cerebral hemorage 
xxxx xxxx xxxx dead of  
an infarct. 
______________________________________________35 
 
With this line across page 28 of the manuscript Beckett separated his oeuvre with 
English on one side, and the rest of the novella, now a nouvelle, written to the end in 
French. Beckett went back to the beginning of the Geulincx passage and, as Cohn 
describes, recapitulated it in French. What is immediately most striking about this 
first version of the passage in relation to the arguments above is that Beckett uses a 
conjoiner in ‘my tutor had given me, together with the Ethics of Geulincx’, where this 
‘together with’ categorically separates the book from what are here ‘smoked glasses’. 
Beckett does go on in this version to invest the glasses with a strange ambiguity, where 
the tutor is ‘a far seeing man’, a man perhaps whose capacity for what Beckett 
                                                
33 This may be ‘insufficient’. 
34 This may be ‘set my mind’ or ‘imagined’. 
35 ‘Suite’ notebook, pp. 27-28, Boston College. Strangely, as with the French version of the passage 
which follows in the notebook, Beckett appears to spell Geulincx’ name correctly. His handwriting is at 
times very difficult to decipher, however, and this particular letter cannot be asserted with full 
confidence. 
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referred to as Geulincx’ ‘sub specie aeternitatis [from the perspective of eternity] 
vision’ is his ‘only excuse for remaining alive’. Without the perspective, he dies of a 
heart attack. However, this being ‘far seeing’ is more than a visionary ability, it is also 
an inability, his being long-sighted as oppose to short-sighted and so his being in need 
of the corrective lenses that are handed down to his protégé. Yet the ambiguities in 
this double meaning are nevertheless constrained by the narrator being given Ethics 
‘together with’ the glasses. We can see in this passage then, when compared to the 
later version, Beckett negotiating ways to instantiate an irresolvable ambivalence 
regarding the theme of being simultaneously free and being constrained, yet this is not 
as fully formed as it would become. Certainly it would be hard to make a case for this 
theme being actualised in the text as it stands in the notebook. While there is a 
tantalising fragment of how the tutor might have ‘had the foresight to’ do something 
relating to the gift of the Ethics and the age of the recipient, Beckett’s curtailing this 
and rapidly turning to a description of the glasses as ‘very fine’ cuts off what may have 
resulted in a more obviously dual use of ‘sight’. 
Something was lacking in this version, and it was presumably in an 
adventurous or brave attitude, perhaps also one of frustration, that Beckett suddenly 
struck a blow right across the page and began again in French. While he had written a 
number of poems and critical pieces in French by 1946, something in the stylisation of 
English at precisely this point gave Beckett the impetus to shift languages and not 
return to English as a language of prose composition for twelve years, other than in 
translation. Perhaps Beckett just came to the same conclusions Belacqua had ‘mused’ 
over regarding his own wanting to ‘write without style’: ‘Perhaps only the French can 
do it. Perhaps only the French language can give you the thing you want’. In 1932 
Belacqua’s musings were immediately rejected as the product of an earnestness not yet 
managing to fathom the subtleties of actual, rather than theoretical, creative work: 
‘Don’t be too hard on him, he was studying to be a professor’36. The possibility of 
French prose was then shelved for fourteen years. 
Beckett’s experiment writing prose in French appears to not have 
instantaneously yielded the ‘thing’ Beckett wanted in 1946 either, though fourteen 
years older Beckett perhaps had the patience and confidence to stay with it when he 
                                                
36 Dream, p. 48. 
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‘mused’ it might work this time. The French passage that follows in the notebook is 
much closer to its eventual published counterpart than the English, but there are 
important deviations from and similarities to the English notebook version. For the 
most part Beckett retains the sharp divisions between the objects in French: 
 
Il m’avait 
donné, à la même occasion, l’Ethique 
de Geulincx.37 
 
He had given me 
on the same occasion, the Ethics 
of Geulincx. 
 
This became simply ‘Il m’avait donné l’Ethique de Geulincz’38 in the published text. 
Similarly, while this French passage saw the arrival of the signed fly-leaf, the book was 
still kept separate from the glasses: 
 
L’Ethique  
portait son nom sur la page de garde  
et xxxx xxxx xxxx les lunettes  
lui avaient peut-être appartenu  
aussi.39 
 
The Ethics 
bore his name on the fly-leaf 
and xxxx xxxx xxxx the glasses 
had perhaps belonged to him 
too. 
 
This was eventually published as ‘L’Ethique portait son nom (Ward) sur la page de 
garde, les lunettes lui avaient appartenu’40, which introduces the crucial comma and 
avoids the fixity and distinctness in the ‘Suite’ notebook. Beckett also retains from the 
                                                
37 ‘Suite’ notebook, p. 28. Boston College. 
38 Beckett 1958, p. 105. 
39 ‘Suite’ notebook, p. 28. Boston College. 
40 Beckett 1958, p. 106. 
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English the visionary status of this tutor, who was ‘un homme du voyant’41 [a man of 
vision]. 
 If, then, Beckett did not immediately find ‘the thing you want’ in La Fin in the 
turn to French in this passage (assuming, that is, that this ‘thing’ has been correctly 
identified in the arguments about fused objects), when did he? He seems to have 
found it for both the English and French versions, and so remade the early French 
attempt into a fully viable and publishable work, through a further act of translation a 
number of years later as a much more experienced French writer. This was while 
working with Seaver to produce a version for Merlin a full eight years later. 
 
4.5  Merlin 
 
 Although Beckett completed the work as a French text before translating it 
back into the language in which Suite had been started as The End, arguably giving 
the impression that if this bilingual text might have a primary version it would be the 
French, thanks to de Beauvoir’s strictness it was the English The End that first saw the 
piece’s full-length publication. This was in 1954 in the English-language Paris-based 
journal Merlin, edited by Alexander Trocchi and Richard Seaver, dubbed by Beckett 
the ‘Merlin juveniles’42. The Merlin version too bears on the arguments about the later 
version’s fusion of the glasses and the Ethics as a product of syntax. The 
corresponding tutor passage is quoted in full: 
 
So I covered the lower part of my face with a black rag and went and begged at a 
sunny corner. For it seemed to me my eyes were not yet completely spent, thanks 
perhaps to the dark glasses my tutor had given me when I was small. He had also 
given me, on the same occasion, the Ethics of Geulinex [sic], I don’t know why. 
They were a man’s glasses already, with a gold frame, for he was farsighted. They 
found him dead one fine morning, crumpled up in the water closet, his clothes in 
awful disorder, struck down by an infarctus. The Ethics had his name (Ward) on 
the front page, and the glasses had perhaps belonged to him too. The bridge, at 
the time I am speaking of here, was of brass wire, of the kind used to hang 
pictures and big mirrors, and two long black ribbons served as wings. I wound 
them round my ears and then down under my chin where I tied them together. 
The lens had lost their opacity, doubtless from rubbing so long in my pocket 
against each other, and against the other objects there. But I had no further need 
of these glasses and used them merely to soften the glare of the sun. If I speak of 
                                                
41 ‘Suite’ notebook, p. 28. Boston College. 
42 Beckett to Reavey, 8 May 1953, HRHRC. Cited by Knowlson 1996, p. 393. 
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them, it is for the sole reason of explaining why my sight lagged behind my other 
senses.43 
 
It is clear from a comparison between this version of the passage and Grove’s that the 
missing conjoiners hypothesised above, and which manifest as ‘together with’, ‘à la 
même occasion’ and ‘aussi’ in the ‘Suite’ notebook, make a similarly explicit 
appearance in this published version. The tutor ‘had also’ given the student, ‘on the 
same occasion, the Ethics of Geulinex […] and the glasses had perhaps belonged to 
him too’. There is no confusing the two objects whatsoever. Not even the man’s being 
‘farsighted’ appears to imply anything about his Ethics. How might this be accounted 
for, and what, if anything, does this version illuminate in relation to Beckett’s 
intended uses of Geulincx? 
Importantly, Beckett did not approve this version. Despite being credited as 
‘translated from the French by Richard Seaver in collaboration with the author’44 in 
Merlin Seaver apparently did most of the translating, and vitally Beckett never saw 
proofs before publication. Seaver told his side of the débâcle in a preface to a 1976 
Grove reader, where he admitted that Merlin’s The End was ‘my translation. Well, 
sort of my translation’45. According to Seaver, Beckett had himself suggested that 
Seaver attempt the translation, and the two met to discuss Seaver’s first draft in Paris 
at Le Dôme at Montparnasse: 
 
Beckett began to read. After a few minutes of perusing first my translation, then 
the original, his wire-framed glasses pushed up into the thick shock of hair above 
– the better to see, no doubt – he shook his head. My heart sank. Clearly, the 
translation was inadequate. “You can’t translate that,” he said, fingering the 
original with utter disdain. “It makes no sense.”46 
 
Beckett went on to point out to Seaver places where ‘you’re literally right’, but where 
Seaver should make such moments what Beckett called ‘a bit tighter’47. For instance, 
according to Seaver, the novella’s opening lines changed through these collaborative 
sessions from the following: 
 
                                                
43 Beckett 1954, pp. 153-154. 
44 Beckett 1954, p. 159 
45 Seaver 1976, p. xiv. 
46 Seaver 1976, p. xxiii. 
47 Seaver 1976, p. xxiv. 
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They dressed me and gave me money. I knew what the money was to be used for, 
it was for my travelling expenses. When it was gone, they said, I would have to 
get some more, if I wanted to go on travelling’48 
 
to the less explicit 
 
They clothed me and gave me money. I knew what the money was for, it was to 
get me started. When it was gone I would have to get more, if I wanted to go 
on.49 
 
Yet the collaborative picture Seaver paints comes under some strain when taking into 
account how furious Beckett was with the editors at Merlin when he saw the 
published version, not having been given an opportunity to correct proofs following 
Seaver’s completed translation. He vented his frustrations to Merlin’s co-editor 
Trocchi: 
 
I have received, not from you, a copy of the latest issue of Merlin. My text is full 
of errors. Why did you not send me proofs? If, in this instance, circumstances 
had prevented me from correcting them, and they would not have, at least you 
could have done what it was incumbent on you to do. Are you too forgetting, in 
the fun of editing, the needs of writers? I am still waiting for you to begin 
payment of the royalties you owe me. I begin to weary of your treatment of me.50 
 
It is unfortunate that there is no detailed description of what Beckett considered the 
specific errors to be, even if Trocchi’s reply appears to indicate the existence of such 
detail: ‘That you were able to get so many recriminations on one small page does 
credit to your literary ability but says little for what I believed was our friendship’51. 
Consequently, it cannot be said with certainty that the differences between the two 
English versions of the passage were indeed certain of those ‘ridiculous mistakes’ 
Beckett found in the Merlin version. Given Beckett’s quoted focus on making it ‘a bit 
tighter’ and his apparent balking at Seaver’s literalism, however, such an inference is 
perhaps justified. The passage is at once, in its refinement over the period 1954-1960 
                                                
48 Seaver 1976, p. xxiii. 
49 Cited in Seaver 1976, p. xxiv. 
50 Beckett to Trocchi, 27 August 1954. McMaster University Samuel Beckett collection, box 1, folder 
22 (‘Collection Merlin’). Beckett wrote to Pamela Mitchell on the same day, thanking her for sending a 
copy of Merlin, telling Mitchell he’d written ‘a stinker’ to Trocchi and that he was ‘fed up with them’ 
(Beckett to Mitchell, 27 August 1954, UoR MS MIT/037). 
51 Trocchi to Beckett, 30 August 1954. McMaster University Samuel Beckett collection, box 1, folder 
22 (‘Collection Merlin’). 
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in a further translation by Beckett for its next English appearance in Evergreen 
Review, made more focussed with brevity while also more open-ended with 
implication. That Evergreen Review version is almost identical to the above-cited 
Grove version and so is not cited in full here. The only variant distinguishing it from 
Grove’s beyond the misspelling ‘Geulincz’ noted above is the indication of the tutor’s 
name ‘(Ward) on the front page’52 instead of on the ‘fly-leaf’. This is an interesting 
amendment in itself, in that it converts a general vocabulary to a more technical 
literary one, and so produces a phrase that intimates more forcefully the forgotten 
learning of the young student by exhibiting a fragmentary synecdoche of this learning. 
The amendment militates against a conception of ‘the series’ as entirely one of a 
reduction from specifics to the more general and abstract, with this alteration of ‘front 
page’ to ‘fly-leaf’ inserting some specialist specificity.  
 In between these two English texts Beckett published La Fin in 1955, and 
again in 1958, both through Éditions de Minuit. Comparable to the later Grove 
version, and in contrast to the botched Merlin translation, this French text carries the 
ambivalence regarding the ontological status of these two objects. Beckett had 
apparently found the thing he wanted yet it is arguably the case that this came about 
at least partly through the considerations of translating a French version back into 
English.  
Something just as interesting results, however, from a comparison of the 
Merlin and ‘Suite’ notebook’s French passages. Seaver’s rendering of ‘on the same 
occasion’ would appear wildly speculative, were it not for the apparent ‘aussi, à la 
même occasion’ in the French part of the ‘Suite’ notebook. Whatever French text 
Seaver was working from it seems plausible that it was not the final French version as 
published by Minuit and was a further version somewhere between the French as it 
was in the ‘Suite’ notebook and as it appeared in Minuit’s 1955 edition. It is unknown 
where this missing stage might be. The fifth Watt notebook at HRHRC bears the title 
‘Samuel Beckett Watt V / Suite et fin / 18.2.45 / 5 Paris Et debut [sic] de L’Absent / 
Malone meurt / Novembre-Janvier 47/48’53. However, as Beer and J.M. Coetzee54 
                                                
52 Beckett 1960, p. 33. 
53 Cited in Ackerley 2005a, p. 245. 
54 Ackerley quotes Coetzee’s PhD thesis accounting for the 90 leaves in the notebook: ‘First 50 leaves 
given to Watt, the next 39 to Malone meurt, leaf 90 to notes on Watt’ (Ackerley 2005a, p. 245). 
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point out, there is no sign of Suite in the notebook and ‘presumably Beckett wrote this 
[title on the cover] when he did not expect to need more than five notebooks, and 
returned to correct ‘Suite et fin’ to ‘Suite’ when he found a sixth was required’55. 
Ackerley points out that ‘the opening pages are ripped out’56 of this notebook. 
                                                
55 Beer 1985, p. 60. 
56 Ackerley 2005a, p. 245. 
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Chapter 5 – Three Novels1 
 
5.1  ‘Vaguen’ 
 
This chapter offers a critical reading of the importance of Geulincx for the Three 
Novels of Beckett’s middle period, focusing predominantly on The Unnamable. 
Firstly the chapter takes a visual approach, enumerating the appearances of imagistic 
allusions to Geulincx, the first of which explicitly names Geulincx. Secondly it focuses 
a similar approach linguistically by explicating the partial quotations of Geulincx’ 
axiom as it manifests throughout the novels. This dual analysis frames Beckett’s 
developing uses of borrowed imagery and quotation in his effort to ‘vaguen’2. As 
recorded first by Gontarski, Beckett’s marginalia in a Happy Days manuscript stated 
that on further revision he should ‘vaguen’ description of the stage’s set, an impetus 
Cohn describes as ‘a despecifying process that would become habitual in the 
composition of his drama’3. It would also be put to effective use in prose, and the 
lineage of imagery derived from Geulincx that can be traced through the Three 
Novels exists as a paradigm of Beckett’s ‘fantasia’ in microcosm. Whereas the project 
to trace the importance and viability of Geulincx, a Geulincx brought out of and in to 
the oeuvre, begins with explicit citation in Murphy and moves towards the barely-
there fleeting presence in the fragmented and minimalist texts and plays beyond the 
Three Novels, so too within these Three Novels the progress of a movement to 
‘vaguen’, a transit from the explicit to the implicit, can be traced. It is a movement 
that is also one from intertextuality to intratextuality, whereby later appearances of 
Geulincx are allusions not only to Geulincx’ own texts, but reference the already 
refracted references to Geulincx within Beckett’s own texts.  
Following these discussions I argue that the ‘one [who] will be born’ in 
Geulingian terms heralded by the Watt of Mercier and Camier could be the self-
flagellating self-asserting first-person narrating voice of The Unnamable. To this end I 
                                                
1 I follow the convention of referring to the ‘Three Novels’ rather than the ‘Trilogy’. This seeks to 
follow Beckett’s own preference expressed a number of times, including to Bray in 1959: ‘No news 
from Calder, but I was told the 3 in 1 was imminent. Please God he doesn’t call it a trilogy’. (Beckett to 
Bray, 26 March 1959, TCD MS 10948/1/24) 
2 Cited in Gontarski 1977, p. 36. 
3 Cohn 2001, p. 263 
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build on Uhlmann’s epistemological suggestion that The Unnamable manifests less a 
Cartesian than a Geulingian form of cogito, and argue that Beckett manages with The 
Unnamable to achieve something entirely new in the ‘series’ that can be traced to 
Geulincx. Recalling Weller’s terminology, this is an ‘actualization’ of principles 
fundamental to Geulincx’ ethics that becomes narrative, that aligns the seeking and 
turning away from self inherent to Geulincx’ humilitas with The Unnamable’s 
paradoxical non-self-assertion. Geulincx’ axiom therefore comes to be seen as central 
to the climax of Beckett’s middle period works.  
 
5.2  Molloy sets sail 
 
The only explicit naming of Geulincx in the Three Novels occurs in the 
following passage from the first section of the first novel, where Molloy has recently 
left Lousse. Molloy questions his capacity for choice and action, and in this context 
asserts his love for Geulincx: 
 
Now as to telling you why I stayed a good while with Lousse, no, I cannot. That 
is to say I could I suppose, if I took the trouble. But why should I? In order to 
establish that I could not do otherwise? For that is the conclusion I would come 
to, fatally. I who had loved the image of old Geulincx, dead young, who left me 
free, on the black boat of Ulysses, to crawl towards the East, along the deck. That 
is a great measure of freedom, for him who has not the pioneering spirit. And 
from the poop, poring upon the wave, a sadly rejoicing slave, I follow with my 
eyes the proud and futile wake. Which, as it bears me from no fatherland away, 
bears me onward to no shipwreck. 
 
Molloy refuses to face the fact of his own impotence, which would be fatal. As Moran 
will also do, Molloy gilds his impotence, adorning it with wistful admiration of the 
philosopher of freedom in slavery, Geulincx. The valiant because doomed effort of a 
‘sadly rejoicing slave’ destined to wish for a shipwreck that will not come is, Molloy 
opines, ‘a great measure of freedom, for him who has not the pioneering spirit’4.  
As might be expected, this passage has been cited by a number of critics as 
evidence of an impact on Beckett’s oeuvre of his interest in Geulincx. As Feldman 
puts it, for example, the passage ‘perfectly corresponds to a sentence in Beckett’s 
                                                
4 TN, p. 51. 
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transcriptions of the Ethics’5, a passage in which Geulincx attempts to find a space 
within all-encompassing impotence for a Christian-like free will: 
 
 
Just as a ship carrying a passenger with all speed towards the west in no way 
prevents the passenger from walking towards the east, so the will of God, 
carrying all things, impelling all things with inexorable force, in no way prevents 
us from resisting his will (as much as is in our power) with complete freedom.6 
 
In 1999 Uhlmann brought to public view a letter written by Beckett to Molloy’s 
German translator (Dr Erich Franzen) in 1954, in which Beckett was unusually 
expansive in his explications of the allusions of the passage in the novel that mentions 
Geulincx, tying it to the passage from Ethics: 
 
This passage is suggested (a) by a passage in the Ethics of Geulincx where he 
compares human freedom to that of a man, on board a boat carrying him 
irresistibly westward, free to move eastward within the limits of the boat itself, as 
far as the stern; and (b) by Ulysses’ relation in Dante (Inf. 26) of his second 
voyage (a medieval tradition) to and beyond the Pillars of Hercules, his 
shipwreck and death... I imagine a member of the crew who does not share the 
adventurous spirit of Ulysses and is at least at liberty to crawl homewards... along 
the brief deck.7 
 
Beckett neglects to mention Homer to Franzen in this connection, though perhaps 
merely because it is too obvious. Entry no. 714 in the ‘Dream’ notebook reads ‘black 
cruiser of Ulysses’, which Pilling annotates: 
 
Bérard, 175; Odyssey, X, 501-502. CF. ‘Draff’ (‘black as Ulysses’s cruiser’; More 
Pricks Than Kicks, 198), the ‘black ferry’ of the poem ‘Text’, and ‘the black boat 
of Ulysses’, (Molloy, ‘trilogy’ 51).8 
 
Dante does not mention the colour of the boat in canto XXVI of Inferno, but 
following Pilling’s work on the ‘Dream’ notebook we can see how the boat being 
‘black’ reveals the Molloy passage to be even more expansively allusive than Beckett 
indicates. One particularly striking parallel between the episode told by Dante and the 
                                                
5 Feldman 2009a, p. 45. 
6 Ethics, p. 317. Feldman’s quotation of the passage, however, does not quite perfectly correspond. It 
misquotes Wilson’s translation by missing out ‘west in no way prevents the passenger from walking 
towards the’ without inserting ellipses. See Feldman 2009a, pp. 45-46. 
7 Beckett to Franzen, 17 February 1954. Cited by Uhlmann 1999, p. 54. Cf. Uhlmann 2006a, p. 78.  
8 Beckett 1999, p.103. 
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context of the ship’s passenger in Ethics lies in how both rely on a dualist distinction 
between an inner and outer world. In Inferno Ulysses exhorts his crew onward on the 
perilous journey ‘beyond the Pillars of Hercules’ through flattery of their inner lives as 
well as of their heroism in the physical world. Citing their heritage Ulysses says 
 
Consider what you came from: you are Greeks!  
You were not born to live like mindless brutes  
but to follow paths of excellence and knowledge.9 
 
This path of an inner world of ‘excellence and knowledge’ supervenes upon the 
exploratory and dangerous journey in the physical world, as in Ethics the proper way 
to live in the social world is dependent upon an inspection of the private inner world.  
 The passage from Ethics in question appears in annotation 9 to Treatise 1, 
Chapter 1, § 2, Reason.10 The section in the main body of the Treatise that Geulincx 
annotates, however, is worthy of further investigation, as it speaks to the possibility of 
Beckett’s fascination with Geulingian thought as an ethics of failure. Fundamental to 
Geulincx’ conception of the authority of God is that it is metaphysically impossible to 
resist. For Geulincx it is pointless to think of resisting, because we have no real causal 
agency. This thoroughgoing submission endangers the viability of Geulincx’ thoughts 
on free will, even on freedom to intend, despite the fact that Geulincx stakes his entire 
ethics on intentionality. Geulincx’ theorising the omnipotence of God’s capacity for 
causation and humanity’s incapacity to resist this in any way might quite easily be read 
as invoking a ruthless, unmovable and authoritarian God, a God whose pre-
established synchronicity is brutal, even fascistic. Geulincx details his ethical fatalism: 
 
To wish to obey the absolute, true and strict will of God in some matter, is to 
wish what has already been done; whether you like it or not, you will obey, just as 
all things will necessarily obey. (But here is not the place to speak of why this 
does not make God the author of Sin, and of how it is consistent with our 
freedom of will).11 
 
The correct place to ‘speak of why […] freedom of will’ is unaffected by this strict 
inevitability that looks suspiciously like determinism, according to Geulincx, is in his 
                                                
9 Dante 2003, p. 309 (Inf. XXVI 118-120). 
10 See Ethics p. 182 for the passage as it appears in the main body of the annotations. 
11 Ethics, p. 16. 
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annotations. Annotation 9, describing the passenger on the ship, is appended to this 
paragraph in order to reconcile a sense of God as ultra-authoritarian with human free 
will. Surely, we must conclude, Geulincx’ ship analogy fails this self-imposed test.12 
The image of a ship-hand crawling in the opposite direction to a ship’s motion fails 
Geulincx because it does not capture the internalised notion of freedom of intention 
Geulincx argues is the only measure of ethical worth. It is a similar failure, though one 
here left unexplained, to the weaknesses Geulincx admits to in the cradle analogy. 
What Geulincx’ analogy does achieve, however, given its failure on these terms, is an 
image of futility that we might suppose to have appealed greatly to Beckett. It is this 
unintended sense of the image as of thorough futility and failure, rather than as one 
illustrating real affirmative freedom (as intended by Geulincx), that strikes Beckett so 
forcefully that he will incorporate it into his work twenty years after he studied it, as a 
paradigm of the possibility of freedom ‘for him who has not the pioneering spirit’. 
This ship on which Molloy imagines himself is the only appearance of 
Geulincx’ ship analogy in Molloy. Uhlmann writes ‘The ship image recurs on three 
occasions in The Unnamable’13, and with his citations keyed to the original Grove 
publication of 1958 cites these as ‘pp. 68, 72, 148’14. This is arguably inaccurate, 
however, as the image recurs four times in The Unnamable, each time more reduced 
and abstracted from its source, more and more vaguened. In missing this fourth, 
fleeting appearance, Uhlmann misses too what is so vital to this lineage – its instancing 
a micro-‘series’ of imagistic vaguening, Beckett’s reducing to what he called 
‘fundamental sounds’15 the reified, memorialised residues of what once were sources. 
The image also, again far from clearly, appears in Malone Dies. The following analysis 
traces these reappearances and argues that they are paradigmatic of Beckett’s evolving 
art as one moving from more direct relation, from more readily identifiable influence 
and allusions (despite their obscurity), to an art of non-relation characterising 
Beckett’s prose of the late 1940s and the 1950s. 
 
                                                
12 Beckett transcribed Geulincx’ annotation almost in its entirety, leaving out only a final long sentence 
where Geulincx justifies ‘familiarising ourselves with these and other analogies’ by virtue of their 
permitting us to ‘perceive the thing itself as well as if we had always been familiar with it’ (Ethics, p. 
182). 
13 Uhlmann 2006a, p. 78. 
14 Uhlmann 2006a, p. 165. 
15 Beckett to Alan Schneider, 29 December 1957. Cited in Harmon, ed. 1998, p.24. 
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5.3  Geulingian imagery in The Unnamable 
 
The Unnamable is so continuously ingrained with the ‘aporia’16 foregrounded 
in its very first paragraph that any attempt to write generalised critical commentary on 
this self-lacerating novel, so exhaustively characterised by what Texts for Nothing 13 
calls ‘The screaming silence of no’s knife in yes’s wound’17, is bound to be undone. 
We can never assert anything of the novel without taking account of such an 
assertion’s necessary concomitant negation. So, at least, runs one strain of orthodoxy 
as regards the critic’s relationship to this work. It is the perception of such 
undermining oppositional structure that is in part responsible for what Bruno 
Clément, while stopping short of calling it a ventriloquising of the critical response, 
describes as a ‘duality of narrative authorities [in] the Beckettian text’: 
 
The not-very-attentive reader (indeed, as experience proves, even the more 
battle-hardened reader) only belatedly becomes aware (if indeed he or she 
becomes aware at all) that there is in the work, in the text that he or she reads, a 
voice resembling, to the point of their being mistaken for one another, the critical 
voice.18 
 
 Clément describes a broad category of ‘the’ critical voice already embedded in, 
indelibly bound into, ‘the’ work. Yet these words of caution, of Clément’s and of 
mine above, must themselves be cautioned, as they also already assert generalised 
critical statements. It is important to note how the authorial option of ‘aporia’, for 
example, mooted by the narrating voice at the beginning of The Unnamable, is itself 
asserted without anything like a full commitment to its implications. It is framed in a 
question: ‘how proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and negations 
invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later?’19 Not even this assertion of a framing 
structure for the novel-in-embryo is without its own particular element of ironic self-
reflexive doubt and specificity. Following this precedent, doubts and hesitancies that 
arise in the novel are of course not all ‘pure and simple’. This most uneasy of novels 
hesitates and doubts in specific instances, in individual moments, and some of these 
hesitancies and doubts are more assertive than others. Still others are discarded, 
                                                
16 TN, p. 294. 
17 CSP, p. 154. 
18 Clément 2006, p. 119. 
19 TN, p. 294. 
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undermined, directly opposed, left partially unresolved, entirely ignored, in 
multifarious ways. In summary, I argue that one should be wary of asserting anything 
too broad and general about the novel, as it will indeed likely be undermined by a 
specific textual moment that works against the validity of any given assertion. But this 
does not mean that one should refrain from critical commentary on the novel out of 
fear that the critical voice is always already embedded in the text as a monolithic 
voice, where the voice of critical commentary is merely the sound of the critic being 
second-guessed. It is possible to speak of this novel without being engulfed by its 
voracious appetite for all-comers, but the safest way to do so, I argue, is by attending 
to the specificities of individual textual moments, always aware that consequent 
generalising is the riskier strategy.  
These general comments about general comments are important for two 
reasons. Firstly, they seek to underwrite an approach to Geulincx’ relevance in this 
work as one comprised in the first analysis of specific textual moments, though ones 
that function within broader thematic frameworks. Secondly, they frame the first 
strongly made assertion of self-identity in The Unnamable. This is an assertion that is 
not, at least not immediately, ‘invalidated as uttered’. Just as some claims about the 
novel can be made more forcefully, some assertions in the novel are made more 
forcefully, more categorically, than others. There is only one instance in this novel of 
selfhood where the first person pronoun constitutes an entire sentence. It is, as so 
many of the other instances of ‘I’ are in the novel, asserted in the context of a 
questioning, but what follows is an instance of a rare and strongly asserted self-
identity, and it occurs as a continuation of the lineage of imagery deriving from Dante 
and Geulincx: 
 
I. Who might that be? The galley-man, bound for the pillars of Hercules, who 
drops his sweep under cover of night and crawls between the thwarts, towards 
the rising sun, unseen by the guard, praying for storm. Except that I’ve stopped 
praying for anything. No, no, I’m still a suppliant. I’ll get over it, between now 
and the last voyage, on this leaden sea.20 
 
When I claim that this identity is forcefully asserted, I mean that it is striking that the 
‘I’ of this passage is left asserted as the ‘galley-man’ of Geulincx’ and Dante’s ship. 
                                                
20 TN, p. 339. 
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The narrator does not retract or otherwise object to their identification with the slave 
making their first moves for freedom, dropping their ‘sweep’ and crawling towards 
the east. What is qualified in this passage, in ‘Except that I’ve stopped praying for 
anything. No, no, I’m still a suppliant’ of the fourth and fifth sentences, is not the 
narrator’s identity as the ‘galley-man’, but only the actions of this identity. The 
question of whether or not the ‘galley-man’ still prays is first asserted then denied, 
before finally being left as implied. Beckett’s intriguing pun here is ‘thwarts’. While 
these ‘thwarts’ are literally the slats as seats for rowers across a boat (the seats 
athwart/across), the word also connotes being thwarted, hindered or stopped. 
Crawling ‘between the thwarts’ is then a movement of freedom through extrication 
that, in virtue of its nautical resonances, recalls Stephen Dedalus’s Icarian attempts to 
‘fly by those nets’ of ‘nationality, language, religion’21 in A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man. Beckett’s Geulingian protagonist crawling across the floor heading in the 
opposite direction to which the ship is travelling and so only free to get as far as the 
bounds of the ship, in contrast to Stephen’s heroic flight into open-ended air, serves 
as an intriguing image of the contrasting visions of freedom and constraint the two 
writers pursue. While Stephen would be the determiner of his own destiny, the 
‘galley-man’ is ‘still a suppliant’. 
Both Molloy and The Unnamable’s narrator think of their ship being wrecked 
by a storm. Molloy remembers with affection, with his ‘love’ for Geulincx, how he 
imagined himself carried ‘onward to no shipwreck’. The Unnamable’s narrator goes 
further, impotently ‘praying for storm’. This wish for ‘shipwreck’ not quite there in 
Molloy but forcefully made in The Unnamable builds on the Dantean impetus in these 
images, alluding to Ulysses’s ship that met a storm five days after passing through the 
Pillars of Hercules: 
 
Our celebrations soon turned to grief: 
and from the new land there rose a whirling wind 
that beat against the forepart of the ship 
 
and whirled us round three times in churning waters; 
the fourth blast raised the stern up high, and sent 
                                                
21 Joyce 2000, p. 171. 
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the bow down deep, as pleased Another’s will. 
 
And then the sea was closed again, above us.22 
 
Even in this allusion to storm and wreck so closely allied to Dante, however, Geulincx 
is also melded. Ulysses describes the fatalistic storm as having ‘pleased Another’s will’, 
and in this ascription of the storm deriving from God, as only possible as deriving 
from God, the two authors are aligned by Beckett. For Geulincx too discusses 
shipwrecks in this context. In a chapter entitled ‘The Shipwreck of Belief’ van Ruler 
discusses another ship analogy to illustrate how the ‘different ways in which the 
analogy operates in [Herman] Witsius and Andala on the one hand and Geulincx on 
the other, are indicative of their conflicting theological views’23. In this earlier analogy 
Geulincx describes how a ship could be ‘made ready, fitted-out’ in all good 
preparation, yet this would not prevent circumstances from conspiring against it, 
where it might be ‘plunged into a storm, or captured by pirates’. Just as in the life of 
an aspiring academic such as himself:  
 
A speech or lecture is perfectly pitched to secure fame and praise, composed with 
the utmost care, and elaborated by exhaustive study, but no honour ensues, no 
applause, only mockery and derision.24 
 
Similarly, Geulincx writes of a merchant on a ship ‘plunged into a storm’ to again 
illustrate occasionalist freedom. Describing a freedom he calls freedom to ‘do as thou 
pleasest; or…do as thou art minded’25, Geulincx adds in his annotations ‘For example, 
the merchant who when a storm blows up flings his merchandise into the sea does not 
enjoy this kind of freedom’, rather this merchant ‘does not do what pleases him, but 
on the contrary acts against how he is minded, and would by no means do it if he were 
not forced to do it’26. Beckett was aware of these further analogies in Ethica, so it 
                                                
22 Dante 2003, p. 309 (Inf. XXVI 136-142). 
23 van Ruler 2003, p. 127. 
24 Ethics, p. 143. Geulincx employs this earlier analogy in the context of his theorising sin and divine 
punishment as further evidence for the impotence of the will, according to which misfortune is 
inevitable and cannot be willed away. 
25 Ethics, p. 323. 
26 Ethics, p. 205. That imagery of ships is so fundamental to Geulincx’ work is of little surprise. van 
Ruler points out for example that Geulincx was ‘born within a mile of the ships that visited Antwerp’s 
harbour, and [...] knew about sea-trade’ (van Ruler 2003, p. 126). 
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perhaps seems unlikely he would entirely disregard them when thinking of ships and 
storms in the context of Geulincx.27 
A few pages after its first mention in The Unnamable Beckett returns to this 
ship image in the context of self-identification, reducing it from what it was previously 
to something vaguened, less explicitly tied to either Dante or Geulincx: 
 
I am he who will never be caught, never delivered, who crawls between the 
thwarts, towards the day that promises to be glorious, festooned with lifebelts, 
praying for rack and ruin.28 
 
Similarly to the image’s first appearance in The Unnamable, here it also frames a self-
identity asserted with a commitment that is often absent, in complex and multivalent 
ways, from so many other assertions of self in the novel. Beckett appears to have 
obtained from Geulincx an analogy for a sense of identity that, even under the 
auspices of The Unnamable’s violent narrator, stabbing ‘no’s knife in yes’s wound’, is 
not yet destroyed. However, despite the fact that such a sense of identity is yet to be 
entirely discarded or disregarded, images of the galley-man are progressively and 
steadily fragmented through the novel. The pastoral but ominous ‘rising sun’ of earlier 
appears in this second image as ‘the day that promises to be glorious’. It marks a 
vaguening shift from objects to atmospherics, from description of a specific object to 
an intimation of mood. Similarly, the ‘storm’ of the first image becomes the 
consequences of that storm in the second, the less specific ‘rack and ruin’. We have 
seen the transition from relation to non-relation traceable through a genetic criticism 
of the Geulincx passage in Suite/The End/La Fin. A similar transition is enacted 
within The Unnamable, but here the alterations and refinements all take place as 
themselves the sinews of the final published text, viewable before our eyes as bounded 
within the limits of the novel itself. These transitions, traceable through elements 
derived originally from Geulincx, reveal the philosopher to be central to Beckett’s 
evolving art, yet central in precisely his being a fleeting and fragmentary presence. 
 In the third appearance of this ship possibilities of real physical escape become 
limited to mere visual glances of prospective freedom, seen as the new sunnier day: 
                                                
27 Geulincx also employs a ship analogy to define propositional content: ‘as there is no shipwreck 
without a ship, neither is there a negation without an affirmation’ (Opera vol. 1, p. 177, cited and 
translated by van Bunge et al. (eds.) 2003, p. 325. 
28 TN, p. 341. 
 144 
 
What a joy it is, to turn and look astern, between two visits to the depths, scan in 
vain the horizon for a sail, it’s a real pleasure, upon my word it is, to be unable to 
drown, under such conditions.29 
 
This is the version of the image missing from Uhlmann’s account.30 Perhaps this is the 
case because Uhlmann considers it not to qualify as a part of the lineage. Certainly it 
differs in certain ways from the other images. It is, for example, the only instance of 
the ship imagery not to mention ‘thwarts’. However, it does give the direction of 
looking as the same as earlier (‘astern’, which is the rear of the ship, as Molloy 
described looking out from the ‘poop’ deck, which is the top rear of the ship). These 
directions bear comparison with Beckett’s description to Franzen of a man ‘on board 
a boat carrying him irresistibly westward’ who nevertheless resists, and travels 
‘eastward within the limits of the boat itself, as far as the stern’. This third image also 
marks an important change in the lineage from one of movement to stasis. The 
turning to ‘look astern’, while the ship travels forward, is the stilled and contemplative 
version of the physical crawling ‘towards the east’ or ‘the rising sun’ when the ship 
was travelling west. Continuing the trend of this ship imagery instantiating in 
microcosm broader shifts within Beckett’s ‘series’, if not the entire oeuvre, at this mid-
point the balance alters from one of searching and seeking, of trying to be free within 
the limited bounds of the ship, to one of standing still, looking and contemplating. In 
the broader ‘series’ such a shift happens in the middle novel of the middle-period, 
Malone Dies, whose waiting and watching for death in his bed follows logically, if not 
entirely consequentially, from Molloy and Moran’s entropic wanderings. Here, within 
The Unnamable, it happens halfway through this lineage of imagery. 
The final of the four images appears shortly after the third (as did the second 
from the first), only a few pages from the end of the novel. There has been a further 
change on board this mysterious ship, and the galley-man with his hope of impossible 
freedom has, if not mutinied, taken some kind of charge: 
 
                                                
29 TN, p. 395. 
30 It appears on p. 146 of the 1958 Grove edition Uhlmann uses. 
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Now it’s I the orator, the beleaguerers have departed, I am master on board, after 
the rats, I no longer crawl between the thwarts, under the moon, in the shadow 
of the lash31 
 
Whatever nameless authority was keeping the deck hand subjugated and dreaming of 
a freedom in drowning has ‘departed’. The narrator is now second in command ‘after 
the rats’, those elemental and frequently violent creatures that reappear throughout 
Beckett’s oeuvre, often as they do so confounding enumerative rationalism. This new 
type of freedom in stasis, in no longer crawling towards a freedom to be found 
elsewhere, no longer even standing still and observing the possibility of freedom, 
asserts the central paradox of Beckett’s middle period. As Alice and Kenneth 
Hamilton assert of Beckett’s twinning of Geulincx and Democritus, the conclusions 
reached by Beckett in navigating between these two reside in a resignation to 
irresolvable paradox: 
 
Beckett’s people appear to be given two choices: either stasis or circular motion. 
Both amount to the same – getting nowhere. The wise among them accept the 
possibility with Democritan laughter, while the less wise (as in Waiting for Godot) 
say, “Let’s go,” and do not move. Molloy is in many ways the best example of the 
one who has learned the lesson drawn by his creator from Democritus and 
Geulincx. He ends his narrative with the words “I longed to go back into the 
forest. Oh not a real longing. Molloy could stay, where he happened to be” (p. 
124).32 
 
The comparable culmination inheres in The Unnamable in that most climactic of 
Beckett’s lines – ‘I can’t go on, I’ll go on’33. Still subject to the movement of the boat, 
the stillness of stasis within movement is the fleetingly best that can be hoped for, and 
that is what the narrator asserts they achieve. 
Continuing the precedents set above by pruritus and internalised psychological 
inspection, this ship from Geulincx, explicitly pointed to by Beckett as deriving from 
Ethics, has a near relative in a much earlier image. In Dream of Fair to Middling 
Women Beckett wrote of a ship on which Belacqua ‘is alone on the deck of steerage-
class’ travelling by the south coast of England at night. The narrator asks of his 
fictional puppet ‘what would be the correct thing for him to think for us’, and 
                                                
31 TN, p. 396. 
32 Hamilton and Hamilton 1976, p. 10. 
33 TN, p. 418. 
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constructs a scene of Belacqua’s stilled pause that mirrors the narrator’s own 
questions and lack of direction: 
 
To begin with, of course, he moves forward, like the Cartesian earthball, with the 
moving ship, and then on his own account to the windy prow. He can go no 
further with security. He leans out to starboard, if that means landward when 
land is to the right of the ship’s motions, and scans the wastes of waters, the 
distant beacons. Was it Beachy Head or the Isle of Wight, was it Land’s End or 
tragic lightboats standing afar out about the shallows of the sea, or lightbuoys 
moored over the shoals? They were red and green and they lancinated his heart, 
they brought down his lips and head over the froth of water. If I were in, he 
thought richly, and it up to me to swim to one of those lights that I can see from 
here – how would I know that land was there, I would see no light from the level 
of the sea, I would certainly drown in a panic.34 
 
As Pilling has pointed out of this scene, Beckett derives the ‘Cartesian earthball’ from 
Descartes.35 In Principles of Philosophy Descartes seeks to define ‘What external place 
is’ via an analogy of a person on a moving ship. He argues that ‘the names “space” 
and “place” do not signify a thing different from the body which is said to be in the 
place’, and so we must think of ‘external place’ in relative terms:  
 
Thus, when a ship is heading out to sea, a person seated in the stern always 
remains in one place as far as the parts of the ship are concerned, for he 
maintains the same situation in relation to them. But this same person is 
constantly changing his place as far as the shores are concerned, since he is 
constantly moving away from some and toward others. Furthermore, if we think 
that the earth moves {and is rotating on its axis}, and travels from the West 
toward the East exactly as far as the ship progresses from the East toward the 
West; we shall once again say that the person seated in the stern does not change 
his place: because of course we shall determine his place by certain supposedly 
motionless points in the heavens.36 
 
Descartes’s ‘earthball’ moves ‘on its axis’ just as Belacqua moves in relation to the 
land and also in relation to the ship. Belacqua, that is, is very rarely stilled in relation 
to his boisterous environment and is more often buffeted by the constantly changing 
world around him than he is able to resist it. This concern with freedom as stasis in 
relation to movement on board a ship, traceable through Dream of Fair to Middling 
Women to Descartes, then later through The Unnamable via Geulincx, evinces 
Beckett’s altering ‘foci’ on particularly Cartesian strains of freedom. Beckett himself 
                                                
34 Dream, pp. 134-135. 
35 See Pilling 2004, p. 235. 
36 Descartes 1984, p. 45. 
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made journeys by ship around the coast of England a number of times37, and as will be 
shown later such voyages also appear refracted through the Geulingian ship in 
Comment c’est/How It Is. Before that, however, one other arguable appearance of the 
post-Cartesian ship in the Three Novels must be addressed. 
 
5.4  The ship in Malone Dies 
 
The appearance of the troubled ship in Malone Dies is itself a little troubled. 
Malone, sick of the ‘Mortal tedium’38 of his embedded fictional narratives, describes 
instead certain of his previous faltering foci. These include incidents and characters 
that recall moments from Beckett’s previous novels, such as Murphy’s encounter with 
Mr. Endon (‘With the insane too I failed, by a hair’s-breadth’). Malone continues: 
 
Bawling babies are what dumbfound me now. The house is full of them finally. 
Suave mari magno, especially for the old salt. What tedium. And I thought I had 
it all thought out.39 
 
‘Suave mari magno’ derives from Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura [On the Nature of 
Things], in which the first century B.C. Roman poet expounds an atomist philosophy 
that includes a number of axioms. This allusion is also arguably one among the lineage 
of ship imagery. The subject of the opening two lines of the second book of De Rerum 
Natura, subtitled ‘The Dance of Atoms’, is markedly similar to Beckett’s storm-
battered ship from Geulincx as it appears in Molloy and The Unnamable: 
 
Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis  
e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem40 
 
How sweet it is to watch from dry land when the storm-winds roil 
a mighty ocean’s waters, and see another’s bitter toil41 
 
                                                
37 Nixon points out, for example, that ‘Beckett sailed to Hamburg from the port of Cobh on board the 
S.S. Washington on 29 September 1936’ (Nixon 2005, p. 5). 
38 TN, p. 218. 
39 TN, p. 219. 
40 Lucretius 1821 (Book II.1), p.96. 
41 Lucretius 2007, p. 36. 
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Again Beckett is drawn to a dichotomy between watching or wishing for a storm to 
wreck a ship and the actual events immediately surrounding that person watching or 
wishing, either safely on ‘dry land’ or crawling ‘along the deck’. Although this passage 
originates from Lucretius, Beckett transcribed it indirectly, from volume 2 of 
Schopenhauer’s The World As Will and Representation into the ‘Whoroscope’ 
notebook (as pointed out by Nixon in 200542). The passage, then, reveals a similar 
fusion of sources to that of the ship image in Molloy, which fuses allusions to Dante 
and Homer. What makes this image in Malone Dies, relayed by the storytelling 
Malone, cohere with those others of stricken ships in the Three Novels is the 
perspective adopted. Malone watches from the shore, immune from disasters befalling 
another, just as the ‘galley-man’ will watch for disaster knowing he too is safe from it. 
The partial quotation is thereby also a voice of the novel’s self-referentiality, if not 
quite of the critical voice Clément describes embedded in The Unnamable: Malone 
himself, safe and dry but dying in bed, narrates a story of a troubled sea-trip in the 
third person, a story that brings his own novel to a disintegrating finality. Eventually 
exhausted at the end of his narrative Malone (via the vice-exister Lemuel) rapidly 
hatchets to death the majority of his protagonists before corralling the last of them 
into his boat. Lemuel sets them sailing and the novel ends upon a final image of his 
hatchet raised in the boat, the oars lolling in the sea, the scene frozen but fading in 
Malone’s collapsing telling of it. Malone himself, however, dying and eventually dead, 
is safe from all this ‘roil’ and ‘toil’ in his bed just as if watching the scenes unfold from 
the ‘dry land’ of the shore. He is the ‘old salt’ in both its senses – as the adventuring 
seafarer imagined on board, and as the storyteller returned safe from the voyage. 
 
5.5 The axiom 
 
Around two-thirds into Molloy’s narrative in the first of the Three Novels the 
protagonist leaves his temporary residence-shelter with Lousse and wanders the town. 
He ensconces himself on the stairs of a ‘mean lodging-house’ before again wandering 
off ‘in search of a familiar monument’ by which he might identify the town as his. 
Molloy describes the physical scene around him, comprising ‘a narrow alley [...] 
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windows [...] Lavatory lights I suppose [...] a blind alley [...] two recesses’, and nested 
somewhat incongruously amongst his semi-realist scenic depiction is Molloy’s 
statement on axioms: 
 
There are things from time to time, in spite of everything, that impose themselves 
on the understanding with the force of axioms, for unknown reasons.43 
 
Molloy’s impressions of the physical world around him, those inevitable elemental 
fragments of being in the world (as The Unnamable’s narrator says, ‘I have few 
illusions, things are to be expected’44), are aligned with acts of intellection. The 
‘windows’, ‘lights’ and the ‘alley’ ‘impose themselves’ on Molloy’s understanding. Yet 
it is ‘axioms’ that are the paragon of visceral fact, of forcefulness, the more 
unquestionable and absolute. Molloy does not ask questions of the things he sees here 
in the town, but records them piece by realist piece as they ‘impose themselves’ upon 
him with an authority akin to that of ‘axioms’. With this reference to the capacity of 
axioms to ‘impose themselves on the understanding’ in mind, the following discussion 
traces the versions of Geulincx’ famous axiom (ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis) as it 
reappears in various instances in Malone meurt/Malone Dies and L’Innomable/The 
Unnamable. This sets the groundwork for the arguments that follow about just how 
forcefully the epistemological boundaries set by the axiom determine the acts of 
intellection given narrative form in The Unnamable. 
 The one appearance of a version of Geulincx’ axiom in Malone Dies is notable 
for how it diverges from the French Malone meurt. The passage containing it occurs 
in Malone’s story of Macmann: 
 
And he clung closer and closer to the wall, but not too close, for it was guarded, 
seeking a way out into the desolation of having nobody and nothing, the wilds of 
the hunted, the scant bread and the scant shelter and the black joy of the solitary 
way, in helplessness and will-lessness, through all the beauty, the knowing and 
the loving.45 
 
Et il allait de plus en plus du côté de la muraille, sans toutefois trop s’en 
approcher car elle était gardée, cherchant une issue vers la désolation de n’avoir 
personne ni rien, vers la terre au pain rare, aux abris rares, des terrifiés, vers la 
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noire joie de passer seul et vide, ne rien pouvant, ne rien voulant, à travers le 
savoir, la beauté, les amours.46 
 
In the English version any allusion to Geulincx is barely noticeable. However, a more 
literal translation of the French ‘ne rien pouvant, ne rien voulant’ would be ‘able to do 
nothing, wanting nothing’ or ‘without being able, without wanting’. Such a translation 
would surely also echo, as the passage in Malone meurt does, Geulincx’ axiom. With 
an emphasis on capacity rather than on value, on being able rather than on being 
worth, Beckett reproduces the metaphysically slanted Latin axiom in a sparse French. 
In contrast, the English ‘in helplessness and will-lessness’ lacks any Geulingian 
syntactic inflection at all. If one were to posit a potential source for this English 
phrase with its explicit ‘will-lessness’ a much more likely candidate than Geulincx 
would probably be Schopenhauer. These two advocates of philosophical will-lessness, 
Geulincx and Schopenhauer, might then be shown here as separate sources for 
Beckett, for the passages in Malone meurt and Malone Dies respectively. When these 
passages from both are placed side by side, however, they reveal themselves as 
instances of just the sort of mutually engraved fragments that rattled round the 
pockets of The End’s narrator. Beckett’s translation of this fragment from Malone 
meurt, done sometime between mid-1954 and October 195547, is not a simple case of 
jettisoning one referent (Geulincx) for a better (Schopenhauer), just as on a broader 
scale Beckett’s acts of translation are, similarly, not a matter of jettisoning one 
language for a better. Rather, the translation refines the more overt reference to 
Geulincx in the French to become one more fundamentally reduced to its sounds, a 
sound (‘will-lessness’) that we might at first read as wholly Schopenhauerian, but 
which we can now see, having noted the Geulingian axiomatic inflection in Malone 
meurt, would be rushing to a mistake as it is also indebted to Geulincx.  
 
5.6  The axiom in L’Innommable/The Unnamable 
 
In contrast to the axiom as translated from Malone meurt into the version in 
Malone Dies, those from L’Innommable to The Unnamable retain the Geulingian 
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inflections of their originals. The axiom appears clearly twice in The Unnamable, yet 
there are also a number of other instances where it is partially quoted or alluded to. 
The first more direct quotation is roughly halfway through the novel. The narrating 
voice dismisses the work of previous narrators in a phrase reflecting the fascination 
Beckett had with Geulincx’ ontology of puppetry, his ‘guignol world’, by saying these 
previous works were ‘too clumsily done, you could see the ventriloquist’. In contrast, 
the narrator hopes, the real work is ‘about to begin’. Such work will happen in a place, 
a closed space that is a physicalised development of earlier mathematical closed 
systems, and the real work happening in this closed ‘place’ that will begin at last is 
work that owes its own possibility to Geulincx’ axiom: 
 
Quick, a place. With no way in, no way out, a safe place. Not like Eden. And 
Worm inside. Feeling nothing, knowing nothing, capable of nothing, wanting 
nothing.48 
 
This closed ‘place’ the narrator desires where there would be no more ‘puppets’ is the 
place where Worm exists, Worm who in Geulingian terminology would be ‘capable 
of nothing, wanting nothing’. But intriguingly it is the sealed ‘safe place’ itself that 
determines this impotence and nothingness. Such places, the narrator says a little 
later, are ‘blessed’: 
 
the place to be, where you suffer, rejoice, at being bereft of speech, bereft of 
thought, and feel nothing, hear nothing, know nothing, say nothing, are nothing, 
that would be a blessed place to be, where you are.49 
 
This and the previous quotation reveal the axiom’s extension into relation with other 
domains of nothingness, sensory, ontological and variously epistemological. More 
than this, however, the ‘place to be, where you are’ as a place in which one is subject 
to Geulingian impotence situates the narrator squarely within that domain ‘It’s 
scarcely possible to exaggerate’ the extent of that Beckett described to Duthuit. It also 
asserts their awareness of, if not quite their exact identification with, he who ‘shall be 
born, said Watt, one is born of us, who having nothing will wish for nothing, except 
to be left the nothing he hath’. While Geulincx’ axiom is embedded within a series of 
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repetitions in the first quotation here, disguised and perhaps therefore appearing as 
somewhat throwaway, it in fact conveys much more ‘force’ as an axiom in its 
intratextual resonances. It repeats the substance of a freedom inhering in stasis in 
relation to movement, that of Belacqua on the ship and the ‘galley-man’ of the Three 
Novels, where the achievement of a ‘place to be’ is achieved, as the second Watt also 
noted, in being ‘where you are’. 
The second, slightly less overt, appearance of the axiom repeats some of these 
‘nothing[s]’, while locating them within a broader context of occasionalist 
metaphysics: 
 
I can’t say anything, I’ve tried, I’m trying, he knows nothing, knows of nothing, 
neither what it is to speak, nor what it is to hear, to know nothing, to be capable 
of nothing, and to have to try50 
 
The futility of action (being ‘capable of nothing’), its being tied with such immediacy 
to an epistemological incapacity (‘he knows nothing’), combined with the obligation 
to act anyway (‘to have to try’), is a remarkably resonant point in Beckett’s ‘fantasia’. 
Firstly, in relation to Geulincx, it reproduces the transition staged in Ethics between a 
theoretical and a practical ethics. As de Vleeschauwer has argued, defending Geulincx 
against critics arguing that Geulingian occasionalism implies quietism,51 Geulincx’ 
Ethics read fully wallows neither in this, nor in solipsism. There are indeed discrete 
moments where Geulincx appears to be carried by tendencies towards both, tempting 
as they must have been to someone so initially concerned to shut out the external 
world. Yet there is also an important transition in Ethics that shifts the discussion 
entirely from a theoretical ethics of self-immersion and a resignation to incapacity, 
into a very practical everyday or ordinary ethics that advocates, indeed depends upon 
and is directed entirely towards, a thorough engagement with a world of pragmatic 
decisions. The impetus for this comes about precisely because of a need Geulincx 
recognises ‘to have to try’. That is to act, despite apparent futility. Geulincx readily 
admits that Ethics cannot provide a person with answers to the multitude of ethical 
decisions made throughout a life, and nor does it develop an elegant Kantian 
categorical solution, despite the neatly balanced central axiom. But what Ethics does 
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seek to do is provide some structured mediation between the abstracted realms of 
humilitas, inspectio-sui, and the everyday and divergent ethical decisions encountered 
all the time. That is, Geulincx advises on what might well be classed as hypothetical 
imperatives, though Geulincx gives them the name obligatione [obligations], of which 
he enumerates seven. For example, the fourth obligation stresses the need to find 
oneself a job or career and to commit to it with determination. Yet this determination 
should only last, as the fifth obligation makes clear, until this choice becomes too 
much to bear. That is, Geulincx directs, should a chosen ‘mode of life’52 become too 
awful one should then, pragmatically, take up something else, ‘redirecting the course of 
my pilgrimage elsewhere, if need be’53. These pragmatic yet open-ended, systematically 
interwoven obligations that Geulincx argues all flow from the axiom, are Geulincx’ 
thought yielding to the possibility of the unforeseen and unknown. What is certain is 
that one cannot, in fact, really do anything. However, Geulincx concedes, as does The 
Unnamable’s narrator, you ‘have to try’.  
This combination of impotence with obligation also resonates in the context of 
Beckett’s own criticism, his own attempts to make the sometimes awkward and always 
difficult step from the abstract to the more concrete as regards his thinking about an 
art of failure in criticism. The situation described in The Unnamable, of being capable 
of nothing yet having nevertheless to try, bears broader comparison with Beckett’s 
aesthetic foci as depicted in the Three Dialogues. In a rare clarion call Beckett wrote 
  
to be an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail […] failure is his world and the 
shrink from it desertion, art and craft, good housekeeping, living.54 
 
According to the dramatised Beckett (B) who nominally attempts to convince a 
version of Duthuit (G) in some of Beckett’s most frequently cited critical statements 
on art, it is feeble for an artist to attempt what B calls mere disturbances of things ‘on 
the plane of the feasible’. Asked what other plane is possible B admits ‘Logically 
none’, but this should not stop one turning in disgust from such feasibility, such 
graspable possibility and achievability ‘weary of its puny exploits, weary of pretending 
to be able’. B prefers 
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The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, 
nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, 
together with the obligation to express.55 
 
This paradoxically confident expression of the futility and failure of expression 
ironically and effectively ends the first of the dialogues. What is primarily intriguing 
about it in relation to Geulincx’ Ethics and Beckett’s utilisations of the Geulingian 
axiom is how it bears comparison with the quotation from The Unnamable which, as 
argued above, carries a trace of Geulincx’ text. It would certainly be claiming too 
much to assert a direct influence on Beckett regarding his theorising artistic failure 
and obligation from Geulincx. Nevertheless, it is striking that at the culmination of 
Beckett’s ‘series’, the climax of the final novel of the three, lies this assertion by The 
Unnamable’s narrator of knowing nothing and being capable of nothing that borrows 
Geulincx’ axiom to frame conclusions that are drawn from Beckett’s ‘fidelity to 
failure’56. 
 The final appearance of the axiom is only a few pages from the novel’s end. 
Asking once again who exactly all this torrent of words has been ‘about’, the narrator 
continues: 
 
I don’t know who it’s all about, that’s all I know, no, I must know something else, 
they must have taught me something, it’s about him who knows nothing, wants 
nothing, can do nothing, if it’s possible you can do nothing when you want 
nothing, who cannot hear, cannot speak, who is I, who cannot be I, of whom I 
can’t speak, of whom I must speak,57 
 
Here, near the paradoxical ending of The Unnamable, Geulincx can still be found 
deeply embedded in Beckett’s prose. Yet at this relatively late stage in ‘the series’ the 
philosopher is not discarded, as a matter now resolved or question answered, as he 
predominantly was in Murphy. Instead it appears that the years of familiarity with 
Geulincx and his axiom have deepened Beckett’s feeling for the intractable nature of 
the ethical axiom, in proximity to which The Unnamable’s narrator chooses repeatedly 
to define their ‘I’. Geulincx appears here in a question, left unanswered, as to the 
viability of the ethical axiom: ‘if it’s possible you can do nothing when you want 
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nothing’. Working against the idea that Beckett’s oeuvre, or indeed the ‘series’ within 
it, is one that seeks wholeheartedly to reject the uneasy intrusions of philosophy or 
philosophers, and always to be resisting an infringement, the fragmentary inclusion of 
Geulincx’ axiom here as a question shows a development in Beckett’s thinking about 
allusion and philosophy still willing to set itself the philosophical problems it had 
once rendered as solved. To borrow Gontarski’s phrase, Beckett is intent on undoing 
what had been earlier established.58  
 
5.7  Nescio 
 
In a 2008 review of Geulincx’ Ethics Ackerley expressed how he was 
impressed by a point made by Uhlmann in the introduction to Ethics. It had been 
made previously by Uhlmann in 2006, but Ackerley argues that situated ‘in the more 
immediate surrounding of Geulincx’ actual writings, it resonates more meaningfully’59. 
Ackerley emphasises Uhlmann’s point as not only fundamental to the philosophical 
implications of The Unnamable, but to Beckett and philosophy more broadly: 
 
I should like to consider briefly the implications of what I believe to be one of the 
more stunning and important statements about Beckett and philosophy that I 
have yet encountered; indeed, something that might well shake the foundations 
of a lot of current scholarship. 
 
Ackerley contextualises this ambitious claim by briefly summarising the ‘long 
established and indeed incontrovertible’ critical orthodoxy potentially shaken, an 
orthodoxy which holds that  
 
just as Murphy deals with the Cartesian dualism of body and mind, and Watt 
constitutes an assault upon the Cartesian méthode, Beckett’s Trilogy and 
especially The Unnamable comprise some sort of critique of the cogito.60 
 
As Feldman also did in Beckett’s centenary year (2006), Uhlmann strove to shift the 
long-standing critical focus of this genealogy away from Descartes. While Feldman’s 
empirical basis for his attack was in part the lack of manuscript material 
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substantiating, or proportionally corresponding to, a critical emphasis on Descartes, 
Uhlmann’s proposed shift of emphasis derives instead primarily from his reading of 
Geulincx: 
 
I argue that the ‘cogito’ which is described in The Unnamable (and which inheres 
in later works) is a Geulingian cogito, rather than a Cartesian one: that it emerges 
through an inspection of the self which leads to the understanding that one 
knows nothing (as in Geulincx) rather than to a point of foundation upon which 
one might build up an accurate knowledge of the world (as in Descartes). To my 
mind Geulincx and Beckett have in common the core affirmation that we are 
ultimately ignorant: while Beckett has stated that the key word to his works is 
‘perhaps’, Bernard Rousset has claimed that ‘nescio’ (I do not know) is the key 
word to Geulincx’.61 
 
This ‘insight’62, as Ackerley describes it 
 
at a stroke [...] defines the incontrovertible truth that The Unnamable, arguably 
the key-stone to Beckett’s entire Temple of Wisdom (or should that now be the 
Folly of Nescience?), is a Geulingian work, and that the philosophical position 
assumed within it can be understood only in these terms (for the moment I am 
content with ‘only’).63 
 
Uhlmann’s arguments are more detailed in the ‘cogito nescio’ chapter of his 2006 
Samuel Beckett and the Philosophical Image. Uhlmann argues for Beckett’s use of an 
‘image of thought’64 derived from Geulincx’ insistence on ignorance and impotence, 
that in turn determines the epistemological boundaries in The Unnamable. Images of 
thought, according to Uhlmann (whose definition is derived from Deleuze’s 
conception of them), are primary, underlying systematised relations between co-
ordinates of knowledge that delimit epistemological borders. They determine what 
can be known before any secondary categories that might appear to play this 
determining role are invoked. These secondary categories are then in some sense 
dependent on that first category of the image, even masquerading as the first category. 
Such patterned relations constitute, according to Deleuze, ‘a prephilosophical 
understanding’65 upon which a philosophical understanding is based, without that 
philosophical understanding necessarily acknowledging or even being aware of this 
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basis. Uhlmann’s claim is that Beckett ‘borrows an image of thought (a way of 
imagining what it means to think) from Arnold Geulincx’66, one derived from 
Geulincx’ repeated insistences on the nature of human ignorance. Uhlmann argues 
‘following Geulincx, he [Beckett] identifies the cogito (the “I think”) with a nescio 
(an “I do not know”)’67, an epistemological alignment resonant with the many 
instances in Beckett’s works of ‘one confronted by ignorance, suffering that 
ignorance’68. However, although Uhlmann makes the provocative assertion that 
impresses Ackerley, it is not investigated in detail, and its viability has in fact not been 
exhaustively tested. Consequently there follow below moves towards a more thorough 
enquiry into the viability of Uhlmann’s initially persuasive, though summary, ‘insight’.  
As noted in Chapter 1, Beckett transcribed the word nescio from Metaphysica 
Vera in 1936: 
 
Secundo S. Varios habeo cogitandi modos in infinitum. 
Cogito ergo, et infinitis modis cogito; sed illae re? quas cogito num sic sin tut 
cogito, adhuc nescio.69 
 
Proposition 2. I have innumerable modes of thought. 
Therefore I think, and think in innumerable modes. But whether the things I 
think really are exactly as I think of them, I still do not know.70 
 
Beckett also transcribed it within a passage from Ethica: 
 
Haereo, nescio, nec habeo quod dicam aliud, nisi nescio. Nescio modum, quo 
sum in hac condicione..; tantum abest ut sciam, quomodo ad illam condicionem 
devenerim.71 
But I cannot get beyond I do not know, there is nothing I can add to this I do not 
know. I do not know how I came to this condition... What is lacking is the 
knowledge of how I came to this condition.72 
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Beckett later deployed the word in The Unnamable where it appears in a passage that 
might itself be read as a critique of Cartesian clear and distinct foundations of 
perception. The narrator describes Worm: 
 
Feeling nothing, knowing nothing, he exists nevertheless, but not for himself, for 
others, others conceive him and say, Worm is, since we conceive him, as if there 
could be no being but being conceived, if only by the beer. Others. One alone, 
then others. One alone turned towards the all-impotent, all-nescient, that haunts 
him, then others.73 
 
The passage produces a critique that aligns a Cartesian conception of self with 
thinking itself, where these ‘others’ constitute an ontology conjured, magically, from 
within an epistemology. Worm is brought into existence through an act of 
intellection, where his being ‘conceived’ is a pun on this birth precisely as a product 
of his being thought. In the fact that there is no real possibility of conjuring anything 
real from thinking alone, other than the fictional avatars turned towards their ‘all-
impotent, all-nescient’ creator, there being no real possibility of asserting the self at 
the same moment as being that self, the ‘ergo’ of Cartesian cogitation is collapsed, 
‘shrunk to nothing’. While the cogito was also a foundational axiom for Geulincx, his 
immediate problematising of it becomes his critique of causation more broadly, and 
Beckett comparably produces a critique that appears to conclude, in its instantiation 
in The Unnamable, in a parodic version of the cogito that amounts to no more than ‘I 
think therefore I think’. We have seen how Geulincx puts the cogito under the 
microscope with his assertion that ‘I have innumerable modes of thought. Therefore I 
think, and think in innumerable modes’. While it is difficult to assert, alongside 
Ackerley, a generalised viability of ‘the philosophical position assumed within’74 The 
Unnamable, much as it was difficult to go along with Wood’s ‘general uneasiness’, at 
certain moments there are fragmentary critiques that course through the text and 
which bring to light possibilities for a Geulingian critique of Cartesianism in discrete, 
individualised ways. 
 
5.8  ‘fundamental sounds’ – pre-established harmony 
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A brief background on Beckett’s Windelband-derived notes is helpful to 
contextualise a discussion of the references in Molloy and The Unnamable to pre-
established harmony. According to these notes Geulincx’ Ethics is the place an 
occasionalist conception of God as the ultimate arbiter between will and action is 
‘furthest developed’. Beckett noted what Windelband called the ‘anthropological 
rationale’ of Geulincx: ‘Illustration of the 2 Clocks which having once been 
synchronised by same artificer continue to move in perfect harmony’. This is before 
noting how ‘Leibniz illustrated with same analogy his doctrine of “preestablished 
harmony”’. Beckett then went on to note the following distinction, a distinction 
recorded as made by Leibniz, between a typically Cartesian and an occasionalist 
conception of pre-established harmony: 
 
[Leibniz] characterised Cartesian conception by immediate and permanent 
interdependence of 2 clocks, and Occasionalist by constantly renewed regulation 
of clocks by clock master.75 
 
The distinction Beckett recorded is revealing. If we go back to Windelband’s 
philosophical history we can see that the division is not quite so sharply delineated. 
For example, Windelband argues in a footnote that an ambivalence regarding pre-
established harmony resides within Geulincx’ own texts: 
 
in the latter author [Geulincx] doubt is not entirely excluded as to whether 
God’s causality in this connection is regarded as a special intervention in each 
individual case, or as general and permanent arrangement. In some passages, 
indeed, the former is the case, but the spirit of the doctrine, taken as a whole, 
doubtless involves the latter.76 
 
Windelband points out, however, that in the analogy of the two clocks Geulincx is at 
his clearest.  
Uhlmann suggests that a refracted instance of a clock to illustrate pre-
established harmony appears in Molloy, where ‘it appears as a gong, which Molloy 
hears at the end of his narrative and which calls Moran to his dinner’77. This gong, 
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however, might also be seen as a forerunner of the bell that ‘rings piercingly’ in Happy 
Days waking Winnie to ‘another heavenly day’78 that denotes little of simultaneities 
but conveys instead something of the interrogating authority inhering also in other 
instances in Beckett’s oeuvre of intrusion and subjugation. In the beams of spotlight 
projected in Play and Not I, for example, or the switch that goes on and off in What 
Where marking the passage of off-stage interrogations. There are, however, explicit 
appearances of pre-established harmony in the Three Novels Uhlmann does not 
address. Molloy, trying to find the right tense in which to speak of his life (‘now I 
speak of it as something over, now as of a joke which still goes on, and is there any 
tense for that’), alludes to what might well be read as alluding to occasionalism’s 
‘regulation of clocks by clock master’: 
 
Watch wound and buried by the watchmaker, before he died, whose ruined 
works will one day speak of God, to the worms.79 
 
Paul Davies has described Molloy’s statement as ‘echoing Leibniz’80, which is surely 
accurate. Yet the ascription is perhaps also not exhaustive. The statement is also 
‘echoing’ Geulincx. Beckett’s ‘Philosophy Notes’ indicate that Geulincx’ version of 
pre-established harmony was imagined as a clock ‘having once been synchronised by 
same artificer’, just as Molloy’s has been ‘wound and buried by the watchmaker’.  
Beckett did delve further into Geulincx’ clock analogy than only in the 
‘Philosophy Notes’, and the resulting research appears in the notes to Ethica: 
 
It is the same as if two clocks agree precisely with each other and with the daily 
course of the Sun: when one chimes and tells the hours, the other also chimes 
and likewise indicates the hour; and all that without any causality in the sense of 
having a causal effect on the other, but rather on account of mere dependence, 
inasmuch as both of them have been construed with the same art and similar 
industry.81 
 
Geulincx uses the analogy to illustrate the incongruous non-relation of will to action. 
Just as ‘the motion of the tongue accompanies our will to speak’82, for example, so too 
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two clocks tell the same time, though with neither clock causing the time as told by 
the other.83 
Later in the novel Molloy again refers to pre-established harmony when 
describing his new direction of wandering: 
 
I am no longer with Lousse, but out in the heart again of the pre-established 
harmony, which makes so sweet a music, which is so sweet a music, for one who 
has an ear for music.84 
 
As Davies also informatively points out here, Beckett is ‘echoing [...] Plotinus and 
Pythagoras, whose doctrines of music in the forces of the universe entered Europe 
through the Florentine court of Marsilio Ficino’85. There is, however, very little that is 
harmonic about this world outside the strange sanctuary of Lousse’s house. Molloy is 
‘out in the heart again’ of a much more chaotic universe than Pythagoras’s, and any 
‘sweet […] music’ Molloy hears in concert with this ‘pre-established harmony’ is 
surely a music somewhat of chaos. Beckett’s version of pre-established harmony, then, 
taking a lead from Geulincx as well as from these other sources cited by Davies, is 
established as an elemental world of ruinous entropy. Surely Molloy does not actually 
hear this music of the spheres. Molloy has no ‘ear for music’. What he does have is an 
ear for having once heard about this music. Molloy’s world, that is, might be a pre-
established world, a world in which he can do nothing to alter the course of events, 
where he ‘could not do otherwise’, but it is not therefore one of ‘harmony’.86 
Beckett transcribed from Ethica on the subject of naming: ‘Things do not 
depend on names, and if there are not names for newly-discovered things, let some be 
                                                
83 While arguments here do not require a detailed investigation into the nineteenth-century controversy 
surrounding the discovery of the analogy in Geulincx’ work and the impact this had on the perceived 
originality of Leibniz’ analogy, it is nevertheless important to note actual passages of text in which 
Beckett read of this analogy. On the controversy surrounding Leibniz’ clock as potentially copied from 
Geulincx see de Lattre 1970, pp. 553-566, and de Vleeschauwer 1957, pp. 45-56. 
84 TN, p. 62. 
85 Davies 1997, p. 61. 
86 This inability to interact with clockwork events in the world underlies more of Molloy. In the woods 
searching for his nemesis Moran admits to his self-delusion when he wonders why he had accepted ‘this 
commission’. He proposes ‘Honour’, admitting ‘It did not take me long to guild my impotence’ (TN, p. 
106). Moran’s inability is to alter the course of events that are at the behest of an unknown (except by 
name) authoritarian entity, even despite his own determined sense of propriety and property when it 
comes to his son, maid and house. 
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devised’87. In the same annotation Geulincx quotes Horace on the subject, which 
Beckett also transcribed: 
 
It has been right, and always will 
To give a name to what has none88 
 
The Unnamable’s narrator cannot even confidently name his own thoughts as 
thoughts, unsure if thought ‘is the name for this vertiginous panic as of hornets 
smoked out of their nest’89. The narrator then sums up his self-inspection as an 
operation of naming: 
 
it’s the fault of the pronouns, there is no name for me, no pronoun for me, all the 
trouble comes from that, that, it’s a kind of pronoun too, it isn’t that either, I’m 
not that either,90 
 
Such parallels, however, should also be resisted. The Unnamable and the two novels 
prior to it certainly exhibit a number of sympathies with Geulincx, as partial 
quotation, fragmented allusion, even giving the philosopher’s name. Tracing the 
continuity of Beckett’s preoccupation with freedom as a man on a ship, be that man 
Belacqua, Ulysses, Geulincx, or someone watched by Lucretius or Schopenhauer, 
however, does not reduce the whole of these broad and deep novels to ones 
predominantly driven by a singular Geulingian focus. The ‘name for’ The 
Unnamable’s narrator is not ‘Geulingian’, even if the devising critic might be tempted, 
Watt-like, to resolve partial-congruency. 
                                                
87 Ethics, p. 324. 
88 Ethics, p. 325. 
89 TN, p. 353. 
90 TN, p. 408. 
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Chapter 6 – Late Works 
 
6.1  ‘Who, what, where, by what means, why, in what way, when’?1 
 
What is it to approach the possibility of the presence of Geulincx in the late works of 
Beckett, in anything beyond the Textes pour rien/Texts for nothing of 1951/1952? To 
be clear from the start, there are no longer any obvious allusions to Geulincx to be 
found. Similarly there is little in the way of a Geulingian lineage of imagery 
comparable to that running through The Unnamable, and certainly nothing like 
Murphy’s overt invocation of the beauty of Geulincx’ axiom can be expected. If a 
valid discourse is to be had about the presence of Geulincx in the late works it must 
simultaneously somehow address itself to his apparent absence.  
Are there then any reasons to suppose Geulincx’ relevance to a reading of late 
works at all? One simple reason is that as late as June 1967 Beckett told the critic 
Sighle Kennedy that Geulincx would be one of his ‘points of departure’ should he be 
in the unfortunate position the critic found herself in, of studying his work. Such a 
departure point, however, might be thought to be relevant solely to the early works, 
works composed when Beckett was himself departing on his ‘series’. Kennedy was 
after all writing a monograph focussed on Murphy and it was specifically this novel 
about which Beckett was asked for information. When Beckett writes ‘my work’ in 
this 1967 letter, perhaps he only means Murphy. 
Even though this might be an unlikely appraisal of Beckett’s intended 
meaning, better reasons than this single fragment of correspondence are needed for 
exploring Geulincx and the late works. If possible such reasons would engage with 
important reservations about the validity of any project tracing influence upon 
Beckett per se. General reservations along these lines frequently find most purchase in 
the context of Beckett’s later works where reduction and abstraction make more 
typical comparative study increasingly difficult. O’Hara, for example, put forward his 
reservations to such a project in 1981 and in so doing spoke for more general 
objections potentially raised in regard to anything like influence and the late works: 
 
                                                
1 Watt Notebook 1, HRHRC, p. 3. 
 164 
[…] any discussion of the influence of […] Mr. X on Beckett is likely to be either 
simpleminded, if it implies that that X’s influence has reached Beckett and 
shaped his work purely and without adulteration, or exasperatingly modified, 
temporized, complicated, and footnoted to death if it admits that Mr. X must be 
understood in the light of J, S, and R, with √2 always to be considered.2 
 
A number of critical approaches in Beckett studies since 1996, some fifteen years after 
O’Hara’s statement, have indeed become extensively ‘temporized’, if by this O’Hara 
means subjected to the accurate dating of Beckett’s reading, the contents of his 
correspondence, his note-taking and manuscript composition. It is what might be 
termed empirical temporizing that, for example, cautions us against reading an 
extensive influence of Geulincx in Dream of Fair to Middling Women or More Pricks 
Than Kicks quite simply because Beckett did not read Geulincx in the original until 
after these works were completed. Such an approach might indeed become 
‘complicated’ and ‘modified’, as there exists the potential to find in these earlier 
works themes that in some specific way correlate with those Beckett later found in 
Geulincx, as was discussed above in relation to ‘pruritus’ and Casanova. Such 
arguments about parallels, fascination and serendipity might convince or they might 
not. But is the fact that something could become ‘temporized’ a convincing objection 
in itself? O’Hara’s argument is surely one of taste, and it does not demolish the 
validity of studying influences upon Beckett per se. Interestingly, O’Hara makes this 
broad statement in the context of one of his own studies of influence, in a paper on 
Beckett and Schopenhauer. Here O’Hara offers no clear alternative for how a study of 
influence on Beckett should proceed, and himself progresses to a ‘modified’ 
Schopenhauerian reading of a number of Beckett’s texts. For example, according to 
O’Hara certain Schopenhaurian qualities of Beckett’s texts are ‘modified’ via 
Berkeley: 
 
The topic of not being to escape one’s self recurs often in Beckett’s postwar 
writings, usually with some reference to Bishop Berkeley. But it derives much of 
its importance and many of its characteristics from Schopenhauer.3 
 
Similarly, when discussing the extensively Schopenhauer-influenced Proust essay 
O’Hara writes ‘Proust offered Beckett a way of representing in art what 
                                                
2 O’Hara 1981, p. 253. 
3 O’Hara 1981, p. 258. 
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Schopenhauer had emphasized, the primacy of individual consciousness’4. All of 
which is assessed in so far as it leads us towards or away from what O’Hara terms 
‘Beckett’s world’5, whereby it is enough to validate the comparisons that ‘Beckettians 
will recognize ideas and topics echoed in Beckett’s work’6. However, O’Hara’s general 
reservations should still be met with answers, even if his own comparative procedures, 
at least in this paper, appear to offer few solutions. 
The scholastic categories of inquiry that inaugurated the composition process 
of Watt (‘who, what, where, by what means, why, in what way, when’) might indeed 
strike one as the valid terms in which to ask intertextual questions of Beckett’s late 
work: ‘Who’ is the Geulincx of this period for Beckett? ‘What’ is he doing to/for/in 
Beckett’s texts? ‘Where’ exactly is he in these texts? ‘By what means’ does his 
presence interact with the text or can we be certain that this is indeed Geulincx? 
‘Why’ invoke or utilise him at all? ‘In what way’ does recognising this presence alter 
our reading? ‘When’ should we be able to verifiably say this presence is Geulingian? 
These questions have served an analysis of Geulincx’ various appearances in Beckett’s 
oeuvre well until this point. They have revealed, for example, ‘when’ in relation to 
Murphy Geulincx becomes important, ‘why’ Geulincx becomes inadequate for the 
composition of Watt, ‘where’ Geulincx is central to versions of Suite / The End / La 
Fin, and ‘by what means’, in The Unnamable, Geulincx provides Beckett with 
elements of a narrative voice and a lineage of imagery. Such questions will also serve 
to reveal the necessity of an empirically ‘temporized’ and ‘qualified’ presence of 
Geulincx in certain aspects of the later works. But importantly these categories of 
question also fall short of recognising, or at least of providing a vocabulary in which to 
speak of, the even more radical ambivalences and ambiguities at work in the later 
works. Without finding a way of addressing this shortfall any discussion of Geulincx 
in the later works might be no less constricted than O’Hara’s reading of 
Schopenhauer.  
One thing that such quantitative questions fail to accord validity to is the more 
qualitative open-ended possibility of ‘perhaps’. As Beckett told Tom Driver in 1961 
while discussing in broad terms dramatic structure as mirroring the presence of ‘both 
                                                
4 O’Hara 1981, p. 264. 
5 O’Hara 1981, p. 257. 
6 O’Hara 1981, p. 254. 
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light and dark’, knowledge and ignorance, as simultaneously present in human lives, 
‘the key word in my plays is “perhaps”’7. Yet an invocation of this ‘perhaps’ here is 
not in order to excuse the unarguable, and variously focusing on Geulincx as 
‘perhaps’ present in the late works is not only to focus on a minor or unlikely facet of 
the works. It is also a way in which that central ‘key word’ to the late works, the 
‘perhaps’ itself, might be approached.  
It has been argued above that traceable from Beckett’s work concurrent with 
his Geulincx research in 1936, up until 1958’s English The Unnamable, there persists 
a ‘fantasia’ that with the benefit of hindsight can be seen as chiefly characterised by 
progression towards its own negation. Allusion and citation in Murphy become 
fragmented in Watt, jumbled with other single-use objects in The End, and further 
abstracted and refined through The Unnamable until they are finally fully severed 
from any directly identifiable connection to its origin. In order to be seen at this 
severed point Geulincx must be traced indirectly, through that process of refinement 
and fragmentation in what might be summarised as a transition from the intertextual 
to a necessity of the intratextual. There is in this trajectory less Geulincx’ sliding away 
from Beckett’s sight than an active, purposeful putting out of sight. Geulincx does not 
simply disappear. He is disappeared, intentionally forgotten, en-graved as he was in 
The End. Yet this is not the end of his story.  
If we recall the ‘autospeliology’ of the Watt notebooks and the strikingly 
Dantean metaphor of voices of a psyche buried in layers of rock, the archaeological 
investigation of which is this ‘autospeliology’, the metaphor can be used to see more 
clearly how Beckett’s purposeful killing off and burying of Geulincx is not necessarily 
an act of finality, and why therefore its posthumous consequences should be 
investigated. The solidity of this rock, in the context of Watt a metaphorically layered 
coherence of self, might also function as a metaphor to describe Beckett’s forms of 
source incorporation in the earlier stages of the oeuvre. This is to say that Beckett’s 
‘notesnatching’ and its resulting fictional incorporations once manifest as an 
investigable and parsable layering, where the identification of a source was a matter of 
pointing up the particularities of a discrete strata, a moment of voice, of quotation, or 
                                                
7 Cited in Graver and Federman (eds.) 1979, p. 244. 
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allusion. One voice, quotation etc. could be separated from another in a relatively 
clear and critical ‘autospeliology’.  
Yet in progressing towards its own negation Beckett’s self-devouring ‘series’ 
complicates this process. It negates one source with another, just as in the narrator’s 
pocket in The End each object indelibly etches itself onto another, each marking and 
burying, en-graving, another like itself. Beckett’s own layers of rock, his various strata 
of sources and influences, become themselves buried inside yet other layers of rock. 
The memory of Geulincx, for example, en-graves those of Dante, Homer and Joyce 
via the lineage of galley-slave imagery. One allusion etches itself into the other to 
make something entirely new, yet made of old things. As the narrator of 1958’s From 
an Abandoned Work puts it, ‘so in some way even olden things each time are first 
things, no two breaths the same, all a going over and over and all once and never 
more’8. All four of these important figures for Beckett are folded into one another in 
this imagery. Beckett’s intention appears to be not an almighty overcoming of the 
authority of these previous writers in a Bloomian act of sabotage, making those 
previous weak in order that he might be strong. Rather it is his determined reduction 
of aspects of these authors to certain of their ‘fundamental sounds’, and it is in a 
distillation and mutual engraving that these previous voices become buried. 
Daniela Caselli points out in a study of Beckett’s uses of Dante, a study that 
argues these uses should not be considered as singular, but rather as producing 
multiple Dantes, that by 1960 Beckett had hoped to entirely dispel even his long-
standing company of Belacqua. Beckett wrote to Kay Boyle:  
 
Belacqua for me is no more than a kind of fetish. In the work I have finished he 
appears ‘bascule sur le côté las d’attendre oublié des cœurs où vit la grace 
endormi’ (cor che in grazia vive) [‘fallen over on his side tired of waiting 
forgotten of the hearts where grace abides asleep’ (heart that lives in grace)], and 
I hope that’s the end of him.9 
 
The graceful sleeping stillness that Beckett quotes from part one of Comment c’est 
was, as Caselli points out, ‘not the end of Belacqua, however: he is also referred to in 
                                                
8 CSP, p. 162. 
9 Beckett to Boyle, 29 August 1960. Cited in Caselli 2005, p. 151. 
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part two of How It Is/Comment c’est, and ‘the old lutist’ is still able to wrench a ‘wan 
smile’ from Dante in The Lost Ones/Le dépeupleur and Company/Compagnie’10.  
While the recurrences of Dante that Caselli cites following Beckett’s hoped for 
‘end of’ Belacqua are still empirically verifiable, still stand out as a relatively discrete 
strata, this example of Dante shows that even though buried, when we are in the later 
stages of Beckett’s oeuvre, its most ghostly stages, such buried voices have the capacity 
to return. Indeed, Beckett’s frequent killing off of a character often serves to revivify 
later on, the self-cannibalising serial protagonists drawing their ever less energy from 
the incorporation of previous characters. Such literary self-cannibalising was arguably 
begun with a pragmatic response to circumstance in Beckett’s turning the rejected 
first novel Dream of Fair to Middling Women to various new good uses in stories for 
More Pricks Than Kicks. This self-cannibalism was later imagined figuratively when 
The Unnamable’s narrator observes his previous avatars wheel around him, where 
‘Malone passes’11 though it might be ‘Molloy, wearing Malone’s hat’12 along with what 
resembles ‘the pseudocouple Mercier-Camier’13. More so than with Belacqua, 
however, Beckett does successfully see to the end of Geulincx. Yet it might still be 
expected, given the example of Dante, that such an end would nevertheless not be the 
final end of Geulincx. How then, we should ask, might a ghostly presence or voice of 
Geulincx, once buried, reassert itself?  
In seeking to address these issues the chapter focuses first on a work entirely 
lacking in strata of rock. How It Is takes place in the messy and fluid ‘warmth of 
primeval mud’14. In this difficult breakthrough work for Beckett, a work that 
manifests fluidity in a number of original and important ways, the ‘perhaps’ presence 
of Geulincx is indeed buried, yet only in a somewhat shallow grave, and it returns 
ghost-like to haunt certain scenes, assertions, and stylistic manoeuvres. 
 
6.2  Geulincx and quotation in Comment c’est/How It Is 
 
                                                
10 Caselli 2005, p. 151. 
11 TN, p. 296. 
12 TN, p. 295. 
13 TN, p. 299. 
14 HII, p. 11. 
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In the muddy and fluid world of How It Is the frequent dominant impetus 
when scraps of old voices that might sound like quotation rear themselves is to 
quickly suppress them. For example, when Hamlet is allowed a momentary breaking 
to the surface the narrator/narrated15 becomes benign and reassuring, recalled to their 
duty to ‘on and end part one’ without recourse to what Edouard Morot-Sir has called 
Beckett’s sometime ‘easy magic’16 of allusion: 
 
a little less of to be present past future and conditional of to be and not to be 
come come enough of that on and end part one before Pim17 
 
Yet the narrative does not always recognise its sources in literary or philosophical 
history, or even the fact that it might have specific sources. Predominantly it 
recognises such scraps of quotation when they are as obvious as the one from 
Shakespeare. That is, only when these are most in danger of being uncovered, when 
the narrator might be ousted as having, to use Eliot’s influential terminology, 
borrowed rather than stolen the allusion. For the reader familiar with Geulincx in 
Beckett’s oeuvre, however, the occasional indirect reference still bubbles through the 
mud unremarked upon by the self-lacerating narrative. For example, the multiple 
nothings of The Unnamable return to bring a similar invocation of wide-ranging 
impotence: 
 
in the dark the mud hearing nothing saying nothing capable of nothing nothing18 
 
As it was in The Unnamable, the assertion of impotence is phrased similarly to 
Geulincx’ axiom. The narrator/narrated’s being ‘capable of nothing’ here continues 
the fragmentation of the axiom that was begun with Murphy’s dissatisfaction at the 
axiom’s unrealistic though nevertheless enticing beauty, and that occurs across ‘the 
series’.  
A second residue of earlier intertextual and intratextual reference that might 
surprise in its persisting, or recurring again, at this late stage involves the Geulingian 
                                                
15 I follow the convention in relation to this novel outlined by Beckett to Hugh Kenner of referring to a 
‘narrator/narrated’, rather than to a narrator. See Kenner 1973, p. 94, where Kenner applies the terms 
to Molloy. 
16 Morot-Sir 1976, p. 63. 
17 HII, p. 38. 
18 HII, p. 61. 
 170 
galley slave from Molloy and The Unnamable. This final and ghost-like reappearance 
brings a newly nuanced understanding of this lineage of imagery, one that speaks to 
Beckett’s struggles as a writer of dual cultural origin. Typifying the self-contradictory 
shifting temporal emphases in Comment c’est/How It Is, in part one the 
narrator/narrated asserts there is no more ship: 
 
old dream I’m not deceived or I am it all depends on what is not said on the day 
it all depends on the day farewell rats the ship is sunk a little less is all one begs19 
 
The narrator/narrated is here back in the ‘old dream’ of the question whether one is 
being deceived or not. They recall the to and fro of Malone’s ‘old aporetics’20 and ‘The 
screaming silence of no’s knife in yes’s wound’, while the narrator/narrated bids 
‘farewell’ to the rats that have featured so frequently in ‘the series’ and that in The 
Unnamable took charge on this very ship. However, just as the last of Belacqua had 
not quite been seen despite hopes to the contrary, the ship too is not yet entirely sunk 
and it recurs in How It Is towards the end of part two. Shortly after the 
narrator/narrated describes his novel as ‘little private book these secret things little 
book all my own the heart’s outpourings’, this heart pours out a further recollection of 
‘life above in the light’21. There are a number of autobiographical recollections filtered 
through the unpunctuated prose of Comment c’est/How It Is, and ‘perhaps’ this scene 
too describes one such scene, of Beckett returning to Ireland:22 
 
what men all colours black to white tried them all then gave up no worse too 
vague pardon pity home to native land to die in my twenties iron constitution 
above in the light my life my living made my living tried everything building 
mostly it was booming all branches plaster mostly met Pam I think23 
 
The whole love story between the narrator/narrated and Pam, here set on ‘native 
land’, is then hilariously told from start to finish in a single verset ending in 
                                                
19 HII, pp. 37-38. 
20 TN, p. 181. 
21 HII, p. 84. 
22 See for example Knowlson 1996, pp. 462-463 for discussion of these refracted recollections which 
include a visit to a friend in hospital, praying as a young boy with his mother, and even the shutting 
himself away from callers while writing the novel. 
23 HII, p. 85. When Beckett returned to Ireland in December 1935 from London he may well have felt 
as though he were going to die as he immediately spent a week in bed with pleurisy before embarking 
on the Geulincx research the following January. He was, however, 30 years old.  
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‘forgiveness’ before ‘silence falls again’24. From this silence rises a scene of what is 
‘perhaps’ then Beckett leaving ‘native land’ from the port at Dun Laoghaire or Cobh 
heading for a measure of relief in Europe: 
 
sea beneath the moon harbour-mouth after the sun the moon always light day 
and night little heap in the stern it’s me all those I see are me all ages the current 
carries me out the awaited ebb I’m looking for an isle home at last drop never 
move again a little turn at evening to the sea-shore seawards then back drop sleep 
wake in the silence eyes that dare open stay open live old dream on crabs kelp 
 
astern receding land of brothers dimming lights mountain if I turn water 
roughening he falls I fall on my knees crawl forward clink of chains perhaps it’s 
not me perhaps it’s another perhaps it’s another voyage confusion with another 
what isle what moon you say the thing you see the thoughts sometimes that go 
with it it disappears the voice goes on a few words it can stop it can go on 
depending on what it’s not known it’s not said25 
 
While this water ‘roughening’ at the stern of the ship is the ship’s own wake and not 
so much the storm of The Unnamable, the ‘clink of chains’ of the ‘little heap in the 
stern’ situates this recollection as a further (and final) stage in the lineage of ship 
imagery.26 The narrator/narrated hears this clink of the chains they are bound in as 
they imagine themselves once again as the galley slave, here wondering though if they 
might be confusing themselves with someone else. If this ‘land of brothers’ is the 
‘native land’ of Beckett’s Ireland then such a reappearance of the enslaved galley-man 
travelling the Irish Sea reveals an intriguing and distinctive aspect to the lineage. The 
ship is travelling in one direction (east towards Europe) but the enslaved 
narrator/narrated moves in the other (back home to Ireland), similarly to the earlier 
images in The Unnamable where the slave shifts between two poles. In those earlier 
images, importantly, this movement towards the boundary of the boat indexed ‘a 
great measure of freedom’. Transposing the galley slave’s freedom of movement in 
stasis to the Irish Sea instantiates one of very few images to be found in Beckett’s 
oeuvre of his culturally divided, mutually committed, literary lands. As Cohn describes 
                                                
24 HII, p. 85. 
25 HII, p. 86. 
26 It is perhaps also viable to read this wake as having something of Finnegan’s in it, though of course 
this requires reading the word ‘wake’, my own imposition on Beckett’s description, as itself a kind of 
Joycean accumulative word. Nevertheless, Joyce has been alluded to in the earlier incarnation of the 
ship in Molloy, and might perhaps be seen as an aspect of that novel’s ‘proud and futile wake’.  
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Beckett he is a ‘French-writing Irishman’27, belonging and committed to both places, 
and writing from a cultural vantage point of navigation between the two. Yet as the 
narrator/narrated of How It Is will describe such voyages, there is little relief to be 
had in having travelled ‘west to east’: 
 
we can drag ourselves thus by the mere grace of our united net sufferings from 
west to east towards an inexistent peace we are invited kindly to consider28 
 
We should be cautious retrofitting the geographical specificity of this final incarnation 
of the galley slave onto the earlier appearances. Nevertheless the fleeting and 
ephemeral presence of Geulincx here brings with it a residue of the earlier imagining 
of the galley slave as a repository of freedom in constraint. The past-presence of 
Geulincx brings a particular context to the ghostly imagery of the narrator/narrated 
leaving ‘native land’, or ‘perhaps’ Beckett leaving Ireland, instancing a fractured 
memory carrying within it and enabling a further fractured memory.  
Caselli points to William Colerick’s reading of this scene ‘as a reference to the 
episode of Ulysses’s voyage as represented in the Comedy’. Caselli argues that 
although it is possible to accept, along with Colerick, that the imagistic specificities 
such as the ship, the mountain, dimming light and the roughening water ‘refer to 
Ulysses’s tale in the Comedy, we can nevertheless read the passage differently’. The 
passage, Caselli argues, can also be read according to  
 
an intertextual perspective, in which the ‘above mentioned’ is not only textual 
but also intertextual. This example shows how a number of scenes are not precise 
allusions but rather a ‘familiar’ murmur, as what has already been said.29 
 
Such an ‘intertextual perspective’ should also take into its consideration the galley 
slave from Geulincx, who constitutes one of the multifarious strands of the ‘familiar’ 
identity here that has ‘already been said’, already murmured. 
 
6.3  Not-Geulincx in Comment c’est/How It Is 
 
                                                
27 Cohn 2001, p. 256. 
28 HII, p. 143. 
29 Caselli 2005, p. 160. 
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In moving further away from anything resembling what Harold Bloom might 
call mere ‘allusion-counting’30 in relation to Comment c’est/How It Is, particular 
moments of the text come to the fore in their being in different ways almost but not 
quite traceable to Geulincx. At such moments the absence of Geulincx itself becomes 
a presence, at least for the reader familiar with the Geulingian traces running through 
the oeuvre.  
Geulincx is not named at any point in Comment c’est/How It Is, which is in 
contrast to his fellow, and more famous, occasionalist Malebranche. Malebranche is 
named in this work amongst what must rank as some of Beckett’s most beautiful 
writing in his entire oeuvre. The lengthy scene rendered as another semi-
autobiographical memory deriving from the Dublin Leopardstown racecourse rises 
mistily out of the mud before dissipating back into it, disintegrating and fading, the 
recollection of shared moments between a protagonist and partner sharing 
sandwiches and affection enlivened briefly before it disappears again. Though as the 
narrator/narrated points out, this recollection is faulty, it might be ‘very pretty only 
not like that’31. Knowlson & Pilling describe the scene as simply ‘too picaresque and 
euphoric to be confused with real life’32. The verset appearing midway through this 
section that names Malebranche is as follows: 
 
suddenly yip left right off we go chins up arms swinging the dog follows head 
sunk tail on balls no reference to us it had the same notion at the same instant 
Malebranche less the rosy hue the humanities I had if it stops to piss it will piss 
without stopping I shout no sound plant her there and run cut your throat33 
 
Malebranche has a dual presence here. He is regarded by the narrator/narrated on the 
one hand as merely ‘the humanities I had’, previous learning now useless along with 
others also listed at other points in the text, ‘notions of mathematics astronomy and 
even physics’34, ‘and with that flashes of geography’35, for example. All of these 
‘humanities’ and sciences are described by the narrator/narrated as being now 
                                                
30 Bloom 1997, p. 31. 
31 HII, p. 32 
32 Knowlson and Pilling 1979, p. 67. 
33 HII, p. 30. 
34 HII, p. 41. 
35 HII, p. 42. 
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nothing but the ‘scraps’36 introduced on the novel’s first page. Yet Malebranche is also 
specifically named. Out of an amorphous ‘humanities’ comes this momentary flash of 
precision, his name even spelled correctly unlike the mention of Geulincx in The End 
/La Fin. This dual presence of Malebranche, specific yet vaguened, reflects certain of 
Beckett’s own experiences of the occasionalist. 
Ackerley and Gontarski cite the apocryphal claim that ‘Malebranche allegedly 
died of the excitement induced by metaphysical discussion with Berkeley’37. 
Malebranche’s lack of ‘rosy hue’, his death, was quite probably something with which 
Beckett was indeed familiar. Beckett’s tutor while he had been studying various 
humanities at TCD, A.A. Luce, was an expert on Berkeley and Malebranche. Luce’s 
influential Berkeley and Malebranche: A Study in the Origins of Berkeley’s Thought 
(published in 1934, only two years after Beckett resigned from teaching at TCD38) sets 
itself out clearly: ‘My aim is to show that the way to the heart of Berkeleianism lies 
through Malebranche’39. It goes on to trace this specific influence upon Berkeley via 
Berkeley’s notebooks and correspondence (particularly those leading up to Berkeley’s 
Theory of Vision, the work Beckett had annotated with ‘Against Geulincx?’ and which 
is still in his Paris library). In Berkeley and Malebranche Luce describes a meeting 
between the two philosophers held in Malebranche’s Paris monastery, ‘when 
Malebranche raised his voice and lost his temper, and according to the bon mot, 
Berkeley became unwittingly “the occasional cause of his death”’40. This death of an 
occasionalist, the tale of a loss of ‘rosy hue’ relayed via a tutor, has resonances with a 
similar death from great excitement, that of the narrator’s Geulincx tutor in The End 
/La Fin. 
Further evidence for Malebranche’s importance as a component of any 
humanities once ‘had’ by Beckett resides alongside Geulincx’ first fleeting 
appearances in Beckett’s early ‘Philosophy Notes’. In these notes Beckett summarised 
some of Descartes’s ideas discussed above in relation to ‘space’ and ‘place’. Beckett 
noted that there was no such thing as ‘empty space’, this being because ‘Bodies are 
                                                
36 HII, p. 7. 
37 Ackerley and Gontarski (eds.) 2006, p. 341. 
38 Luce also served as a referee for Beckett’s 1937 application to Cape Town for a lectureship in Italian 
(see Knowlson 1996, p. 754 n. 5). 
39 Luce 1934, p. 43. 
40 Luce 1934, p. 89. 
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parts of space, limitations of the universal extension’. Beckett noted the lineage 
accounting for the more famous occasionalist in terms of his views on what Tad 
Schmaltz calls Malebranche’s ‘Vision in God […] the doctrine that we see all things 
(that is, bodies) in (that is, through ideas in) God’41. Beckett writes of Malebranche’s 
epistemological ideas in the notes, comparing them to Descartes’s ideas on space: 
‘Similar view of mental world by Malebranche’42. The notes go on to cite Malebranche 
as a parallel to the Spinozan original of Murphy’s Chapter 6 epigraph: ‘(amor 
intellectualis quo deus se ipsum amat = raison universelle of Malebranche)’43, and they 
name Malebranche on further occasions both where he becomes interchangeable with 
Geulincx and where he is aligned more closely with La Forge. When Beckett 
described occasionalist conceptions of God he conflated Geulincx’ and 
Malebranche’s views as distinct from Spinoza’s: 
 
According to Geulincx & Malebranche God creates world & us of will, 
according to Spinoza the world is necessary consequence of nature of God. 
Causal relation understood in two quite different ways.44 
 
Malebranche also enters the notes at other moments as a seeming afterthought, an 
annotation, such as during a summary of Descartes’s ideas on error: 
 
Error is an act of free-will parallel to act of sin; it is the guilt of self-deception.  
(This thought elaborated by Malebranche).45 
 
The claim deserves to be made that such notes of Beckett’s from the early 1930s are 
part of what constitute any ghostly ‘humanities I had’, the learned repository that now 
only exists as ‘scraps’ in Comment c’est/How It Is. There is a biographical precedent 
already established for such a claim. That is to say, similarly to how scenes from 
Beckett’s own life in a predominantly Irish landscape find their refracted and redacted 
ways into the text of Comment c’est/How It Is, so too do instances of his early 
                                                
41 Schmaltz 2000, p. 59. It was about such views that Malebranche had his extensive argument with 
Antoine Arnauld (1612-94). Schmaltz describes this exchange: ‘The exchange between Malebranche 
and Arnauld on the issue of the nature of ideas, which was one of the major intellectual events of the 
early modern period, appears at times to be a battle for the soul of Descartes’ (Schmaltz 2000, p. 61). 
42 TCD MS 10967/187v. 
43 TCD MS 10967/188r. 
44 TCD MS 10967/190v. 
45 TCD MS 10967/184r. 
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autodidactic ‘notesnatching’ such as manifested by the ‘Philosophy Notes’ and in his 
likely familiarity with certain of Luce’s work. By 1960, however, such ‘humanities I 
had’ are as fragmented into ‘scraps’ as are the autobiographical images, and similarly 
are seen only darkly. 
There were two good reasons for Beckett to explicitly name Malebranche 
rather than Geulincx as one of the ‘scraps’ of ‘the humanities I had’ in Comment 
c’est/How It Is, other than simply Malebranche’s eligibility as an occasionalist. Not the 
least important of these is that Geulincx could not function in Comment c’est/How It 
Is in the way Malebranche does. Geulincx has been too prevalent through Beckett’s 
earlier works to warrant his appearance in Comment c’est/How It Is. This late text 
requires ‘the humanities I had’ to be further removed from any humanities voiced or 
named in Beckett’s previous works. Had Beckett here named Geulincx minus a rosy 
hue he would thereby have given Geulincx’ name in three works (Murphy, Molloy, 
and Comment c’est/How It Is). At the very least such repetition would have been 
Beckett overplaying his hand, over-relying on Geulincx as a name that would span the 
entire ‘series’ and beyond. Beckett needed an occasionalist for Comment c’est/How It 
Is but Geulincx was unavailable. Specifically, Geulincx cannot any more function as a 
simple token of occasionalism, which is one of Malebranche’s functions in this text. In 
this sense, then, Malebranche functions in part as Geulincx’ occasionalist understudy, 
taking his place. But Malebranche also functions specifically, ‘less the rosy hue’, and 
in this he becomes not only fixed into ‘the series’ in his echoing the tutor in The End 
/La Fin but he also exhibits a fragment, a multifarious scrap of Beckett’s own 
‘humanities’ deriving from both his early ‘notesnatching’ and his TCD tutor that is 
not pointed up at any other place in the oeuvre. In these ways, the non-presence of 
Geulincx, the presence that is instead Malebranche’s, is as important for 
consideration of Geulincx’ relevance as is the overt presence of Malebranche. 
 
6.4  Not-quotation in Comment c’est/How It Is 
 
The narrator/narrated admits of such ‘scraps’ of ‘the humanities I had’ that 
despite their fragmentary nature in the present ‘they have marked me that’s the main 
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thing’46. Perhaps not with the violence with which characters are attacked with tin 
openers, their names etched into each other’s backs and arses with fingernails, but 
such ‘notions’ have indeed ‘marked’ the narrator/narrated and his novel in deep yet 
subtle ways. There are a number of points in Comment c’est/How It Is where a critic 
might attempt to reveal this being ‘marked’, to elucidate what might ‘perhaps’ be a 
residual presence of Geulincx. Certain of these are addressed here, specifically the 
mud, the narrator/narrated binary and the tripartite structure of the novel, before in 
the following section focus turns to what a ‘guignol world’ might be in Comment 
c’est/How It Is, Still, Act without Words 1 and in two late works for television. 
The elemental mud of Comment c’est/How It Is has frequently been discussed 
by critics alongside that of Dante’s muddier sections of Hell. In 1978 Michael 
Robinson claimed the novel’s narrator ‘exists in a landscape which is composed of a 
number of details from different circles of the Inferno’47. The mud, specifically, recalls 
the fifth circle of the banks of the river Styx to which the wrathful are condemned: 
 
And I, intent on looking as we passed, 
 saw muddy people moving in that marsh, 
 all naked, with their faces scarred by rage.48 
 
This mud ‘gurgles in their throats’49 as those who claw their way through the mud 
inflict attacks on each other with violence comparable to Comment c’est/How It Is: 
 
They fought each other, not with hands alone, 
but struck with head and chest and feet as well, 
 with teeth they tore each other limb from limb.50 
 
More recently Daniel Albright has argued of such a comparison that in sections of 
Comment c’est/How It Is the text ‘looks like Dante but is in fact quite up to date, – a 
parody of Dante based on modern technology’. According to Albright, Beckett 
parodies the obligation to express via the medium of radio, whereby ‘Each mud-
                                                
46 HII, p. 41. 
47 Robinson 1978, p.79 
48 Dante 2003, p. 132 (Inf. VII, 109-111). 
49 Dante 2003, p. 133 (Inf. VII, 125). 
50 Dante 2003, p. 133 (Inf. VII, 112-114). 
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crawler with his can opener treats the man in front of him as if he were a radio, 
making him speak or sing out through a series of learned responses’51. In the study 
with perhaps the most subtlety and authority, one that takes its theoretical contours 
from the multivalent concept of ‘authority’ itself, Caselli correlates the mud of the text 
with speech, the muddy surface of the text enacting its process of constructing itself as 
heard and recorded speech: 
 
Inferno VII is reconstructed in How It Is/Comment c’est’s painfully detailed 
exploration of the materiality of speech and its investigation of how repetition 
and reproduction confer the status of reality upon invisibility.52 
 
For Caselli, Inferno is less a source for this text than something which ‘participates in 
the intractable economy of the text by being an “unthinkable beginning”, an already 
said/written which constitutes itself as the transcription of an already said’53.  
In contrast to the many studies citing Dante’s relations to this novel, Geulincx’ 
name has never been invoked in relation to the mud of Comment c’est/How It Is. Yet 
while he offers nothing like the images of violent resourcefulness of Dante’s 
unrelenting damned, Geulincx does describe a geographically based zone of existence 
that bears comparison with Comment c’est/How It Is. Geulincx describes himself 
staring out at the world from his occasionalist, disconnected vantage point. He asks 
himself what good his eyes are if he will only ever see ill, if he can never know for sure 
that the world is as he naïvely believes it to be. Nevertheless, he enumerates an 
ontology comprising ‘regions’ of the earth as he (admittedly, quite probably faultily) 
sees it. Beckett transcribed Geulincx’ regions in summary, which in their strange 
mixture of specificity and generality also convey similarities with the semi-
geographical areas such as ‘The Sky’ and ‘The Nothingness’ Beckett outlined as those 
in which Watt would take place: 
 
We see then that the world as it affects our senses can be conveniently divided 
into regions, and the inhabitants of those regions. The first region is that of the 
vast sky…and the inhabitants of this region are the stars…The second region is 
the air […] its inhabitants are clouds, and the phenomena they produce…The 
third region is the sea, whose inhabitants are fish… The fourth region is the land, 
of which there are two sub-regions: the upper, whose inhabitants are plants and 
                                                
51 Albright 2003, p. 120. 
52 Caselli 2005, p. 156. 
53 Caselli 2005, p. 157. 
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animals…and the lower sub-region, whose inhabitants are metals, stones, and 
every kind of mineral.54 
 
It is the fourth of these regions, specifically the ‘lower sub-region’, that adds a 
Geulingian aspect to the mud of How It Is. This is not only because it offers an 
evocative image of a Dantean environment with which Beckett was also familiar, or 
because it emphasises the elemental ontology of ‘stones’ and ‘metals’ that constitute so 
many of Beckett’s own environments as they affect the senses of his protagonists. It is 
also because of how Geulincx writes of his own body as subject to this fourth region:  
 
My body is a part of the world, an inhabitant of the fourth region, and claims a 
place among the species who walk over it55 
 
As much is to be expected, of course, of Geulincx’ place in the world. That is unless 
he would want to claim to be something other than a human who would ‘walk over’ 
the surface of the Earth. However, the walking ‘over it’ here reads in two ways, once 
we have in mind Comment c’est/How It Is. Not only is the ‘it’ the earth which is 
walked over, putting Geulincx safely in the upper fourth region, ‘it’ is also the body of 
Geulincx’ narrator, a body that is itself walked over in an image of barbarism and 
cruelty more at home in a murky lower region. Just as Geulincx claims a place among 
the species that walk over the earth, he claims a place among the species that also walk 
over his body. It is something he does in many other places where he describes his 
being subject to, in a different (metaphorical) zone, that ‘boundless ocean of miseries, 
on which I presently toss’56. As we have seen, the sometime painful facts of Geulincx’ 
own life creep to the surface of Ethics, where he alludes to the cruelties and 
hindrances inflicted upon him, his family and his hopes. Placing himself in this zone 
reads as though he is in a series of those who might ‘walk over’ one another, a series 
similar to that in Comment c’est/How It Is. 
In this ‘fourth region’, as Geulincx describes the world in which humanity 
lives, any ‘I’ is subject to the authority of God, of another existing elsewhere, living 
their ‘life the other above in the light’57 as How It Is renders its vision of such 
                                                
54 Ethics, p. 329. Ellipses are quoted as they appear in Ethics. 
55 Ethics, pp. 329-330. 
56 Ethics, p. 350. 
57 HII, p. 8. 
 180 
dependency. The narrator of Comment c’est/How It Is is simultaneously produced as 
the novel’s narrated by virtue of the narrator’s hearing and recording, ‘when the 
panting stops’, this other, this other who is a narrator telling of his own life: ‘my life 
last state last version ill-said ill-heard ill-recaptured ill-murmured in the mud’58. The 
fractured narrative that is ‘ill-heard ill-recaptured’, then, is also an I-heard, an I-
recaptured. The narrator’s self is both murmuring itself in the present and 
recuperating ‘I’ from the past, from elsewhere. Such an interweaving of identity and 
its relations to an ultimately inaccessible other also has its Geulingian precedent. The 
occasionalist divide that becomes tangible to humanity, though still limited by a lack 
of access to the ineffable, becomes for Geulincx tangible in the fourth region of 
elemental walking over. Exhibiting both the impressionableness of Descartes’s piece 
of wax59 and a proto-existentialist sense of being-in-the-world within a theological 
framework, Geulincx describes being subject to the authority of one who must 
resemble us and on whom we depend, even though we are not given real access either 
to our world or to theirs: 
 
Hence also, there must be someone else who can by His own power impress on 
me the likeness of the world; just as He impresses my action on small parts of the 
world; and in each case in an ineffable manner, which perpetually eludes me as I 
try to grasp it.60 
 
Just as the world is only ‘ill-seen’ and ‘ill-recaptured’ by the narrator of Comment 
c’est/How It Is, for Geulincx there is only an unverifiable ‘likeness’ impressed upon 
him by another, an authority to which he must defer. He must defer to this other, just 
as Beckett’s narrator requires a narrated, because there is no such thing as direct 
knowledge or unmediated experience, no event in the present or memory of the past 
that does not elude one as one tries to ‘grasp it’. Such is illustrated in How It Is, for 
example, by the cooing of the couple at the Dublin racecourse where the narrator 
admits it sounds ‘very pretty only not like that’. Geulincx writes that  
 
                                                
58 HII, p. 7. 
59 The piece of wax Descartes uses in the second meditation to illustrate how his idea of a thing, the 
piece of wax, cannot be known through the senses but through ideas in his mind of the thing. The wax, 
held to the fire, is for Descartes a paragon of physical impressionability.  
60 Ethics, p. 328. 
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things placed outside us cannot impress their likeness on me; nor can I myself 
capture that likeness of my own accord; for such things impinge or affect at most 
my own body, and this is as much to say that it does nothing of itself towards 
perceiving them.61  
 
This is as much to say that a body is not sufficient, just as a narrator is not sufficient. 
The narrated is required to enliven, to enable narrative, just as Geulincx requires the 
agency of God to enliven the body, to connect it with the experiencing consciousness 
of the mind. 
 
 6.5  Coming, being, going 2 
 
As well as such fragmentary shards of Geulincx and not-Geulincx in Comment 
c’est/How It Is there are also broader approaches Geulincx takes to ethics that have a 
resonance with the structure of Comment c’est/How It Is. As we have seen, Beckett 
transcribed Geulincx’ notion that ‘I have my whole being (in coming hither, acting 
here, departing hence)’62, the tripartite structure setting clear boundaries that map 
onto the tripartite structure of Comment c’est/How It Is. Cohn describes this number 
three, as, along with the mud, Beckett’s ‘debt to Dante’. According to Cohn ‘The 
number three is emphasized – sacred to the Florentine, but arbitrarily chosen by the 
French-writing Irishman’63. But ‘perhaps’ this choice is not as arbitrary as it might 
appear. Just as the mud can be seen to also owe something to Geulincx along with its 
debts to Dante, revealing similarly intertwined debts to those owed by the image of 
the galley slave, so too this ‘triune plot’64 traces similar contours to the triune life that 
Geulincx describes in Ethics and Metaphysics. It thereby continues the trend among 
these earlier images of combining ‘scraps’ derived from both Dante and Geulincx.  
As Beckett transcribed in the penultimate paragraph of his typed notes, 
Geulincx’ seven ethical obligations are bounded by this tripartite structure, mirroring 
how Geulincx conceives of the structure of life itself: 
 
I introduce a division of the Obligations into those concerned with death (such as 
the first two Obligations), those concerned with life (such as the third, fourth, 
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62 Ethics, p. 337. 
63 Cohn 2001, p. 256. 
64 Cohn 2001, p. 257. 
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fifth and sixth), and those concerned with birth (such as the Seventh Obligation). 
For every Obligation of man is concerned with either coming hither, being here, 
or departing hence; in short, with hither, here, or hence.65 
 
There is, then, an intriguing structural parallel between Geulincx’ emphasis on how 
life is and the three parts of Comment c’est/How It Is, the three parts which are 
announced in the novel’s very first words with ‘how it was I quote before Pim with 
Pim after Pim how it is three parts I say it as I hear it’66. However, when it comes to 
later stages of the novel Beckett frequently confounds such strictly demarcated 
divisions. The three sections of the novel are indeed predominantly bound by the 
narrator/narrated’s coming ‘hither’ to Pim, his being ‘here’ with Pim, and his having 
gone ‘hence’ from Pim. Yet the frequent struggle to avoid a continual restatement of 
these categorical differences manifests as the narrator/narrated asserting these 
temporal zones out of order, or simultaneously, as one against or as one opposed to 
the other. As a consequence it must be acknowledged that while Geulincx might be 
seen to operate in such boundaries and borders of the text, he is also, in the text’s 
pushing against these boundaries and borders, resisted.  
 
6.6  The ‘guignol world’ 
 
Even in the ontologically minimal and cruel world of Comment c’est/How It Is 
there is occasional and occasionalist wonder at the body and its apparent miraculous 
abilities, even though such abilities might be only misplaced impressions of agency. 
Such wonder appears, for example, at the climax of the novel, where the act that 
concretises part two’s being ‘here’ with Pim is the laying on of a hand. The event is 
mediated via a remarkably occasionalist perspective: 
 
Smartly as from a block of ice or white-hot my hand recoils hangs a moment it's 
vague in mid air then slowly sinks again and settles firm and even with a touch of 
ownership already on the miraculous flesh67 
 
In this taut verset there is little sign of a will motivating this hand. There is not even 
any ‘I’ merely congruent with the occurrences observed. The hand feels as though 
                                                
65 Ethics, p. 350. 
66 HII, p. 7. 
67 HII, p. 51. 
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either freezing cold or blazing hot, but the narrator cannot say which. The sensation 
stops at the hand, and does not reach the experiencing consciousness of the narrator. 
There is figurative description, but not wilful action. All is ‘as from’ or ‘with a touch 
of’. All is observed and recorded, but nothing is caused and nothing of the hand’s 
movement is described in terms of an interaction between it and the rest of the 
narrator/narrated. While it might be ‘my’ hand that ‘recoils’ and ‘hangs’, ‘sinks’ and 
‘settles’, ‘my’ is not strong enough on its own to claim the connection, and while there 
is ownership, it is a cruel ownership of the other, of Pim and not of the self. Molloy at 
times had suffered similar fissures and mediated perceptions of his hands. When 
crouched behind the rock like Belacqua at the beginning of his narrative, Molloy 
gazed ‘towards my hand also, which my knee felt tremble and of which my eyes saw 
the wrist only’68. Such apparent fissure between mind and body, the narrator/narrated 
watching with some ‘vague’ wonder the movement of his own body, reveal Beckett’s 
continuing interest in a nuanced understanding of Cartesianism, where the best 
account of the specifics of such a progressively nuanced understanding is his engaging 
with occasionalism. As Cornelis Verhoeven describes Geulincx’ accounts of 
movement as expressed in his axioms, ‘we become the astonished spectators even of 
our own activities at the very moment we perform them’69. 
It is the fact that Beckett focuses specifically on the movement of a hand, as 
Geulincx does in Ethics, that leads to the suggestion such moments reflect Beckett’s 
Geulingian occasionalist interests. Yet ‘perhaps’ it is as much Malebranche as 
Geulincx who informs such passages. For the disconnected hand or arm (that lays 
onto and into Pim) was also Malebranche’s metaphor of choice for illustrating 
occasionalist incapacity and disconnection. In The Search After Truth Malebranche 
writes, for example, ‘I move my arm because of the union God has established 
between my mind and my body’70. Malebranche goes on to discuss his arm’s 
movement in detail (and to define terms such as ‘union’ and ‘faculty’). In his study of 
Malebranche and Berkeley, Luce cites an extract from one of Berkeley’s notebooks 
that, as Luce reads it, pokes fun at Malebranche’s argument about limbs: ‘We move 
                                                
68 TN, p. 11. 
69 Verhoeven 1973, p. 78. Translated and cited by van Bunge et al. (eds.) 2003, p. 329. 
70 Malebranche 1997, pp. 669-670. 
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our legs ourselves. ‘Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from 
Malbranch’71.  
Beckett’s emphasis in his transcriptions on the movement of a hand, arm or 
body follows that of Geulincx’ examples. His transcriptions from Metaphysica Vera, 
for example, contain the following on the movement of a hand: 
 
Manus nostra non movetur ad imperium voluntatis, sed ad concensum.72 
 
But my hand is moved not at the command of my will, but by consent to it.73 
 
The wonder expressed at occasionalist movement of the hand in How It Is is given a 
deistic aspect when, for example, movement appears to be ‘impossible’, reliant on a 
‘miracle’ for its achievement of ‘the impossible’: 
 
huge cymbals giant arms outspread two hundred degrees and clang clang miracle 
miracle the impossible do the impossible suffer the impossible74 
 
For Geulincx, as we have seen, movement in a physical world is entirely dependent 
upon God’s willing such action, who ‘in an ineffable manner conjoins certain 
motions’75 with my own will. A human body, according to Geulincx, has no more 
capacity for being influenced by my own will than any other element of the external 
world. I am conjoined to all only when God wills it, or ‘because of the union God has 
established’ as Malebranche describes it.  
Movements of a hand or arm without apparent agency such as appears in 
Comment c’est/How It Is can be seen as even more closely allied with Beckett’s ideas 
on Geulincx and distinguishable from those on Malebranche when we recall Beckett’s 
description of Geulincx’ ‘fascinating guignol world’. This is a world where, as Beckett 
appears to have understood it, all is puppetry, where humanity and everything in the 
world are puppets at the mercy of God the all-powerful puppet-master. The body that 
lays its hand upon Pim in the climax of the novel goes on to treat Pim as if he were a 
                                                
71 Berkeley quoted in Luce 1934, p.90. It is a ‘summary statement’, as Luce describes it, which 
resembles Beckett’s own perceptive annotation in his edition of Berkeley’s Theory of Vision. 
72 TCD MS 10971/6/3v. 
73 Metaphysics, p. 42. 
74 HII, p. 64.  
75 Ethics, p. 231. 
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puppet. Just like a puppet Pim is an empty vessel until he is mistreated into action, 
until another will ‘walk over’ him: 
 
Pim never be but for me anything but a dumb limp lump flat for ever in the mud 
but I'll quicken him you wait and see and how I can efface myself behind my 
creature when the fit takes me76 
 
Pim as ‘a dumb limp lump flat’ waiting to be quickened by the violent hand of the 
narrator/narrated serves as a sharp reminder of the authority in Geulincx’ 
authoritarian world. The violent ‘fit’ that forces Pim into action, and behind which 
the narrator/narrated can ‘efface’ themselves, recalls us to the dominion of God in 
Geulincx’ world where, as Beckett described it, all is puppetry, where there is no sight 
of God who is ineffably effaced behind His own actions. Where He is, as Stephen 
Dedalus describes the artist, ‘refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his 
fingernails’77. Or in the case of Comment c’est/How It Is, sharpening them for further 
attack. 
 
6.7  Still 
 
In order to focus more tightly on this idea of puppetry and a ‘guignol world’ I 
turn now to the short prose piece Still, a piece which, similarly to Comment c’est/How 
It Is, turns on such puppet-like movement, but which foregrounds the explication of 
such movement as the raison d’être of the entire piece. Written between 17 June 1972 
and the end of July that same year,78 Still has a multivalent relationship to an idea of 
the ‘series’ in Beckett’s oeuvre. Standing apart as an individual piece (the only one of 
the Foirades/Fizzles written first in English), it became a part of that series of short 
texts, and was also incorporated into the tripartite collection that includes Sounds 
(1972-3) and Still 3 (1973). Both these latter pieces received their first publication 
alongside an essay by Pilling in Essays in Criticism (1978) in which Pilling describes 
Still as an achievement of Beckett’s syntax of weakness, the phrase Beckett used in 
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78 See Bryden, Garforth, Mills (eds.) 1998, p. 172. 
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1962 in an interview with Harvey and again in correspondence with Bray.79 This is a 
syntax that operates in Still, according to Pilling, ‘by insinuation rather than assertion, 
by its infinite suggestibility rather than by its vehement rigour’80. Arguing that Still is a 
high-water mark within the context of certain of Beckett’s aesthetic concerns, Pilling 
asserts that these concerns date as far back as Beckett’s earliest works of fiction: 
 
Nothing better illustrates how far Beckett has travelled in forty years of writing 
than the way he has ‘enlivened the last phase of his solipsism’ not, as his 
‘sometime friend’ Belacqua did (in More Pricks than Kicks, 1934), ‘with the belief 
that the best thing he had to do was to move constantly from place to place’, but 
rather with the belief that the best thing he can do is to keep still.81 
 
Internally too Still conveys a series, a tripartite before, during, and after. Its first and 
final sections are comprised predominantly of strong declarative sentences that 
become, as Pilling calls it, ‘ruffled’82, unsettled, by the physical movement of the 
narrated protagonist’s hand and head in the middle section. Yet Still not only reflects 
a Geulingian structure in the hand and head coming ‘hither’ towards each other, 
being ‘here’ if only a moment with each other before departing ‘hence’ from each 
other. Ackerley and Gontarski suggest that the movement of the protagonist’s arm up 
to meet his head whilst sat on a chair in the middle section’s action, action around 
which the work centres and which disturbs the surface of declarative stasis, 
‘constitutes a return to the concerns of Geulincx and the Occasionalists’83 for Beckett 
at this late stage. Certainly, Still focuses on physical movement as a separate 
occurrence to the body’s willing it, as it also appeared at moments in Comment 
c’est/How It Is. The ‘miracle’ of movement as it was in Comment c’est/How It Is is 
something observed in Still, however, with a reverential resignation that distinguishes 
it from Comment c’est/How It Is, and aligns it even more closely with a Geulingian 
aesthetic. The dense, fragmentary syntax of the breathless Comment c’est/How It Is 
lacked the necessary breathing space for anything like the visceral realist focus of Still. 
Yet certain movements of the body are nevertheless remarkably similar to those in the 
                                                
79 Beckett used the term with Bray specifically to describe his work in the second notebook in which he 
was composing the beginning of Pim, as Comment c’est was then called. 
80 Pilling 1978, p. 149. 
81 Pilling 1978, p. 143. 
82 Pilling 1978, p. 148. 
83 Ackerley and Gontarski (eds.) 2006, p. 543. 
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earlier novel. A body again seemingly moves of its own, or someone else’s, accord; 
‘this movement impossible to follow let alone describe’: 
 
The right hand slowly opening leaves the armrest taking with it the whole 
forearm complete with elbow and slowly rises opening further as it goes and 
turning a little deasil till midway to the head it hesitates and hangs half open 
trembling in mid air. Hangs there as if half inclined to return that is sink back 
slowly closing as it goes and turning the other way till as and where it began 
clenched tightly on rest.84 
 
The narrated’s right hand here takes ‘with it’ its own forearm. It has the power of 
hesitation, and ‘it’ can seemingly choose to hang there, almost possessing its own 
inclination to return to the armrest. It is a graceful and steady movement that ‘ruffles’ 
not only the declarative stasis, but also opposes itself to the body’s un-still-able 
‘trembling all over’85 of the first and third part, thereby constituting an opposition of 
stasis to movement, as well as one of movement to stasis. The arm’s movement is 
described not unlike that of a budding plant, its ‘leaves’ not only the arm’s leaving 
behind the armrest, but as its ‘opening slowly’ and ‘opening further’ also do, revealing 
a slight pastoral impetus in the movement, a movement that also echoes Arsene’s 
contrarian analysis that any budding will inevitably also wither. The scene also carries 
a fractional echo of a Celtic past in ‘deasil’, a Scottish (perhaps surprisingly not Irish) 
Celtic word meaning, according to the OED, ‘Righthandwise, towards the right; 
motion with continuous turning to the right’. Yet ‘deasil’ also carries connotations of 
magic, of rituals involving people animated clockwise round a sacred stone, for 
instance, or a significant building. The movement of this hand, then, read as Ackerley 
and Gontarski’s ‘return to the concerns of Geulincx and the Occasionalists’, is indeed 
partly a detailed illustration of the favoured example discussed by Geulincx and 
Malebranche. It does not substitute for God, ‘the Bastard, he [who] doesn’t exist’86, a 
farcical astrological backdrop such as in Murphy. But the Celtic interjection (of a 
word that also appears repeatedly in 1964’s All Strange Away) nevertheless brings a 
                                                
84 CSP, p. 241. 
85 CSP, p. 240. 
86 ‘[T]he bastard, he doesn’t exist’ paraphrases a quotation from Hamm in Endgame, but Beckett 
reportedly replied to a question from Edna O’Brien (who was writing an article for the Sunday Times 
Magazine in 1986) with the same sentence: ‘“God – do you have any thoughts you would like to air, 
about God?” “No…no…none….Wait, [vigorously] I do – the bastard, he doesn’t exist”’ (O’Brien 
1986, p. 53). 
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hint of ritual and witchery to this simple movement both familiar yet in Still become 
estranged. 
There is, however, something else that intrigues in the occasionalist movement 
of Still that bears a mark of Beckett’s ‘fantasia’. As discussed above, a musical fantasia 
can be improvised or semi-improvised, it can continue in a particular vein or it can 
freely incorporate elements from around it. A fantasia is unpredictable and 
foregrounds itself as a malleable and changeable thing. It can encounter something 
apparently wholly other to itself yet does not need therefore to turn away to continue 
being itself. It can incorporate what is other as a new version, a changed version, of 
itself. William Drabkin describes how Beethoven’s fantasias would ‘both maintain and 
break with tradition’, arguing that certain of these fantasias could incorporate 
elements previously entirely alien to them: 
 
It was in the Fantasia for piano, chorus and orchestra op. 80 (1808), however, 
that Beethoven broke most strikingly with tradition by introducing a chorus into 
a form that had been instrumentally conceived for some 300 years.87 
 
The comparison worth making here is between this history of instrument-only 
composition, and Beckett’s own works until the early 1970s. That is, the ‘fantasia’ 
involving Geulincx, having laid implicit and even dormant at various times up until 
now, will be reinvigorated by coming into contact with ideas that might seem entirely 
alien and other, but which in fact turn out to be quite close to Beckett’s earlier ideas 
on Geulincx, and cohere with them to form something new, yet nevertheless 
something that is a continuation of a lineage. 
When O’Hara argues that the critic cannot write of influence upon Beckett 
because such writing must, if it is not to be simpleminded, be too complex, ‘modified’ 
and ‘temporized’, he shuts off one of the ways in which complexity itself in Beckett’s 
art might be grasped, an art that is so frequently and deeply characterised by 
complexity, even in its moments of stark minimalism. Beckett’s own creative 
impetuses are themselves ‘modified’ and ‘temporized’, indeed his works even make 
use of these two both as themes and as stylistic performances. Ignoring what is either 
‘modified’ or ‘temporized’ in Beckett’s works is to ignore fundamental aspects of 
                                                
87 Drabkin quoted in Field. Last accessed 1 May 2010. 
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these works. What is intriguing in the movement of Still’s narrated, what fits the 
nameless seated man into a ‘series’ of protagonists that includes the narrator/narrated 
of Comment c’est/How It Is before him, is that similarly to how Pim was ‘dumb limp 
lump flat’ waiting to be animated into something resembling life, the arm of this 
narrated too is that of a puppet’s.  
If we accept this assertion, that the arm of Still is in a sense the arm of a 
puppet, can we say that this description is wholly accounted for by describing it as ‘a 
return to the concerns of Geulincx and the occasionalists’, even when we invoke 
Beckett’s description of Geulincx’ ‘guignol world’? What really constitutes this 
‘return’? Why ‘return’ to anything like Geulincx or the occasionalists at all? The 
answer to these questions, I want to argue, lies with Beckett’s ‘fantasia’ having 
encountered, only shortly before Beckett wrote Still, something that would further 
modify and temporize it, that was at first sight other than itself. While this other might 
not be as seemingly alien as Beethoven’s chorus was to the previously exclusively 
instrumental form, it nevertheless altered any further manifestations of a Geulingian 
‘fantasia’ in the remainder of Beckett oeuvre. It is in part Heinrich von Kleist who 
prompts Beckett’s ‘return to the concerns’ of occasionalism. The puppetry of 
Geulincx does indeed ‘return’ in Beckett’s late works, but this is only once Beckett 
encountered Kleist’s writings on puppetry. The following discussion of this encounter 
and its manifestations in Beckett’s works beyond Still argues how encountering Kleist 
appears to have reinvigorated Beckett’s interest in a ‘guignol world’, making such an 
idea ‘fascinating’ and viable once again.  
 
6.8  Kleist 
 
Beckett’s interest in Kleist’s essay on puppetry and grace has long been known 
about, having first been brought to light by Knowlson in 1979, who then discussed it 
further in the biography of 1996.88 When Knowlson first reported Beckett’s interest in 
1979 he qualified the interest, yet this via stating its potential significance: 
 
                                                
88 See Knowlson & Pilling 1979, pp. 275- 285, and Knowlson 1996, pp. 569, 584, & 632-633. 
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If, on the little evidence available, there is no justification for speaking of actual 
influence, there is much common ground to be explored between Kleist’s essay 
and Beckett’s own ways of thinking about art, the theatre and life.89  
 
The theme of puppetry runs from Beckett’s earliest works. In ‘Love and Lethe’ the 
courting couple were likened to puppets: 
 
Like fantoccini controlled by a single wire they flung themselves down on the 
western slope of heath. From now on till the end there is something very secco 
and Punch and Judy about their proceedings,90 
 
Shortly after writing Murphy Beckett’s hope and simultaneous fear was that his 
protagonist was too little and thereby also too much a ‘puppet’. Murphy’s narrator 
had insisted that their star protagonist was distinguished from all other characters in 
the novel in regard to his self-determinism: 
 
All the other puppets in this book whinge sooner or later, except Murphy, who is 
not a puppet.91 
 
Yet Murphy’s self-determinism, manifesting in his refusing to search out a job, for 
example, and refusing to explain himself to curious onlookers such as Ticklepenny, 
comes with its own problems that can undermine the very distinction the narrator 
confers. Shortly after finishing the novel in July 1936 Beckett described Murphy’s 
apartness to MacGreevy, where he admitted its flaw: 
 
There seemed to me always the risk of taking him too seriously and separating 
him too sharply from the others. As it is I do not think the mistake (Aliohsa 
mistake) has been altogether avoided.92 
 
The reference to one of the brothers in Dostoevsky’s The Karamazov Brothers forms 
part of the admission that Murphy’s freedom, the thing that Murphy himself takes 
most seriously, separates him from the other puppets of the novel a little too baldly, 
and he thereby becomes a puppet of his creator who illustrates the importance of 
such a distinction. Also, The Unnamable’s narrator describes himself as being ‘in my 
                                                
89 Knowlson and Pilling 1979, p. 277. 
90 Beckett 1993, p. 100 (‘Fantoccini’ – ‘puppet’ or ‘doll’; ‘Secco’ – ‘dry’). 
91 Murphy, p. 78. 
92 Beckett to MacGreevy, 7 July 1936. CL, p. 350. 
 191 
Punch and Judy box’93. Yet while this list is not necessarily to describe a latent 
trajectory that reaches its logical terminus in the puppetry of the late works, the theme 
finds its most focussed and determining manifestations in certain late works, and 
there are a number of reasons for this distinction.  
Beckett’s interest in puppetry was revived and subsequently became further 
concretised following what appears to be a discovery datable to late 1969, and is owed 
somewhat to Bray. In a letter from Beckett to Bray dated ‘2.9.69’ Beckett mentions 
‘grace in the Kleistian sense’94, and in a further letter a month later he writes ‘Got the 
Kleist Marionetten theater [?] and other essays’95. On October 13 Beckett again 
mentions ‘Kleist’s marvelous essay on Marionetten theater with unforgettable 
anecdote of duel with bear. Other essays in book pall compared’96. It is well 
documented in their correspondence that Bray continually sent Beckett works to read, 
and this is what appears to have happened with Kleist. Further circumstantial 
evidence points the same way. Knowlson reports that in late 1969 Beckett went 
looking for Kleist’s memorial at Wannsee (which he could not find, returning later 
with an unnamed friend), and it is not long after the series of correspondence with 
Bray in 1969 that Beckett mentions Kleist on a number of occasions. In 1971 during 
rehearsals for Happy Days at the Schiller-Theater Beckett was apparently trying to 
imbue Winnie with a sense of ‘grace in the Kleistian sense’, as Knowlson describes: 
 
He was anxious to ensure that all of Winnie’s movements should be as crisp, 
precise and economical as possible. He argued that precision and economy 
would produce the maximum of grace, quoting Kleist’s essay on the 
Marrionetten theatre to reinforce his argument.97 
 
Five years later, in 1976, this after the particular take on puppet-movement had been 
focused in Still, Beckett again referred Knowlson and Ronald Pickup to Kleist’s essay. 
According to Knowlson, Beckett used the essay to ‘illustrate what he said about the 
relations between economy and the grace and harmony that he wanted to see in the 
movements of the protagonist of Ghost Trio’98.  
                                                
93 TN, p. 342. 
94 Beckett to Bray, 2 September 1969. TCD MS 10948/1/432. 
95 Beckett to Bray, 3 October 1969. TCD MS 10948/1/440. 
96 Beckett to Bray, 13 October 1969. TCD MS 10948/1/443. 
97 Knowlson 1996, p. 584. 
98 Knowlson 1996, p. 632. 
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Kleist’s Über das Marionettentheater (1810) describes the marionettes of 
puppet-theatre as embodying a state of grace unattainable in a human world of self-
consciousness. In a fictional dialogue between two men in a public park narrated in 
the past tense by one of the interlocutors, Kleist uses a number of examples to argue 
that self-consciousness erases ‘grace’ via knowledge of that very grace. In one such 
example a ‘young acquaintance of mine had lost his innocence before my very eyes’99, 
when an attractive youth of about fifteen, who had started to show ‘faintly the first 
traces of vanity, a product of the favour shown him by women’, was informed how he 
resembled a well-known statue in one particular movement he made while putting his 
foot on a stool. The youth had apparently just been noting to himself this same 
resemblance, and the coincidence flattered his burgeoning vanity. Yet as he tried to 
replicate the movement in a mirror, to witness it a second time, his movements that 
had once manifest as selfless grace became grossly comic as his consciousness of the 
movement prevented him from actually attaining it, even as it taunted him with its 
proximity. Over the following year the boy’s attractiveness entirely dissipated. A 
similar story involves the ‘fencing bear’, where Kleist tells of a bear (a paradigm 
implicitly lacking human self-consciousness) that could fence better than any human 
because it would never be fooled by feints of a sword, responding only to genuine 
thrusts which it could successfully parry. Marionettes, according to Kleist, embody 
the state of grace that was in the boy before his fall, and in the fighting bear that 
would respond only to the real. Kleist’s logical conclusion is that puppetry or non-
human consciousness affirms the state of grace that humanity’s self-consciousness 
denies. It is a conclusion that is comparable and compatible for Beckett with 
Geulincx’ so-called ‘guignol world’, a world in which all is puppetry because all is 
dependent on God.  
According to Geulincx humanity lacks knowledge of how it does things, of 
how it is connected to the world around it, yet it is connected to the world around it 
via its ‘Pater ineffabilis’100 [‘ineffable Father’101]. There is, however, an important 
distinction between Kleist’s and Geulincx’ conceptions of being tied to a world. 
Humanity for Geulincx is still capable of an awareness of the fact of its being tied, of 
                                                
99 Kleist 1978, p. 1211. 
100 TCD MS 10971/6/5r. 
101 Metaphysics, p. 97. 
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its incapacity, even though it cannot alter its fate, whereas no puppet is capable of 
attaining this awareness of its own state. Indeed it is precisely such lack of awareness 
that defines it, for Kleist, as the embodiment of grace. A Geulingian ‘guignol world’, 
then, is potentially a much crueller affair that that of the ‘Kleistian’ puppet-world, a 
world in which puppets enact grace as a lack of self-consciousness. There is in 
Geulincx’ ‘guignol world’ a comparable impotence and dependence to that of Kleist’s 
conception of puppetry. There is also, however, self-consciousness – the capacity for 
an awareness of one’s being tied if not a capacity for breaking ties. It is awareness of 
these ties that motivates Geulincx’ occasionalist ethics, that prompts the axiom. 
According to Geulincx, God (as Beckett noted from Metaphysics) is ‘The Author of 
this union’102 between humanity and the world, and ‘neither we, nor our bodies, nor 
anything else, can move something without the cooperation of Him who is the author 
of motion’103. Any motion we experience is only thanks to God’s use of it ‘as an 
instrument to engender various thoughts in our mind’104. These ‘thoughts in our mind’ 
are what distinguishes Geulincx’ puppetry from Kleist’s. The basic difference 
between the two conceptions is one of a kind of suffering. Both Kleist’s and Geulincx’ 
puppets are dependent on an external authority for anything to happen. But with an 
awareness of being tied, Geulincx’ puppets are subjected to perceiving their 
enslavement, which no Kleistian puppet has to suffer. The ‘grace’ of Kleist’s puppets 
is one of blissful ignorance.  
Perhaps something like this distinction accounts for Beckett’s description of 
Geulincx’ world as specifically ‘guignol’, a world as not just puppet-like. Beckett may 
have had in mind the Parisian Théâtre du Grand-Guignol, a theatre famous in the early 
part of the twentieth century for its displays of cruelty and violence, its name for a 
time even becoming shorthand for such performances.105 Combining the two puppet-
                                                
102 Metaphysics, p. 94. Cf. TCD MS 10971/6/5r. 
103 Metaphysics, p. 100. Cf. TCD MS 10971/6/5r. 
104 Metaphysics, p. 105. Cf. TCD MS 10971/6/5v. 
105 The Théâtre du Grand-Guignol was founded in 1897, and had its heydays (under various directors) 
in the first three decades of the twentieth century prior to its being taken over in 1930 by Jack Jouvin. 
After the war the theatre declined until its eventually closure in 1962. ‘Nous n’aurions pas pu 
concurrencer Buchenwald’ [We could not compete with Buchenwald] (quoted in Pierron 1995, p. 
XXXIV) was the assessment of Charles Nonon, the theatre’s final director, on why the post-war 
audience had less appetite for fictional visceral horror. There were, however, also accusations of 
wartime collaboration levelled at the theatre. For a history of the theatre, see Hand & Wilson 2002. 
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worlds of Kleist and Geulincx would provide Beckett with a single world of both 
grace and cruelty at one and the same time.  
Kleist and the marionette theatre therefore illustrate a shift in Beckett’s 
working parameters comparable to that ascribed earlier to ‘pruritus’. As with 
‘pruritus’ we know Beckett had at times a more, and at times a less, explicit concern 
with puppets and puppetry. Most specifically Beckett is concerned with how puppets 
and puppetry might function as framing imagery for a novelist’s fictional character, or 
‘vice-exister’106 as The Unnamable also calls it, and a character’s relations to their 
author. At times, as in The Unnamable’s reference to Punch and Judy, such concern 
might bear little apparent relation to anything involving Geulincx. At others, however, 
the relation between Beckett’s tropes of puppetry and his interest in Geulincx might 
be argued to be stronger. To clarify such relations, before turning to how Kleist and 
Geulincx interact in the later works Ghost Trio and Nacht und Träume, I look at Act 
Without Words 1 in order to argue that any later utilisation of the tropes of puppetry 
is best thought of as a modification of earlier such deployments, earlier deployments 
that can be seen to bear comparison with Geulincx.  
 
6.9  Staging the ‘happy ones’ – Act Without Words 1 
 
Because Beckett’s first encounter with Kleist appears to have occurred in late 1969 it 
can be confidently asserted that Kleist’s ideas of puppet-grace had no bearing on 
Beckett’s composing Act Without Words 1, written in 1956. In contrast, what does 
impact on this earlier piece as regarding puppetry and mime, is Geulincx, but 
Geulincx filtered through the theme of insatiable need that is manifested in Watt in 
an implicit fracturing of the ethical axiom. In summary, in Act Without Words 1 
Beckett puts in play one of Arsene’s ‘happy ones’, one of those who would always 
need in precisely the place where they could not satisfy that need, and the visual 
vocabulary through which Beckett stages this is that of puppetry, where the man 
onstage is treated by an offstage taunting authority as if he were a puppet of that 
authority’s cruel whims. 
                                                
106 TN, p. 317. 
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Seen in the context of Arsene’s statement in Watt, according to which ‘The 
glutton castaway, the drunkard in the desert, the lecher in prison, they are the happy 
ones’, Act Without Words 1 might then be seen as more than a self-contained work of 
‘obvious allegory’107 as Ackerley and Gontarski describe it, or ‘too obvious and pat’108 
as Ihab Hassan wrote. Cohn has similarly described the piece as instantiating 
‘slapstick comedy at the cosmological level, and the meaning is almost too explicit’,109 
with Gontarski summarising how critics are frequently embarrassed by the mime’s 
apparent ‘directness’110. Situating the play in a lineage of imagery that takes a cue from 
Arsene’s statement, however, makes it possible to see that the idea of need that is 
central to Act Without Words 1 is threaded with an aesthetic of impotence and 
desperation traceable to Beckett’s fracturing of Geulincx’ ethical axiom in Watt. 
Given such an inflection, this unnamed man in the desert can be seen as less a 
straightforward image of generalised humanity, what we might take Beckett’s own 
description of him as ‘human meat – or bones’111 to mean. Not even an all-too-neat 
allegory of Existentialism (as Gontarski argues as a way of redeeming the play’s 
torture-farce elements and its theme of freedom and enslavement), the mime can be 
seen, in light of Geulincx’ importance for Watt, as a fragmentary shard of the 
complications and complicities inherent in Beckett’s analects of philosophical 
imagery. As we have seen, Beckett uses the phrase ‘guignol world’ to describe 
Geulincx’ world on 28 November 1956, which was very close to when he was working 
on the play he described to Alan Schneider on October 15 1956 as ‘the desert 
mime’112. Beckett, then, had guignol worlds very much at the forefront of his mind in 
late 1956.  
In the short mime a man in a desert is continually taunted with temptations to 
his needs by the shade and non-shade of a contrary palm tree, and by ‘a tiny carafe, to 
                                                
107 Ackerley and Gontarski (eds.) 2006, p. 3. 
108 Hassan 1967, p. 192. 
109 Cohn 1962, p. 247. 
110 Gontarski 1993, p. 29. Gontarski summarises previous critical embarrassment prior to his 
existentialist reading of the rebellion implicit in the protagonist’s ‘cutting of the umbilical rope’ 
(Gontarski 1993, p. 32), a reading according to which the play reveals that ‘Man, in a frenzy of 
(in)activity, is born – free’ (Gontarski 1993, p. 32). Gontarski is thereby one of the few dissenting 
critics in his offering an affirmative appraisal of the play. 
111 Gontarski 1993, p. 31. 
112 Beckett to Schneider 15 October 1956. Cited in Harmon (ed.) 1998, p. 12. 
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which is attached a huge label inscribed WATER’113, hung out for him by an unseen 
offstage figure. The man is taunted in a world in which he appears as a puppet of his 
invisible and unaccountable torturer. It is not, however, simply a master/slave 
dynamic between the separated non-pseudo-couple (the man onstage vs. the authority 
invisible offstage) that situates the play within a ‘guignol world’. More specifically, the 
man’s suffering is manifested in the visual language of that of a puppet. This mime 
employs less a choreography redolent of music-hall slapstick, as much of the later 
comedy in Beckett’s theatre arguably references, and relies instead on a figure ‘dumb’ 
and ‘limp’, as Pim is in Comment c’est/How It Is, a figure of a puppet quickened by 
the invisible unnamed (‘ineffable’) figure offstage. 
The man enters the stage ‘flung backwards’, is whistled back offstage and is 
flung back on again twice before he ‘hesitates, thinks better of it, halts, turns aside, 
reflects’114. The whistle continues to direct his action, calling his attention to objects or 
locations on stage. It makes him aware of the palm, carafe, the scissors and cubes. But 
it is perhaps the ropes of the play that most forcefully illustrate him as puppet. The 
text does not specify how any of the objects should be lowered, only stating a rope 
when one is dropped for the man to climb up (the ‘umbilical rope’115, as Gontarski 
describes it), which he then cuts with the scissors. Yet the practicalities of 
performance dictate that objects would be lowered either by rope or some other kind 
of thread, amenable to being hoisted slower or more quickly as the text specifies. 
Such ties are akin to those of a puppet, and as the man reaches up to the carafe of 
water, bundles cubes on each other and falls off them trying to reach skywards, his 
movements appear as those of a marionette. Though, importantly, a marionette 
separated from his puppeteer. As the water is lowered so the man raises his hands, 
and as the cubes are deposited so he goes to them. He is brought ‘hither’ to act ‘here’ 
just as for Geulincx God brings humanity into the world to act here, connected 
invisibly and conducted entirely at the mercy of this unknowable, unspeakable, 
‘ineffable’ authority.  
Yet there is self-consciousness to this puppet, an awareness of his impotence. 
The puppet-like man is continually preoccupied with his own hands. He looks at 
                                                
113 CDW, p. 204. 
114 CDW, p. 203. 
115 Gontarski 1993, p. 32. 
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them at the beginning of the play, cuts his fingernails part way through the play, and 
in his final gesture prior to the curtain ‘He looks at his hands’116 again. This is a man 
decidedly in a world where his own instruments of capacity are no use. They cannot 
prevent his being tortured, however much he might rebel, and as the play progresses 
his frustration turns to disillusion. As the man stares at his own impotent hands while 
the curtain falls the effect is one of witnessing his implicitly asking similar questions to 
those asked by Geulincx of his ‘guignol world’: 
 
Why do so many and such great calamities conspire against me? Have I offended 
God in some way? […] Thrust into a body as if into a prison, am I paying the 
penalties that I have deserved, and among others this grave one, that I am 
oblivious of the offence that I am expiating?117 
 
This 1956 mime and Geulincx’ sideways relevance to it mean that Beckett’s later focus 
on puppetry and the grace of movement in the physicality of characters on stage and 
screen cannot solely be ascribed to his encountering Kleist. What is more fruitful is 
the attempt to reveal how Kleist impacts on these elements of Beckett’s work that 
were previously, as is the case with Act Without Words 1, marginal or perhaps distant 
relations of his interest in Geulincx. In the late television plays Beckett explores other 
guignol worlds beyond that of Still in works that increasingly invoke formality as a 
way to dispel self-consciousness, seeking to enact Beckett’s own form of Kleistian 
‘grace’ as infiltrated by a Geulingian puppet-like impotence, as one of suffering and 
self-consciousness. 
 
6.10 ‘Chamber Telly’118 as ‘guignol world’ 
 
Although Beckett had referred to Kleist while rehearsing Happy Days in 1971 
in relation to Winnie’s ‘economy’ of movement, it is his reference five years later when 
rehearsing Ghost Trio that more pointedly reveals the late period interests in 
puppetry, a reference recorded by Knowlson: 
                                                
116 CDW, p. 206. 
117 Ethics, p. 351. 
118 Beckett to Bray, 24 January 1976, TCD MS 10948/1/599. Whilst Beckett had said ‘Possible title for 
TV piece: TRYST’ (Beckett to Bray, 16 January 1976, TCD MS 10948/1/597), and he had given the 
piece this title in its manuscript (UoR MS 1519/1) before changing it to Ghost Trio, ‘Chamber Telly’ 
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MS 10948/1/599). 
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Beckett applied Kleist’s two examples to the figure in Ghost Trio as he moves to 
the window or the door, or looks up from the pallet to the mirror. From the two 
different kinds of movement in the play, one sustained, economical and flowing, 
the other abrupt and jerky, as F ‘thinks he hears her’, it is as if Beckett’s figure is 
poised midway between two worlds. For his ‘man in a room’ is still, in spite of 
everything, a creature bound to the world of matter, not quite the still-life figure 
that at moments he appears to be.119 
 
In another article on Ghost Trio Knowlson makes further parallels between the two 
types of movement of the protagonist F and Kleist’s puppets, pointing out that the 
lack of footfalls heard when F walks reflects Kleist’s ideas that puppets do not need to 
feel or rebel against the force of gravity. Kleist’s argument is that ‘puppets need the 
floor only to touch and enliven the swing of their limbs by momentarily retarding 
their action’120. Similarly, when the bodiless female voice V says of F that he will ‘now 
think he hears her’121, Knowlson points out of the sudden movements in a particular 
production that in ‘Beckett’s German production, this raising of the hand is even 
more abrupt and puppet-like than in the BBC version’122. 
An early manuscript version of Ghost Trio stipulates that F ‘moves bowed 
through space with no visible propulsion’123, a direction Ackerley describes as giving 
‘an incorporeal or immaterial quality to his actions’124. Such movement of F is perhaps 
one reason he might himself be considered one of the Trio of ghosts (along with V 
and the briefly appearing boy). Yet the trio, as Cohn notes, might also refer to 
Beckett’s own ‘three instruments – Beethoven’s Largo, a woman’s voice, and a camera 
eye. “Trio” may also embrace the play’s […] three movements, or its three positions’. 
As argued above, Beckett’s tripartite structuring of Comment c’est/How It Is maps 
onto the structure of a human life as described by Geulincx. This movement of ‘no 
visible propulsion’ is also, as well as being ephemeral, a form of puppet-like 
movement. It is the gliding ‘grace’ of a marionette unfixed to the floor. Consequently, 
we can say that the two types of movement in Ghost Trio, the jerky sudden surprise 
and the premeditated slow and steady repetition, are both puppet-like movements. 
                                                
119 Knowlson 1996, p. 633. 
120 Quoted by Knowlson 1986, p. 197. 
121 CDW, p. 410. 
122 Knowlson 1986, p. 196. 
123 UoR MS 1519/1. Cited by Ackerley 2009, p. 144. 
124 Ackerley 2009, p. 144. 
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The protagonist of Ghost Trio is confined within the bounds of puppetry even while 
they might appear to rebel against them, as was also the case for the protagonist of Act 
Without Words 1. As Cohn describes, there may be a ‘cue to rebellion’125 in V’s ‘Ah!’ 
when F declines her instruction, but as is implied by Knowlson in whichever of the 
two types of action F pursues, ghostly steadiness ‘with no visible propulsion’ or jerky, 
seemingly spontaneous, rebellion, each is subject to its own kind of limitations. The 
‘guignol world’ of Ghost Trio, then, is one in which rebellion too is a form of 
puppetry. It was in order to illustrate just such a thesis of thoroughgoing constraint 
and limitation that Geulincx contrived the analogy of the traveller on the ship. 
According to this image as Geulincx presents it, the will of the ineffable other might 
be resisted, but this resistance is futile because it opposes itself to what cannot be 
influenced.  
  
6.11  Nacht und Träume 
 
Whereas Beckett had considered using Schubert’s music in what became 
Ghost Trio,126 he went further with his final television piece, borrowing the name from 
the Schubert Lied as title. The title, however, is far from the only aspect of Nacht und 
Träume that makes real an idea Beckett had in mind much earlier than the play’s 
actual process of composition. As Cohn details, a number of the late television pieces 
found newly viable forms for earlier ideas. Just as ‘Quad successfully negotiated the 
geometries of the abandoned “J.M. Mime” of 1962, so Nacht und Träume successfully 
enfolds the dream of the abandoned Mime du rêveur A of 1954’127. The 1982 work 
eschews the comedy of the earlier protagonist (A) injecting himself with a ‘seringue de 
sa fesse’128 [syringe in his buttocks], and A’s clumsily burning himself with a match 
used for both sight and the needle’s sterilisation. The Pavlovian narrative of education 
as serial punishment inhering in A’s dealings with the match would be utilised two 
years later in Act Without Words 1. Nacht und Träume does, however, return to the 
broader device of staging, here filming, a mime within a mime as a dream (the 
                                                
125 Cohn 2001, p. 338. 
126 See TCD MS 10948/1/498 (Beckett to Bray, 22 January 1976) where Beckett writes he had been 
thinking of using a ‘Schubert quartet I hope’ for what became Ghost Trio, but he did not know which. 
127 Cohn 2001, p. 374. 
128 UoR MS 1227/7/16/1 fol.2. Cited in Gontarski 1985, p. 196. 
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hypodiegetic dream of 1954’s Mime du rêveur A remaining unwritten). It is the 
fleeting dream existence of Nacht und Träume that is this work’s ‘guignol world’, 
forming as it does another minor turn in Beckett’s Geulingian ‘literary fantasia’.  
Nacht und Träume brings in from off-screen an aspect of the multifarious off-
stage/off-screen identities that in Act Without Words 1 was the taunting faceless force 
offering temptations, in Act Without Words 2 prompts the figures from their 
slumbering in sacks with a ‘goad’129, and in Ghost Trio was the dislocated V. In Nacht 
und Träume such a mysterious and ‘ineffable’ figure manifests synecdochically as the 
hands offering comfort. The hands come into the frame when the protagonist (A) 
dreams ‘His dreamt self (B)’. They place a Benedictine assurance on the brow of the 
dreamer and wipe his mouth after offering a cup. As A dreams of himself receiving 
these comforts he thereby gives himself up to a guignol world where his rest, his 
momentary stasis, his stillness, relies on this external authority, this authority of a 
disembodied pair of hands. In one of the most striking puppet-like images in this 
piece, in Süddeutscher Rundfunk’s production when L (the left hand) places itself on 
B’s head and B wakes within the dream, L then moves gently back and as it takes itself 
away from B’s head the synchronicity between the removing hand and A’s rising head 
has all the looks of a hand pulling back the puppet-head of B with invisible strings. In 
the text this movement is rendered only as ‘B raises his head, L withdraws and 
disappears’130. Yet on screen, as Knowlson observed of Geister Trio, the puppet-like 
motion of those in the play is much more pronounced. This invisible force with which 
L pulls back the head of A works as a subtle streak of menace against the images of 
benediction.  
Themes of power and impotence are thereby inscribed in the play’s dream 
within a dream structure. A remains himself even in this dream where he becomes B. 
That is, he dreams himself to be the same person who is in need of such relief, and as 
such is not free from the needs from which he suffers. In a revealing letter to Reinhart 
Müller-Freienfels (who commissioned the play) Beckett responded to a question 
about whether the dreamer and his dreamt self could be played by two different 
actors: 
 
                                                
129 CDW, p. 210. 
130 CDW, p. 465. 
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The dreamer’s face is virtually invisible. Head resemblance alone is enough. So 
by all means 2 separate performers for the dreamer and his dreamt self. The more 
so as he may be supposed to dream himself somewhat other than he is.131 
 
The dreamer’s dreamt self could appear different, but not entirely distinct. He must 
be a version of himself in his moment of relief. Even though he is stilled, paused in 
one of Beckett’s many ‘moments’ for comfort, he is ‘still’ himself needing this relief, 
relief that is conveyed through the hands. As the off-screen authority was in Ghost 
Trio, in Nacht und Träume this is a thoroughgoing authority. It does not offer any 
substantial relief from the state of affairs in which it is needed other than further 
dependence upon its own temporary cures.  
Grayley Herren argues, as does Ulrika Maude, for the centrality of this play’s 
technological aspects in any critical assessment of it. Herren names these 
technological aspects the play’s ‘formal tensions’, a move similar to Albright’s, who 
describes Beckett’s exploration of the limits of a particular mode of technology as his 
‘extraordinary doting on technique’132. Herren writes that ‘Nacht und Träume’s formal 
tensions undermine its superficial harmonies, offering the manipulative powers of art 
as the only enduring consolation’133. Herren points out that the dream in Nacht und 
Träume happens when called to happen by A. B is thereby, according to Herren, an 
artistic creation of A. Herren’s conclusion is also similar to Albright’s. It is the artistic 
act of making rather than anything resulting from this that redeems the doomed 
attempt to make. Yet perhaps the neatness of such a consolatory conclusion might 
make us wary of its effectiveness. 
A ‘guignol world’ as a place of self-created temporary restfulness, of 
momentary stillness, such as is dreamt by A in Nacht und Träume, brings us back to 
Murphy. For Murphy also sought, or rather surrendered himself to in his bondage 
enabling self-inspection in his chair, a temporary relief in a trance-like version of 
himself. For both Murphy and A, for the former explicitly so and for the latter 
implicitly, Geulincx’ ethical occasionalism is ‘not enough’ as a means of finding a 
freedom that is not also dependence and subservience. This is the truer ‘manipulative’ 
element to A’s dreaming of B. B has a powerful hold over A such that A is a puppet of 
                                                
131 Beckett to Müller-Freienfels, 5 August 1982. Cited in Maude 2009, p. 129. 
132 Albright 2003, p. 3. 
133 Herren 2000, p. 186. 
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B. He is the manifestation not of A’s freedom, but rather of his enslavement. 
However, B in his turn is the puppet of the disembodied hands. Nacht und Träume, 
then, far from offering a play of consolation and religious relief, implicates a series of 
dependence and subservience in a guignol world not unlike that of the series in 
Comment c’est/How It Is. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
It is perhaps fitting that the end of Beckett’s ‘fantasia’ is reached with discussion of an 
explicitly musical work, Nacht und Träume. That Beckett told Harvey ‘painting and 
music have so much better a chance’1 than his own usual medium, in one of a number 
of places where Beckett pointed to the importance of music for literature, should keep 
readers alert to the viability of a musical vocabulary brought to bear on Beckett. The 
‘fantasia’ that has been argued for here is one we must necessarily see with hindsight. 
It derives from a musical term presumably never intended by Beckett as a direct 
description of his prose, whether or not he ever meant the term to apply to a planned 
monograph for Coffey. Yet it is more than an easy convenience that this musical term 
should be co-opted into a discussion of Beckett’s oeuvre. The term, so immediately 
alien to Beckett’s oeuvre of starkness and minimalism, nonetheless allows a critical 
tracking and tracing of change, incorporation, and progressive vision through the 
works that brings Geulincx, as a single strain of influence and confluence among 
many, clearly into view.  
 There was never any reason to expect, in a body of work so changed as 
Beckett’s between 1936 and 1982, that Geulincx would be a fixed and stable point of 
reference for Beckett. The foregoing stays close to identifiable moments at which 
Geulincx breaks to the surface of Beckett’s often strict and unyielding prose, revealing 
Geulincx’ latent, though sometimes explicit, presence in works well beyond what is 
traditionally ‘the most Geulincxian of the works’, Murphy. Yet throughout these 
various reasserted recurrences Geulincx in Beckett retains something of a residue of 
freedom memorialised, freedom both remembered and buried. Geulincx provides a 
way of reading across Beckett’s shifting ‘series’ that maps the contours of a 
determinedly changeable aesthetic while never reducing such contours to a definitive, 
neat, single shape. The trajectory that traces a progression from the explicit to the 
implicit, from the thematic to the performative or even the realist to the abstract 
through Beckett’s oeuvre is a familiar, yet nevertheless fascinating one. While the 
‘moments’ at which Geulincx is asserted through fragmentary allusion or citation 
                                                
1 Harvey 1970, p. 249. 
 204 
predominantly adhere to such a coherent trajectory, it is hoped that the foregoing 
analysis also points to those moments at which the residual, remembered en-graved 
presence of Geulincx complicates or confounds the neatness with which one might, 
with hindsight, fix Beckett as simply working through and then beyond the struggles 
he determinedly set himself as a young man. In a body of work so concerned with 
memory, obligation and futile or entropic emancipation, the remembered, 
memorialised presence of one who promised so much strange and complex freedom 
such as Geulincx is deferred to at the same time it is critiqued even in Beckett’s very 
late years. Geulincx’ presence remains through Beckett’s great realisation that ‘all I 
am is feeling’2, to become one of few philosophical figures of feeling in the middle to 
later period works, a figure of both affection and obligatione. 
There is also little wonder in the fact that Beckett was so drawn to Geulincx’ 
slave on the ship. For not only is the slave an image of metaphysics and of ethics, he 
also figures as an image of the creative act as one of momentary relief, futile yet 
determined. As Geulincx wrote and Beckett transcribed, ‘Every analogy is lame,’3 
though Beckett nevertheless used one to describe the artistic will to go on that 
parallels the constrained freedom of the onboard slave:  
 
‘What do you do,’ Beckett once asked, ‘when “I can’t” meets “I must”’; and he 
compared himself to a man ‘on his knees, head against the wall – more like a cliff 
– with someone saying “go on” – Well, the wall will have to move a little, that’s 
all.’4 
 
For Geulincx ‘I can’t’ also meets ‘I must’. While the ethical axiom counsels 
abstention, his pragmatic realisation was that one must act in the world even if one 
cannot. When the then little-known writer encountered the little-known philosopher 
in 1936 the kinship and admiration Beckett felt is palpable in his correspondence. His 
moving away from thoroughgoing enthusiasm and indebtedness over the following 
decades was itself only a matter of going so far within limited bounds, within self-
imposed constraints. The difficulties and necessities of this manoeuvring produce 
Beckett’s ‘literary fantasia’ as itself a philosophically ethical one of incapacity and 
obligation. 
                                                
2 Graver and Federman (eds.) 1979, p. 240. 
3 Ethics, p. 323. 
4 Graver and Federman (eds.) 1979, p. 29. 
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